How the brave bpk died. Dembel album

In the 60s, our fleet was replenished with a series of large anti-submarine ships (BOD) of project 61. With a standard displacement of 3500 tons, they became the world's first large warships equipped with gas turbine power plants. For the characteristic sound of the operation of these installations, the sailors nicknamed the BOD of this project “singing frigates”. Most of them became part of the Black Sea Fleet. Among these was the BOD “Brave”.

On the morning of August 30, 1974, the Courageous BOD left the Northern Bay of Sevastopol and headed to the sea for firing practice with anti-aircraft missiles. Already at the site of the exercises, in preparation for firing at 10:02 a.m., in the aft cellar of 16 anti-aircraft missiles, the sustainer engine of one of them spontaneously started, then the starting engine of another missile worked, after which the rest of the Volna anti-aircraft missiles stored there exploded. The shock wave tore off the roof of the aft superstructure along with the launcher for these missiles, destroyed the transverse bulkheads and tore the ship's hull in several places. Through the cracks formed, water began to flow, quickly filling 4 compartments. After 8 minutes, the roll of the ship to starboard reached 12 degrees. A fire broke out on the stern that settled into the water by 1.5 meters. By 11 o'clock, large missile ships (BRK) "Troubled" and "Conscious" approached the scene of the tragedy, which landed emergency rescue teams on the "Courageous", and then unsuccessfully tried to take it in tow. After 12 hours, the same type of BOD Komsomolets Ukrainy came to their aid, and at 13 hours 25 minutes - two rescue ships. All of them tried to shoot down the fire with water jets in the area of the aft storage of aviation fuel and the ship's helicopter ammunition, but soon they were forced to retreat due to heavy fire. Due to the threat of new explosions, a torpedo tube was deployed on the Courageous and all five torpedoes were fired overboard.

At 1445 hours, despite all efforts to fight the fire, the aft cellar with aviation depth charges and jet fuel exploded. 2 more compartments were flooded, the ship plunged into the water to the aft tower, and the list reached 28 degrees. At 15:03, an order was given to leave the ship, and its crew with rescue teams moved to other ships. Soon, the BOD almost vertically, stern down, began to go under water. The depth of the sea in this place was 125 m, so when the stern of the 144-meter ship touched the bottom, its sinking slowed down. The bow part rose above the surface of the sea for several minutes, then it abruptly went under the water. It happened at 15 hours 57 minutes, 40 km from the Chersonese lighthouse at a point with coordinates 44 ° 44 'N. and 32° 59’ E 24 people died (including 5 cadets). 26 sailors were injured and burned.

Later, technical documentation, as well as parts of equipment and weapons with a total weight of about 40 tons, were raised to the surface from the Brave, and in December 1977 the BOD hull was blown up. The death of the ship made it necessary to speed up work to improve the fire safety of ammunition depots. The results were not slow to affect: when in 1984 a similar accident occurred in the bow cellar of the Volna-M air defense system of another BOD of the Black Sea Fleet, the ship did not receive significant damage.

In Sevastopol, on the territory of the Communards cemetery, you can find a small, modest monument. It is located between the mass grave of the crew of the battleship Novorossiysk and the monument to Lieutenant P.P. Schmidt. The inscription carved on the marble monument says: "To the sailors of the Courageous, who died in the line of military duty in August 1974." It also contains a list of 24 names of the dead sailors. You won’t be able to get more information from this monument; in the USSR, they preferred not to particularly spread about the death of this ship.

BOD "Brave"

The large anti-submarine ship "Courageous" was included in the fleet on January 25, 1966 and for its enough short life managed to make 7 military campaigns. From June 5 to June 30, 1967, the ship carried out a combat mission to assist the Egyptian armed forces and visited Port Said. In 1968-69, the Courageous BOD passed Maintenance at the 61st plant in Nikolaev, during which its missile armament was modernized. Since 1969, the captain of the 3rd rank Ivan Petrovich Vinnik was appointed the captain of the ship.

In 1970, the BOD was declared an excellent ship of the Black Sea Fleet, took part in the Ocean maneuvers, went to the coast of Cuba and the Atlantic. In 1972-1973, the ship underwent another eight-month repair at the docks of Sevastopol. As part of a detachment of ships of Rear Admiral L. Ya. Vasyukov, the BOD "Valiant" paid friendly visits to the ports of Italy - Taranto and Messina. The last combat campaign of the ship in the Mediterranean took place from November 10, 1973 to March 6, 1974. "Brave" was part of the 70th brigade of anti-submarine ships.

BOD "Very" belonged to the ships of the project 61 type "Komsomolets of Ukraine" (according to NATO codification - Kashin). It was a type of large anti-submarine ships that were in service with the Soviet Navy from 1964 to 1991, and were subsequently in service with the Russian Navy. In 2012, only 1 ship of this type remained in the Black Sea Fleet of Russia - the Smetlivy SKR. It remained the only ship of the 20 ships of the project that managed to enter the fleet of the USSR from 1962 to 1973. The remaining 18 ships were decommissioned and dismantled for metal, another one - BOD "Brave" - sank.

The standard displacement of ships of this type was 3500-3700 tons, the maximum displacement was 4500-4750 tons. Modernized ships have 3950/4900 tons, respectively. Hull dimensions: length - 144 m (modernized - 147 m), width - 15.8 m, draft - 4.8 m (up to 6 m). 4 gas turbines with a total capacity of 94,000 hp worked on 2 screws, providing the ship with a maximum speed of 36-38 knots. The cruising range at a speed of 20 knots was 4,000 nautical miles. The ship could accommodate the Ka-25 anti-submarine helicopter. The BOD provided for the storage of 5 tons of aviation kerosene, as well as ammunition for a helicopter (depth charges, anti-submarine torpedoes, sonar buoys). Due to the lack of a hangar on the ship, the helicopter could only be temporarily placed on it.

The armament complex of the new ship could be called innovative. For the first time in Soviet shipbuilding, the BOD received 2 M-1 Volna air defense systems. Each anti-aircraft missile system was a two-beam launcher ZIF-101, a store with 2 rotating drums for 8 V-600 missiles each and a Yatagan control system. The artillery armament included 2 twin 76-mm AK-726 turret artillery mounts (rate of fire 90 rds / min., Maximum firing range 13 km., Reach in height - 9 km., Ammunition of each mount consisted of 2400 unitary shots). In addition, the 2nd Turret fire control system was present on the ship, the ship was equipped with a PTA-53-61 five-tube torpedo tube for 53-57 or SET-53 torpedoes and had 2 RBU-1000 and RBU-6000 jet bombers (ammunition load 48 RSL-10 and 192 RSL-60, respectively).

All ships of this project had advanced radar weapons and hydroacoustics, as well as excellent seaworthiness and maneuverability. These ships were distinguished by their remarkable appearance and architecture.

From August 4 to August 7, 1974, the Otvazhny BOD took part in the regular exercises of the fleet, and from August 27, the ship was to become the flagship command ship during the 2nd stage of the exercises. BOD "Brave" was supposed to ensure the firing of small missile ships, as well as take part in anti-submarine exercises with torpedo firing. On August 29, 1974, the ship under the control of Captain 2nd Rank I.P. Vinnik went to the open sea and successfully conducted torpedo firing. At dawn on August 30, the BOD embarked on a raid in Streletskaya Bay in order to take on board Rear Admiral V. Kh. Sahakyan, the chief of staff of the KChF, as well as a group of senior fleet officers. On this day, the ship was supposed to provide anti-aircraft fire from small missile ships at a training ground near Cape Khersones. At 9:55 in the morning, the ship arrived at the training ground, and a combat training alert was announced on it.

Just 3 minutes later, at 0958, a slight shaking of the ship was felt on the bridge, as if a small explosion had occurred in its stern. After that, the machines were immediately stopped, an emergency and combat alarm was announced on the ship. 10 seconds after the first, a stronger explosion shook the ship, a sheaf of flame and a clearly visible cap of white smoke appeared behind the stern pipe. After another 20 seconds, there was a third explosion, which occurred in the area of missile cellar No. 8. Above the site of the explosion, a column of flame rose and poured thick black smoke. The explosion was so strong that it tore off the cellar lid and, together with the launchers of anti-aircraft missiles, threw it onto the aft chimney. After that, a strong fire began in this area of the BOD, and the personnel of the ship began to fight for unsinkability and survivability.

As it was subsequently found out, the following happened: after a combat training alert was announced on the ship, the midshipman, who was at the control panel of the missile control post of the aft cellar No. 8, in which 15 V-601 missiles were stored in 2 vertical drums in combat condition, acting in accordance with the instructions , ordered the sailors on duty to connect an external power supply. After that, he turned the toggle switches on the power supply panel to the “on” position. Immediately after the click of the last toggle switch, he saw through the porthole a fairly strong sheaf of flame on the left drum. Without launching fire extinguishing equipment, the midshipman left his combat post and rushed along the corridor to the bow of the ship, where he was overtaken by a strong explosion, the blast wave of which threw him aside.

In the course of the investigation, it was possible to establish that exactly 18 seconds had passed from the moment the fire appeared in cellar No. 8 to the moment of a strong explosion. Subsequently, it was found that the fire in the cellar appeared due to the spontaneous activation of the main engine of one of the anti-aircraft missiles. This was followed by the launch of the rocket engine of its own launch stage, which led to the launch of the launch engines of several more rockets. All this led to a sharp jump in pressure in the cellar (about 3 atmospheres), as a result of which a force of about 2500 tons began to act on the cellar lid, which caused it to fail. As a result of the explosion, 2 holes were formed in the side plating of the ship in the area of the 8th cellar, through which outboard water began to flow into the compartments.

At 10:23, the personnel of the Brave, which was located in the aft compartments of the ship, were ordered to evacuate the ship. At this time, the fire on board was gaining momentum. At the same time, ammunition cellars No. 6 and No. 7 were constantly watered from hoses. At 10:40, the destroyer Consciousness approached to help the BOD, and after another 12 minutes, the Troubled, from which a special rescue party was landed on the Courageous. At 10:54, the destroyer "Conscious" took the BOD "Brave" in tow in order to take the ship aground in the Chersonese area, at that time the ship's roll had already reached 13 degrees. After 7 minutes on the "Brave" began the procedure for pumping fuel from starboard to port, but this did not help to get rid of the roll.

Soon the stern of the BOD plunged into the sea along the upper deck, and the roll to starboard reached 16 degrees. Secret documents were quickly evacuated from the ship. At 11:24 torpedoes were dropped into the sea, the list of the ship was reduced to 14 degrees. At the same time, ammunition cellars No. 6 and 7 were flooded with water using fire hydrants. At 11:55 a.m. BPC Komsomolets Ukrainy arrived at the scene to provide assistance.

At 11.59 the fire on board the ship was localized, white smoke began to fall from the cellars. However, after 7 minutes, the towing cables from the destroyer "Conscious" broke, new cables began to start from the "Troublesome". All this time, the fire in the aft engine room of the ship continued. At 12.27 a command was given to stop the water supply to the compartment, it was decided to use only foam. A chemical fire extinguishing system was activated in the aft engine room. The towing of the ship in distress at a speed of 3 knots began again at 12:49, at which time the roll of the anti-submarine ship reached 17 degrees.

At 12:55, the rescue ship Beshtau arrived at the scene at 13:20 - SS-15 and SS-26, a few minutes later the fire and decontamination vessel Flame. From these ships, foam was supplied to the area of the burning cellars on board the BOD "Courageous". At 14:30 an attempt was made to pump out water from the aft compartments, but after 17 minutes an explosion of aviation ammunition located in cellar No. 10 occurred. Apparently, at the same time, the tank, which stored 5 tons of aviation kerosene, also exploded. All this seriously complicated the situation, the roll of the ship to starboard quickly reached 19 degrees, increasing to 25. At 15:07 it stabilized at around 27 degrees. After another 3 minutes, the power supply to the instruments was cut off on the ship and the lighting turned off. At 15:12, the personnel received an order to evacuate the ship in distress, the last BOD to leave was its captain.

At 15.35, the Otvazhny BOD began to dive into the Black Sea astern without capsizing, a tug was given from the destroyer Bedovoy. After only 12 minutes, the ship completely disappeared under the water. The depth at the site of its flooding was about 125 meters. In total, 5 hours and 47 minutes passed from the moment the fire was discovered on the ship to its flooding. As a result of internal explosions and holes in the hull, the ship took on board almost 3600 tons of water, 6 impenetrable compartments were flooded. At the same time, after flooding 4 compartments located in the stern, the trim and roll were stabilized, and the BOD had positive stability. But when the water completely flooded 2 more compartments, the ship's buoyancy was exhausted. However, even when it sank, the Courageous BOD showed a very high survivability. According to the specification, the ships of this project could only stay afloat after the flooding of 3 adjacent compartments.

Of the 287 people who were on board the Otvazhny BOD, including cadets undergoing practice, 24 people died (19 sailors and 5 cadets). During the struggle for survivability and unsinkability, as well as in extinguishing the fire, the entire personnel of the vessel acted skillfully and showed courage. All measures were taken to save the ship, but the damage received as a result of the explosions made it impossible to save it. Subsequently, valuable equipment was dismantled from the sunken ship, and its hull was blown up on the ground.

Sources of information:
-http://ser-sarajkin.narod2.ru
-http://flot.sevastopol.info/history/otvazhniy.htm
-http://d-t-p.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4443:----qq&catid=33:2010-06-24-10-13-10&Itemid=40
-http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki

In connection with the rapid development of air defense and anti-aircraft missile systems by the beginning of the 1960s. there was a need for rocket ships of special construction.

The design of the ship began in 1956. According to the operational-tactical task, the functions of the ship included air defense of ship formations from attacks by aircraft and cruise missiles, as well as anti-submarine defense.

After the approval at the beginning of 1957 of the main tactical and technical elements, TsKB-53, headed by B. I. Kupensky, began to develop draft design. Technical project(project 61) was completed and approved in 1958, after which at the plant. On September 15, 1959, 61 Communards in Nikolaev laid down the lead ship, Komsomolets Ukrainy. On December 31, 1960, it was launched, and on October 15, 1962, it was handed over to the Navy for state trials.

The ship's hull is welded from steel SHL-4 (10KhSND), smooth-deck, with a characteristic rise of the upper deck to the bow and an inclined stem. To ensure a high speed, it had very sharp contours (the ratio of length to width was 9.5). The main watertight bulkheads divided the hull into 15 compartments. The double bottom occupied about 80% of the ship's length.

The ship had a 90-meter superstructure developed along the length with two masts, two bases for antenna posts of the Yatagan control system and two double chimneys. The exceptionally large size of the pipes lowered the temperature of the exhaust gases, reducing the thermal visibility of the ship, and also made it possible to replace the propulsion system through the hatches located in them. To reduce displacement and improve stability, the superstructure, masts and pipes were made of aluminum-magnesium alloys (for the first time on a ship, aluminum-magnesium alloys of the AMG-5V brand were used in large quantities, including for non-pressure bulkheads, baffles in superstructures and air ducts. The melting temperature of the first batches of alloys was 300-400 ° C, the combustion temperature was 1200 ° C. As it turned out, when extinguishing a fire with sea water, the released hydrogen interacted with magnesium and intensified the fire). Only the areas where the masts, launchers, antenna posts, as well as the navigation post were made of steel.

Propulsion system

From the very beginning, two options for the main power plant were considered - a traditional steam turbine (STU) and a gas turbine (GTU). The latter, due to its lightness and compactness (specific gravity 5.2 kg / hp versus 9 kg / hp), reduced the displacement of the ship from 3600 to 3200 tons and increased efficiency. In addition, starting from a cold state took 5-10 minutes for a gas turbine compared to several hours required for a PTU. For these reasons, a variant with gas turbine engines was adopted.

For a melodic whistle gas turbines the ships of the series in the fleet were dubbed "singing frigates".

The bow and stern engine rooms occupied one compartment each. Each housed the all-mode main gas turbine gear unit (GGTZA) M-3 with a capacity of 36,000 hp. manufactured by the Southern Turbine Plant in Nikolaev, two gas turbine generators GTU-6 for 600 kW each and a diesel generator DG-200/P for 200 kW.

Each GTZA consisted of two non-reversible gas turbine engines (GTE) with a capacity of 18,000 hp each. with reversible mating gear. Each gas turbine engine had its own gas outlet pipe. Each of the two shafts had a four-blade fixed-pitch propeller.

The compartments between the compartments were occupied by auxiliary mechanisms (roll damper, auxiliary boilers). Fuel was stored in double-bottom tanks with a capacity of 940 tons, 70 tons of fresh water for the crew and 13 tons of water for auxiliary boilers were also stored there.

Armament

The armament of the new ship was innovative. For the first time in Soviet shipbuilding, it was equipped with two anti-aircraft missile systems (M-1 Volna). Each complex was a two-beam launcher ZIF-101, a Yatagan control system and a store with two rotating drums for 8 V-600 missiles each.

Artillery armament consisted of two twin 76-mm AK-726 turrets (rate of fire 90 rds / min, range 13 km, height reach 9 km, ammunition load 2400 unitary shots) and two Turret fire control systems.

The ship had a five-pipe torpedo tube PTA-53-61 for SET-53 or 53-57 torpedoes with the Buzzer torpedo fire control system, two RBU-6000 and RBU-1000 rocket launchers each (ammunition load 192 RGB-60 and 48 RGB-10 respectively) with the Burya control system.

Placement of weapons on the BOD project 61 "Strict" (1985)

The ship provided for storage for 6 tons of aviation fuel and ammunition for the Ka-25 anti-submarine helicopter (anti-submarine torpedoes, depth charges, sonar buoys), however, due to the lack of a hangar, it was possible that there was only a temporary base.

The mine rails traditional for Soviet destroyers with slopes in the stern have been preserved. Two F-82-T launchers were envisaged for firing passive radar reflectors. Protection against torpedoes was provided by a towed BOKA-DU guard and a degaussing device.
The hydroacoustic means included the Titan all-round viewing station and the Vychegda fire control station, located in the wing fairing. The detection range of the submarine was 3.5 km.

The unsinkability of the ship was provided for the most unfavorable case of flooding of any three adjacent compartments when the ship was loaded in the range from standard to full displacement. When three adjacent compartments were flooded, the calculation provided for a steady static list of the ship of about 13 °, a freeboard height of at least 0.6 m at a maximum wind speed of 24 m/s, which the ship can withstand before capsizing.

With a normal displacement in deep water (at least 75 m), with a sea state of up to 3 points inclusive, the ship, moving at full speed, with a raised fairing, could develop a speed of 34 knots. It was planned to increase the speed and cruising range by supplying air to the channels of the propellers.

The crew of the ship according to the state of 1962 consisted of 266 people: 22 officers, 18 midshipmen and chief foremen and 226 foremen and sailors. According to the state, since 1974, 25 officers were provided on the ship.

For the Soviet Navy, 20 ships pr.61 were built.

The lead ship of the BOD series "Komsomolets of Ukraine"

BOD "Brave", to which this story is dedicated, was the seventh in this series (ships pr.61 were built at two shipyards in Nikolaev and Leningrad).
The large anti-submarine ship "Courageous" was included in the lists of ships of the USSR Navy on July 3, 1963 and on August 10, 1963 was laid down at the plant named after 61 Communards in Nikolaev. Launched on October 17, 1964, entered service on December 31, 1964 and January 25, 1965 was included in the Black Sea Fleet.

BOD "Brave"

length - 144 m. width (maximum) - 15.8 m. side height: at the stem - 13.2 m, at the midsection - 8.1 m, at the transom - 8.5 m., draft (at full displacement) - 4.6 m., displacement ( full) - 4510 t.

At the end of August 1974, a naval exercise was conducted in the Black Sea Fleet, headed by the chief of staff of the fleet. The first stage was held on 27 August. Previously, on August 26, a briefing was held for ship commanders in the conference hall of the Black Sea Fleet headquarters. The commander of the "Brave" was instructed by the commander of the 70th brigade

captain 1st rank Makarov and commander of the 41st separate brigade of missile boats (OBRK) captain 1st rank Komar.

It was at this time that the Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet, Rear Admiral Sahakyan, chose the BOD "Brave" as his flagship and control ship at the second stage of the fleet exercises, on August 30, during rocket firing by small missile ships (RTOs) of the 41st OB RK and to determine the effectiveness of the air defense system "Wasp" when repelling an air enemy. On August 29, the 70th brigade of the BOD, with the participation of the Brave, was supposed to carry out an anti-submarine mission and actual torpedo firing.

On August 29, the Courageous BOD, under the command of Captain 2nd Rank Vinnik, went to sea to perform a planned combat exercise with actual torpedo firing. The preparation of the ship for the battle and the campaign was carried out in full according to a two-hour schedule. The readiness of the ship to go to sea was checked by the headquarters of the 70th brigade of anti-submarine ships.

Their last combat exercise - torpedo firing - was successfully completed on the Courageous.

On the evening of August 29 and on the night of August 30, the Otvazhny BOD, together with the Bedovyy BOD and the Komsomolets Ukrainy BOD, took part in the anti-submarine exercise of the 70th brigade under the command of the brigade commander Captain 1st Rank Makarov.

Last hike

August 30, 1974, at about 5.30 am, "Brave" after the end of the night exercises of the search and strike group, consisting of several ships and a submarine, became on the Streltsy roadstead of Sevastopol.

At 7:45 a.m., Rear Admiral V.Kh., Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet, arrived on the ship. Sahakyan with a group of officers of the fleet headquarters. After that, the "Brave", at 7 hours 52 minutes, again went to sea, on his last trip.

On this day, the ship was supposed to provide anti-aircraft fire from small missile ships at a training ground near Cape Khersones.

258 officers, midshipmen, foremen and sailors, 16 cadets (6 from the Frunze VVMU and 10 from the Kaliningrad VVMU) and 13 seconded went out to sea from the ship's crew. In total, there were 287 people on the ship, along with two admirals and staff officers. The chief of staff of the fleet was the senior at sea and in training by position and rank.

At 9:55 in the morning, the ship arrived at the training ground, and a combat training alert was announced on it.

The personnel took their places on alarm, some last time in life.

The foreman of the launch team, midshipman Shuportyak, arrived at the missile control post in the cellar of ZUR No. 8. Senior sailors Karyakin and Daukshte, sailor Vinclovas also ran there.

Cadets Filippov, Kolyshev, Borisov, Staritsyn, Belousko, Anikeev and Ionov did not leave at the signal of a combat training alarm from cockpit No. 4, which was next to the cellar of ZUR No. 8, presumably they clarified with newly arrived comrades which posts they should go to combat alert, although all those not scheduled for combat alert are required to appear at the ship's GKP.

In total, in the stern of the ship from the 164th frame, in the future emergency zone, there were 78 people, including 3 midshipmen, 13 foremen, 55 sailors and 7 cadets. According to the order given on the ship, the cooks and the outfit of those working in the galley remained in the galley. This time they were cook-instructor foreman of the 1st article Petr Murgu, senior cook sailor Idzhyan Akop and senior baker sailor Sergey Petrukhin, as well as an outfit from BCH-3: senior miner Petr Bedakov, senior electrician-torpedo pilot Petr Goncharuk and torpedo pilot Yaroslav Vorozhbit.

Sailor Vladimir Prochakovsky, who remained in charge of the chief boatswain of the ship, and sailor Abrahamia from the supply service, who delivered admirals and officers to the ship in the morning on a boat and missed breakfast, had a bite to eat in the galley.

Midshipman Shuportyak, who was at the control post of the missile control post of the aft cellar No. 8, in which 15 V-601 missiles were stored in 2 vertical drums in combat condition, acting in accordance with the instructions, ordered the sailors on duty at the post to connect an external power supply. After that, he turned the toggle switches on the power supply panel to the “on” position. Immediately after the click of the last toggle switch, at 10:01:15 (this time, and the time of subsequent explosions, was established by the commission during the investigation of the circumstances of the explosion, approx.), through the porthole, he saw a fairly strong sheaf of flame on the left drum. Then another strong flash followed, illuminating the entire cellar (the starting main engine of the B-601 rocket ignited the starting engine, an increase in temperature and pressure initiated the operation of solid-fuel engines of other missiles). The smoke that appeared began to envelop the glass of the post. As midshipman Shuportyak later stated, he seemed to be trying to report to the battery commander, Senior Lieutenant Kostin, but he did not receive Shuportyak's report - the connection allegedly did not work.

Through the enveloping anti-ship missiles and the smoke quickly filling the cellar, flashes of fire sparkled, noise and rattle grew. It was clear that there was a fire in the cellar, threatening to explode rockets and fire. Shuportyak was frightened, did not, as it should be according to the instructions, manually turn on the missile irrigation system from the anti-ship missiles and, shouting: “Leave the PKS!” - rushed to run (during the experiment, when the entire crew of the "Brave", but already on board the BOD "Resolute" played all the actions of the tragic morning of August 30, Shuportyak could not show where the output of the stock of clinkets flooding his combat post ... approx).

Having jumped out into the cockpit No. 4, he ran past the cadets and the orderly along the cockpit and, without saying anything to them, ran out into the corridor No. 11, where the aft emergency party of midshipman Petrikin was located. Only here he shouted: “Now there will be an explosion!” - and ran on

The commander of the emergency party stood at a loss.

Without informing anyone about the causes of the explosion, Shuportyak hid somewhere on the ship and appeared only two hours later.

The commander of the ship in the navigation post, the admirals on the bridge, the officers on the GKP and in the PEJ did not know anything about the fire that had begun in cellar No. 8 - about the fire that was flaring up, which would lead the ship to disaster.

In cockpit No. 4 BCh-3, the cadets, who were on the ship without a practice leader, continued to discuss and allocate their places at combat posts during rocket firing.

Noise was heard in adjacent compartments, and cut off in cellar No. 8, paint began to bubble on the bulkheads. Realizing that a dangerous situation had arisen, the sailors began to leave the compartments, but not everyone succeeded.

Columns of smoke emerged from the exhaust hatches on the deck. On the navigation bridge, Rear Admiral Sahakyan, noticing smoke in the area of the stern pipe, said:
- Again, the mechanics are smoking the sky ...

Apparently, Sahakyan forgot that gas turbine plants do not produce smoke, which he observed earlier on his destroyer.

In cellar No. 8, where the flames raged and the pressure increased, the exhaust covers should have been triggered by sensors. Did they work? Unknown.

The lids are supposed to be open. Then, from an increase in temperature, the inhibitor system was supposed to automatically turn on in order to fill the cellar with an inert gas and prevent air from entering it. One can only speculate whether the system worked or not; if she gave a signal to the Dozor post, then there was no one to take it (due to combat training alert, duty at the Dozor post was not provided for approx.).

The fire in the cellar grew. The automatic activation of the cellar irrigation was disabled (due to the imperfection of the device automatic system extinguishing, it periodically spontaneously fired, flooding the ammunition cellars, as a result of which the system was switched from automatic to signal mode, with manual control, approx.), midshipman Shuportyak did not turn it on manually from the missile control post (RCP). However, irrigation could still be switched on from corridor No. 11; But nothing was done...

As a result of the operation of the rocket engines, the temperature and pressure in the cellar began to rise rapidly, the fire increased, gases and flames intensively escaped through the exhaust covers. In the cellar, the hull structures melted and partially collapsed.

Petty officers of the 1st article Valery Vershinin and Algirdas Makshtutis were trapped in a fire trap in the assembly room and, apparently, immediately died. Both were only 21 years old.

The foreman of the 2nd article Ivan Volodin, who was on duty there, did not get out of the rampart line and, apparently, died immediately. He was only 19 years old.
At 10:01:30 a.m., the first powerful explosion followed in cellar No. 8, the flame burst out.

In the turret compartment of the aft gun mount, the exit was probably jammed. The commander of the anti-aircraft commanders department, Alexander Urupa, remained there. He was 21 years old.

In cellar No. 8, the temperature and pressure from the running rocket and fire engines were rapidly increasing, the intensity of the release of flame and gases through the exhaust covers increased. The sloping section of the cellar deck above the baffle in the recess area became hot, and the hull structures adjacent to the cellar began to collapse in the KMO.

4-5 seconds after the first explosion, in the cellar No. 8 there was a similar to the first, but stronger explosion.

The explosion was thrown overboard, the sailors Suleymanov and Tuikin, who were subsequently picked up by a boat. On the navigation bridge, where the admirals and officers of the fleet headquarters were located, they paid attention to the emission of smoke in the stern. Rear Admiral Sahakyan again began to scold the mechanics. At the same moment, the signalman reported: “Flame from the stern pipe!” (the signalman made a mistake, the flame rose above the pipes from cellar No. 8, approx.).

At 10:02:00 a.m., there was a third strong explosion in cellar No. 8.

Petty Officer 2nd Class Adam Achmiz, who jumped out of the cockpit to the upper deck after the first explosion, immediately after the second explosion rushed to the aft gun mount, apparently to the rescue of his comrade Alexander Urupa, who was in it. He had already run up to the tower and grabbed the handrails of the door, opening it, he was thrown onto the deck by the shock wave and did not get up.

Within just one minute, in the stern, in the compartments adjacent directly to cellar No. 8, and on the upper deck, nine sailors died from explosions, burned alive, and a cadet from the Kaliningrad VVMIU Alexander Ionov, two sailors (E. Daukshte, M. Nikitin ) were thrown overboard by an explosion, but, not being able to swim (perhaps as a result of a shell shock), they drowned.

After the second explosion, four cadets of VVMU them. Frunze rushed into the water, well prepared at the school, they confidently floated on the water. The hydraulic shock from the third blast hit them just as they thought they had escaped.

The third explosion, having torn off the cover of cellar No. 8, destroyed the longitudinal and transverse bulkheads of the cellar and caused partial destruction of other hull structures and fuel tanks in the cellar area. As a result, hot gases and flames burst into neighboring rooms. A fire broke out in the compartments adjacent to the 8th cellar, including in the KMO, cabins No. 3, 4, 5, corridors No. 11, 10, 9. As it turned out later, during a diving examination, there was a violation of the outer plating in the area of the 3rd the cockpit on the starboard side is about 5 m long, 3.5 m high and with a sag of 0.6 m.

From the combat log of the BOD "Brave" for 08/30/1974:

10.02. Smoke, fire and explosion appeared in the area of the stern pipe. Combat and emergency alerts have been declared.

From the memoirs of the former senior assistant commander of the Courageous BOD, Captain 1st Rank V. V. Balashov:

“At 10:02 there was a strong explosion. The commander gave me the command: "Come out, first mate, look." I went to the upper deck.

In the stern to the stern pipe, the flames raged, and there was a lot of smoke. The metal twisted and melted from the heat.

There was a gaping hole in the area of the aft launcher. There was a trim to the stern, she settled into the water along the transom. There was a list of 12-13 ° to starboard. The ship apparently took 1000-1200 tons of water. The fire approached cellars No. 6, 7 with anti-submarine ammunition. The rocket launcher dangled overboard. The PJ was out of order ... In front of my eyes, sailor Petrukhin partially climbed out of the galley through the porthole, he was burned, his skin peeled off, and his bones were exposed. I saw how the metal melted ... ".

At the call of Prochakovsky, only one sailor Abrahamia managed to run out of the galley. The third explosion jammed the door to the vestibule, threw the sailors onto the deck, boilers with boiling water overturned on them. Sailor Petrukhin was the first to come to his senses, got out into the 10th corridor, but the door from it also jammed. Choking on smoke and gases, he climbed into the narrow porthole of the galley and stuck in it, screaming in pain. The rest of the sailors, also scalded and slightly alive, got out into corridors No. 9, 10 and everyone died there (the crew in the galley had the opportunity to evacuate through the elevator to the dining room, but in a stressful situation, not knowing that the doors were jammed, everyone rushed to the doors and near them they suffocated from the smoke approx.).

A fire broke out in the stern of the emergency ship. Through the destruction in the outer skin, outboard water began to flow into the cellar compartment No. 8, cellar No. 9 and the KMO. There was a roll to starboard and trim aft. The filtration of water into the cockpit No. 6 has begun.

In the navigation post, the commander of the ship Vinnik, who announced a combat and then an emergency alarm at 10:02, immediately gave the command to stop the machines and began to organize a fight for the ship's survivability, trying to find out the situation and the cause of the emergency. Midshipman Shuportyak, who knew the root cause of the explosion and fire in his cellar no. ship Vinnik, on alarm switched to the GKP which was inside the ship, Rear Admiral Sahakyan remained on the navigation bridge approx.).

The team remaining in their places, and the emergency party immediately began to fight for the survivability of the ship.

Meanwhile, on the navigation bridge of the ship, the confused commanders and officers of the fleet headquarters continued to discuss the cause of the fire, which, by the way, was never found out; for some reason, the explosion of the VVD cylinders was considered the main version of the explosion.

Accepted by the command of the ship (unfortunately, as in the case of the battleship Novorossiysk, there were too many commanders on the bridge of the Courageous), the version of the explosion of cylinders in the KMO and the spread of fire from there to other compartments with explosions of missiles and ammunition in them did not allow to correctly assess the nature of the damage, including damage to the fuel tanks due to the burning of the deck by the fire of the operating marching and starting rocket engines in cellar No. 8 and their subsequent destruction by the rocket explosion. The fuel floating up in the compartment from the fuel tanks contributed to the increase in the fire.
What fire fighting equipment did the ship have at that moment?

In the event of a fire in cellar No. 8, it was planned to turn on irrigation from the RCC and corridor No. 11, but, as you know, it was not turned on; in case of fire in the KMO - liquid volumetric fire extinguishing from the ZhS system with its inclusion in corridor No. 11 of the water spray system in the KMO. In the event of a fire in cellar No. 9, the irrigation of cellar No. 9 from the turret compartment or cockpit No. 5 should have been turned on. However, due to heavy smoke, and then a fire in corridor No. 11, a breakthrough of gases and flames from cellar No. 8 to KMO through the aft bulkhead , which caused a fire in the KMO itself, as well as in the cockpit No. 5, these stern fire-fighting equipment were not put into action. But perhaps the explosion damaged the fire main itself.

It was possible to use only fire nozzles and portable fire fighting equipment: air-foam guns and portable fire extinguishers, but only to localize the fire in rooms bordering on the zone of intense fire.

To pump out the water entering the KMO when extinguishing a fire with outboard water, two sump pumps located in the KMO were to be pumped out. Due to a fire in the KMO itself and corridors No. 9 and 10, they were not put into operation.

It was possible to use the sump pumps in rooms 6, 8 and 10, but this was also not done due to fires in the 11th corridor and the 5th cockpit. However, it is possible that these pumps were also damaged in the explosion.

It was necessary to immediately determine the area and volume of compartment flooding. This could be done according to the indications of the signaling devices on the board of unsinkability of the PES, but due to the smoke and lack of lighting, the personnel left the PES.

PEZH, which is the command post of the BS-5, designed to receive and evaluate information, to directly manage the fight for the damage of the ship, failed, primarily due to its location in a fire hazardous area. In this regard, the state of the aft compartments was not monitored all the time until the death of the ship, and the bow compartments up to the 164th frame - only visually. The GKP only tentatively assessed the area of flooding. Spare PJ (nasal remote control), apparently, was not used.

Means of fighting fire and water were used only from the side of the bow of the ship: the bow bulkhead of the KMO on the 164th frame became the line of defense against fire and water. This border remained until the moment the ship was abandoned by the personnel. However, from the aft side, the personnel could not localize the fire on their own. Power went out in the stern, leaving the fire main without water. Combat-ready personnel in the stern were left without leadership. It was impossible to pass from the bow to the stern of the ship through the fire zone.

Due to the lack of information and the inability to correctly assess the situation, no measures were taken to restore the watertightness of the ship's hull (in B. Karzhavin's book "The Death of the Courageous" on page 106, the following is written: "Due to the lack of information and the inability to correctly assess the situation, there were no measures were taken to restore the watertightness of the ship's hull, since nothing was known about the hole at the GKP. "This is unlikely, after the third explosion the ship received a list of 12-13 ° to starboard, here, probably, even any housewife would have guessed that most likely in water has penetrated the hull of the ship, i.e. the hull has a crack or hole approx.).

Meanwhile, the fire in cellar No. 8 and in adjacent compartments intensified, fuel from damaged tanks floated to the surface of the water and supported intense combustion, this was also facilitated by the aluminum-magnesium alloys from which the ship's superstructures were made.

In 5 - 10 s after a strong third explosion in the area of cellar No. 8, a series of successive explosions resembling a cannonade was heard (probably rocket warheads exploded approx.).

At this time at the stern

Explosions and a subsequent strong fire in cellar No. 8 and adjacent compartments cut off the stern of the ship (from the artillery tower to the flagpole) from communication with the bow of the ship.

The 13 sailors who remained in the stern after the explosion began to concentrate in the area of the heliport in the poop due to fire and heavy smoke. They did not hear the loud-speaking commands and did not know the situation on the ship. They tried to go to the bow, but the fire did not let them through, and they all returned to the poop. There were no officers and midshipmen among them, the foremen of military service did not take over the leadership, so the emergency party, which was able to start the fight for damage, was not organized.

Only the commander of the bilge machinists department, foreman of the 2nd article Anatoly Myslinsky, seeing the fire flaring up, rushed to extinguish it with local fire extinguishing equipment. The last time he looked out of the hatch, naked and black. Taking a breath of fresh air, he disappeared inside the ship again. He was not seen again.

The foreman of the 2nd article Anatoly Myslinsky died heroically, having fulfilled his duty to the end. He was only 21 years old.

Sailors on poop, seeing a suitable RTO, and fearing another explosion, decided to jump overboard. Sailor Tsyganok, an electrician BCH-3, jumped first, the rest followed him and were picked up by RTOs. Only sailor Kuchinka, who could not swim, did not jump and remained on the poop, holding on to the flagpole (sailor I. D. Kuchinka, was removed from the poop of the "Brave" at 11 h 47 min, that is, 1 h 45 min after the explosion) .

It raises questions about the fact that the command of the ship made no attempt not only to organize a struggle for survivability at the stern, but even to conduct reconnaissance of the situation, besides this, there could be wounded who needed outside help.

How could the emergency party get into the stern through the fire zone? The ship had a boat and a captain's boat, it was enough to launch either a boat or a boat and go to the stern, especially since the ship had stalled. Thus, it was possible to remove people and land an emergency party, at least in the first hours of the disaster.

Sailor Sergei Petrukhin was still trying to get out of the galley window, screaming desperately. He managed to get out halfway, but the basin did not fit through the narrow porthole and he hung face up above the deck, supported by other sailors. At first he asked them: “Guys, save me, I don’t want to die,” but the fire that started in the galley began to burn his legs and, experiencing unbearable pain, he began to ask: “Bring a knife, stab me” ...

They could not help him in any way - the gas cutters were in the aft compartments, cut off from the rest of the ship by fire.

Himself almost distraught from his impotence and from the sight of the sailor's terrible torment, the ship's doctor, Senior Lieutenant Viktor Tsvelovsky, periodically gave him painkillers injections of morphine. Didn't help. In front of the eyes of the crews of the Courageous and neighboring ships, a young sailor of the first year of service died a terrible death (it still remains unclear why the sailor could not be saved: if the gas cutters remained on the stern on the Courageous, they could very well be on other ships from which on "Brave" was landed two emergency parties, in addition, barges and rescue ships approached the board of the "Brave", which could well transfer the necessary equipment to the ship. In the book by B. Karzhavin "The death of the" Brave "there are the following lines:" at 11 h 35 min the signalman at the running post (from the GKP approx.) was given the command: - Send to "Conscious": gas welding is necessary - cut off the hanging part to pull out the person!

At first glance, the correct team, but it should only be noted that by 11:35 a.m. the Conscious had already landed its emergency party and at 11:00 began towing the Courageous. At 11.45 "Trouble" landed his ASG, but he apparently did not receive any instructions about the gas cutter. There are no more mentions of the gas cutter either in Karzhavin or in the magazine "Brave", it seems that everyone forgot about the stuck sailor approx.).

Suddenly, in one of the portholes of the galley, the burned face of Vladimir Prochakovsky suddenly appeared. They rushed to him, but he said: “Everything is clear with me, save the ship,” and, losing consciousness, disappeared forever in the depths of the galley. He was only 22 years old.

Courageously, with dignity, the sailor died, thinking at the last minute not about himself, but about the ship and his comrades.

(According to eyewitnesses, Sergei Petrukhin got stuck in the porthole of the starboard side. In many photographs of the ship in distress, the starboard side is clearly visible, but the stuck sailor is not visible on them, only in the photograph below it was possible to notice the presence of people in the area of the galley porthole).

The picture clearly shows the part of the deck turned inside out by the explosion with the lid of cellar No. 8, and the boat is also visible, which was never used to land the emergency party aft

From the act of the commission for investigating the causes of the death of the BOD "Brave" dated September 14, 1974.

“... sailor Prochakovsky V.S. - boatswain, excellent student in combat and political training, member of the Komsomol, trying to get out of the burning ship through the porthole and having received severe burns, he said to his comrades' attempt to help him: “Guys! Everything is clear with me. Save the ship! - and died in the fire.

Sergei Petrukhin got stuck in one of these portholes of the superstructure, Vladimir Prochakovsky spoke his last words from such a porthole

The fire on the ship continued. It was on fire in cellar No. 8, aft engine room, corridors No. 8, 9 and 10, cockpits No. 3, 4, 5 and on the ZKP.

The personnel of the aft emergency party, combat units 2, 3, 5 and RTS could start extinguishing the fire only in corridors No. 8, 9 and 10. They led the fight against the fire and. about. BC-5 commander, Senior Lieutenant Martynov, watch mechanic and commander of the bilge group, Lieutenant Gul, commander of the aft emergency party, midshipman Petrikin (aka foreman of the hold team) and foreman of the 1st article Dolinchuk, whose face was already burned. A young lieutenant Bezmeltsev from BCh-2 helped them.

The ship was slowly listing to starboard.

Warships and rescue ships hurried to help the ship in distress from all sides (27 ships gathered near the Courageous) aviation was lifted into the air (Ka-25, Mi-4 helicopters, LI-2 aircraft).

The fire on the "Brave" continued to intensify, especially in the compartments adjacent to the explosion area, and in the KMO.

Apparently, it continued to be fed with fuel from the destroyed fuel tanks No. 16 and 17, where there were 62 tons of fuel; in addition, in the KMO area there were 126 tons of fuel in tanks No. 12, 13, 14 and 15. But which tanks were destroyed? This has not been established.

The high temperature and smoke made the conditions for the struggle for the survivability of the ship more difficult, there was a danger of an explosion of ammunition in the cellars from No. 6, 7, 9, 10, as well as a fire in the kerosene store.

At 10:15 a.m., the commander of the ship reported to the chief of staff of the fleet:
- It is necessary to flood the 6th and 7th cellars of BCh-3.

At 10:16 a.m., a command was given from the GCP:
- Seal all hatches and necks!
(But after all, this should have been done on the ship on combat and emergency alerts!)

At 10:18 the command followed:
- The commander of the BS-2 turn on the irrigation system of the aft missile cellar (!)

(You can’t call this command otherwise. At 10:02, the lid of the missile cellar with part of the deck was opened by an explosion like a tin can, there and in the adjacent compartments there is an intense fire, and at 10:18, i.e. after 16 minutes, command to turn on the irrigation system, which by that time no longer existed, and the cellar as such did not exist).

It was enough to “stick your nose out” with the GKP to make sure that it was not possible to “turn on the irrigation system”.

BOD "Brave"
The large anti-submarine ship "Courageous" was included in the fleet on January 25, 1966 and managed to complete 7 military campaigns in its rather short life. From June 5 to June 30, 1967, the ship carried out a combat mission to assist the Egyptian armed forces and visited Port Said. In 1968-69, the Otvazhny BOD underwent maintenance at the 61st plant in Nikolaev, during which its missile armament was modernized. Since 1969, the captain of the 3rd rank Ivan Petrovich Vinnik was appointed the captain of the ship.

In 1970, the BOD was declared an excellent ship of the Black Sea Fleet, took part in the Ocean maneuvers, went to the coast of Cuba and the Atlantic. In 1972-1973, the ship underwent another eight-month repair at the docks of Sevastopol. As part of the detachment of ships of Rear Admiral L. Ya. Vasyukov, the Courageous BOD paid friendly visits to the ports of Italy - Taranto and Messina. The last combat campaign of the ship in the Mediterranean took place from November 10, 1973 to March 6, 1974. "Brave" was part of the 70th brigade of anti-submarine ships.

BOD "Very" belonged to the ships of project 61 of the type "Komsomolets of Ukraine" (according to NATO codification - Kashin). It was a type of large anti-submarine ships that were in service with the Soviet Navy from 1964 to 1991, and were subsequently in service with the Russian Navy. In 2012, only 1 ship of this type remained in the Black Sea Fleet of Russia - the Smetlivy SKR. It remained the only ship of the 20 ships of the project that managed to enter the fleet of the USSR from 1962 to 1973. The remaining 18 ships were decommissioned and dismantled for metal, another one - BOD "Brave" - sank.

The standard displacement of ships of this type was 3500-3700 tons, the maximum displacement was 4500-4750 tons. Modernized ships have 3950/4900 tons, respectively. Hull dimensions: length - 144 m (modernized - 147 m), width - 15.8 m, draft - 4.8 m (up to 6 m). 4 gas turbines with a total capacity of 94,000 hp worked on 2 screws, providing the ship with a maximum speed of 36-38 knots. The cruising range at a speed of 20 knots was 4,000 nautical miles. The ship could accommodate the Ka-25 anti-submarine helicopter. The BOD provided for the storage of 5 tons of aviation kerosene, as well as ammunition for a helicopter (depth charges, anti-submarine torpedoes, sonar buoys). Due to the lack of a hangar on the ship, the helicopter could only be temporarily placed on it.

The armament complex of the new ship could be called innovative. For the first time in the history of Soviet shipbuilding, the BOD received 2 M-1 Volna air defense systems. Each anti-aircraft missile system was a two-beam launcher ZIF-101, a store with 2 rotating drums for 8 V-600 missiles each and a Yatagan control system. Artillery armament included 2 twin 76-mm AK-726 turret artillery mounts (rate of fire 90 rds / min., Maximum firing range 13 km., Reach in height - 9 km., Ammunition of each mount consisted of 2400 unitary shots). In addition, the 2nd Turret fire control system was present on the ship, the ship was equipped with a PTA-53-61 five-tube torpedo tube for 53-57 or SET-53 torpedoes and had 2 RBU-1000 and RBU-6000 jet bombers (ammunition load 48 RSL-10 and 192 RSL-60, respectively).

The death of the BOD "Brave"
From August 4 to August 7, 1974, the Otvazhny BOD took part in the regular exercises of the fleet, and from August 27, the ship was to become the flagship command ship during the 2nd stage of the exercises. BOD "Brave" was supposed to ensure the firing of small missile ships, as well as take part in anti-submarine exercises with torpedo firing. On August 29, 1974, the ship under the control of Captain 2nd Rank I.P. Vinnik went to the open sea and successfully conducted torpedo firing. At dawn on August 30, the BOD embarked on a raid in Streletskaya Bay in order to take on board Rear Admiral V. Kh. Sahakyan, the chief of staff of the KChF, as well as a group of senior fleet officers. On this day, the ship was supposed to provide anti-aircraft fire from small missile ships at a training ground near Cape Khersones. At 9:55 in the morning, the ship arrived at the training ground, and a combat training alert was announced on it.

Just 3 minutes later, at 0958, a slight shaking of the ship was felt on the bridge, as if a small explosion had occurred in its stern. After that, the machines were immediately stopped, an emergency and combat alarm was announced on the ship. 10 seconds after the first, a stronger explosion shook the ship, a sheaf of flame and a clearly visible cap of white smoke appeared behind the stern pipe. After another 20 seconds, there was a third explosion, which occurred in the area of missile cellar No. 8. Above the site of the explosion, a column of flame rose and poured thick black smoke. The explosion was so strong that it tore off the cellar lid and, together with the launchers of anti-aircraft missiles, threw it onto the aft chimney. After that, a strong fire began in this area of the BOD, and the personnel of the ship began to fight for unsinkability and survivability.

At 10 o'clock a combat alarm was announced on the ship, and then an emergency one, at that time a fire was raging in cellar No. 8, in corridors 9 and 10. The BOD received a roll of 12 degrees to starboard. Between 10:10 and 10:20, a command was given to turn on the water protection system on the ship, irrigation and flooding of cellars No. 6, 7 and 10 began. However, it was not possible to carry out the plan, as the pipelines failed. An explosion from the poop of the ship threw 7 sailors into the sea, who were picked up by the ships that approached the scene.

At 10:23, the personnel of the Brave, which was located in the aft compartments of the ship, were ordered to evacuate the ship. At this time, the fire on board was gaining momentum. At the same time, ammunition cellars No. 6 and No. 7 were constantly watered from hoses. At 10:40, the destroyer Consciousness approached to help the BOD, and after another 12 minutes, the Troubled, from which a special rescue party was landed on the Courageous. At 10:54, the destroyer "Conscious" took the BOD "Brave" in tow in order to take the ship aground in the Chersonese area, at that time the ship's roll had already reached 13 degrees. After 7 minutes on the "Brave" began the procedure for pumping fuel from starboard to port, but this did not help to get rid of the roll.

At 12:55, the rescue ship "Beshtau" arrived at the place at 13:20 - SS-15 and SS-26, a few minutes later the fire and decontamination ship "Flame". From these ships, foam was supplied to the area of the burning cellars on board the BOD "Courageous". At 14:30 an attempt was made to pump out water from the aft compartments, but after 17 minutes an explosion of aviation ammunition located in cellar No. 10 occurred. Apparently, at the same time, the tank, which stored 5 tons of aviation kerosene, also exploded. All this seriously complicated the situation, the roll of the ship to starboard quickly reached 19 degrees, increasing to 25. At 15:07 it stabilized at around 27 degrees. After another 3 minutes, the power supply to the instruments was cut off on the ship and the lighting turned off. At 15:12, the personnel received an order to evacuate the ship in distress, the last BOD to leave was its captain.

At 15.35, the Otvazhny BOD began to dive into the Black Sea astern without capsizing, a tug was given from the destroyer Bedovoy. After only 12 minutes, the ship completely disappeared under the water. The depth at the site of its flooding was about 125 meters. In total, 5 hours and 47 minutes passed from the moment the fire was discovered on the ship to its flooding. As a result of internal explosions and holes in the hull, the ship took on board almost 3600 tons of water, 6 impenetrable compartments were flooded. At the same time, after flooding 4 compartments located in the stern, the trim and roll were stabilized, and the BOD had positive stability. But when the water completely flooded 2 more compartments, the ship's buoyancy was exhausted. However, even when it sank, the Courageous BOD showed a very high survivability. According to the specification, the ships of this project could only stay afloat after the flooding of 3 adjacent compartments.

The large anti-submarine ship (bpk) "Brave" was a representative of a new class of modern medium-sized surface ships, which, according to the fleet construction plan in the 60-70s, were to be replaced by destroyers built in the 40s and 50s. The displacement of the ship was about 4500 tons, length 144 m, width 158 m and draft about 5 m. Its main combat mission is anti-submarine operations in remote areas of the sea and ocean. This class of ships arose as a counterbalance to the submarines of foreign fleets, including, and above all, nuclear-powered, armed with long-range ballistic missiles with nuclear weapons. Several dozen such ships were built in the Soviet Navy, including more than ten in the Black Sea Fleet.

The ship of this building (project 61) had the most advanced hydroacoustic detection stations for that time and level of technology submarines, rocket launchers, anti-submarine torpedo weapons. In addition, it was armed with two anti-aircraft systems and two 76.2-mm anti-aircraft automatic artillery mounts. This is the first ship of the Navy, where the main engines were gas turbines, which significantly reduced, in comparison with steam-powered ships, the preparation time for the campaign and made it possible to develop the maximum speed in a matter of minutes. With all four turbines running, it reached 36 knots. These driving characteristics gave him great advantages over destroyers, ensuring the earliest possible arrival in the area of the proposed location of the submarine (Fig. 50).

The ship also had a helicopter anti-submarine complex: a helipad for one helicopter, stocks of depth bombs, radio-acoustic buoys and aviation fuel.

By the way, when the Komsomolets Ukrainy bpk, the lead of this series on the Black Sea, and the guards bpk Soobrazitelny first entered the Mediterranean Sea in 1964, American sailors immediately dubbed them “singing frigates” for the characteristic sound of gas turbines and expressed admiration for the appearance of these ships. Indeed, the ship has streamlined contours, a solid deck raised on the forecastle, pipes beveled back, which gives it a swift and architecturally perfect look.

The “Brave” entered service with the Black Sea Fleet in January 1966, sailed a lot for nine years, and annually carried out military service in the Mediterranean Sea (the so-called systematic actions of the ships of the Black Sea and other fleets with the task of counteracting and neutralizing the 6th US Fleet and other military -naval forces in the Mediterranean), successfully participated in all major exercises and maneuvers of the USSR Navy, including the well-known naval maneuvers "Ocean", with missile firing in the Atlantic Ocean and joint search operations with the Northern Fleet in the Barents Sea (together with the Leningrad anti-submarine cruiser). The "Brave" also participated in actual hostilities - in ensuring the security of Port Said in 1968, in organizing the defense of the port of Conakry (Guinea) in 1972 at the request of President Sekou Toure.

I know this ship well. Being the flagship navigator of the Black Sea Fleet, I sailed on it many times, moreover, by the nature of my work, I had to follow all of its voyages - even from Sevastopol. I remember how this ship in the Mediterranean Sea actively and successfully performed the tasks of direct tracking of large warships of the US 6th Fleet during one of the then frequent crisis, pre-conflict situations related to the situation in the Middle East.

In 1969, Captain 3rd Rank Ivan Petrovich Vinnik was appointed commander of the "Brave" - a man of high decency and responsibility, thorough and solid in decisions and actions, a true professional in maritime command business. I have known this officer for a long time and well, ever since his senior sergeant years.

With the advent of a new commander, the ship not only did not give up its positions, as sometimes happens, but continued to steadily increase its level of combat readiness. For the high level of combat readiness in the same year, the ship received the title of "excellent" ship and annually confirmed it with all and numerous checks of the most different levels. In 1970, the "Brave" won the prize of the USSR Navy for missile firing, which he held for another year - and this is "competition" with dozens of similar ships as part of not only the Black Sea, but also other fleets - the Baltic, Northern and Pacific. The ship took part in the testing of new naval equipment, for which its commander in 1972 was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, a high and rare for peacetime. Everything course tasks, combat exercises in 1973-1974. on the ship were performed with excellent and high performance. The Brave took first place among the ships and was awarded the banner of the "Best Connection Ship". By the end of August 1974, the "Brave" successfully completed the main tasks of the annual combat training plan, more than half of the ship's crew were high-class specialists - 1st and 2nd class, more than half of the combat posts, ship's divisions were called "excellent". On this ship, in general, there was a good atmosphere, high commanding demands were combined with goodwill, respect for subordinates, and concern for them. All this led to skillful, really courageous actions of the absolute majority of the crew in an emergency.

Now about the events immediately preceding the accident and the death of the ship.

In June 1974, the commander of the BPC "Brave" captain 2nd rank I. Vinnik was appointed with a promotion to the position of commander of a ship formation in another garrison of the fleet, in Donuzlav, where he left, transferring command affairs and duties to his senior assistant captain-lieutenant V. IN. Balashev for their temporary execution. The new commander appointed to the "Brave" was on vacation, and the situation in the new formation required the quickest arrival of I.P. Vinnik. However, at the very end of August, on the 28th, he was called to Sevastopol to ensure a responsible exit to the sea of the Brave. On August 30, it was planned to conduct a complex combat exercise of missile boats with the implementation of practical missile firing at several targets, with an air defense exercise of the formation at sea.

"Brave" was supposed to provide control over all the forces of the protection of the area, aviation, firing boats and small missile ships (MRK). Given the complexity of the task, the fleet command decided to call on the ship an experienced old commander, captain 2nd rank I. Vinnik.

On August 29, in the afternoon, the ship went to sea to carry out the planned tasks of combat training, and in the morning at 07:30 on August 30, taking on board the Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet, Rear Admiral V.Kh. Sahakyan, commander of the brigade of missile ships, captain 1st rank A.F. Komara and a number of other officers of the headquarters and management of the fleet, "Brave" went to the area of the exercise. At 9:25 a.m., the Brave, along with firing small missile ships, entered the planned combat training ground. The missile boats and ships began their final preparations to carry out missile firing, turning on their observation radars and firing stations. At 9:55 a.m., a training combat alert was played on the Otvazhny to ensure control of missile firing by small missile ships, and radar stations were turned on. At 9:59 a.m., the senior assistant reported to the commander, who was at the Main Command Post (GKP), about the readiness of the ship for the exercise.

To understand the organization of ship control, the following explanations should be made. The GKP of the ship of this project is located inside it, in a specially equipped room where all communication and control lines converge, both internal and external. In a normal navigation situation, the commander and watch officer are on the navigation bridge - a room in the upper part of the bow superstructure, from where not only technical, but also visual observation of the environment can be made, where all the necessary communications are also displayed. As on the GKP, there are engine telegraphs and steering control on the navigation bridge. On alert, when the commander descends to the GCP, the watch officer remains on the navigation bridge to assist the commander in controlling the ship with his reports on visual observation. Rear-Admiral V. Sahakyan, Chief of Staff of the Fleet, was on the navigation bridge with access to the sea.

At 10:02, Captain 2nd Rank I. Vinnik, having made sure that the ship was ready for the exercise, climbed onto the bridge and at that moment saw white smoke and force of fire in the area of the stern pipes. Then the first explosion happened. The commander announced a "combat alert", transmitted on the ship's broadcast about the fire on the ship and the order: "Bow and stern emergency parties to put out the fire."

After 15-20 seconds there was a second explosion in the same area. The commander, with the permission of the chief of staff, went down to the GKP to control the struggle for the ship's damage, leaving the watch officer on the navigation bridge. After 20-30 seconds, two more explosions occurred - the third and fourth, again in the stern of the ship. The first assumptions about the cause of the explosion were ambiguous - either launch cylinders in the aft engine room (cylinders with compressed air to start the main engines) or rockets in the cellar of the aft anti-aircraft missile launcher explode.

An "emergency alarm" was played, the commander ordered: "To the commanders of combat posts and command posts, report the presence of smoke, fire and water in their premises." Reports were received that there was no communication with the stern machine, the stern missile cellar, the stern emergency party and the stern tower, as well as data on the condition of the premises located forward of the stern machine. A struggle for the survivability of the ship began, aimed primarily at localizing the resulting fire. The senior assistant sent by the commander for a visual assessment of the damage and the condition of the stern of the ship reported that the stern missile cellar had been torn apart, the anti-aircraft missile launcher had been thrown into the area of the stern pipes by explosions. There is a strong fire in the cellar, the fire is moving into the stern car and into the stern, into the area of \u200b\u200bthe artillery installation and the artillery cellar. The commander reported the situation to the chief of staff of the fleet and, according to the established form, according to the table of established signals, to the command post of the fleet and his formation. In addition, personally through the airfield, with which direct communication was maintained, he transmitted about an explosion and a large fire, transmitted to the fleet command post a request to urgently deliver foam concentrate or carbon dioxide in cylinders by helicopters to drop them into the aft cellar. One of the small missile ships, at the request of the commander, approached the stern of the BPC, removed part of the personnel from the upper deck, and also picked up several people dropped by explosions from the water. They did not dare to involve small rocket ships in extinguishing the fire in the stern of the ship, since they also had military missiles, and artillery ammunition, and fuel, and the likelihood of subsequent explosions was not excluded ...

The joint efforts of the ship and the PZhS-123 fire and rescue vessel, which approached the port side of the Courageous, managed to stop the spread of fire, the fire began to weaken. But, unfortunately, the reserves of the foaming agent both on the Otvazhny and on the PZHS-123 turned out to be clearly insufficient to eliminate a strong fire, and it began to spread again, especially to the stern of the ship. As time has shown, water alone from the ship's fire main and even very powerful PZhS water extinguishing agents were not enough to cope with the fire. It was only possible to stop its spread to the bow, and the stern was almost defenseless from the intensifying onset of fire. The commander in this situation reasonably feared for the fate of the aft cellar and aviation fuel, which was also in the stern, but nevertheless did not forget to warn the rescue ship not to pour water into the interior without calculation, which could lead to a deterioration in the stability of the ship. Prudently and timely, the commander also freed himself from live torpedoes when the fire of the stern pipes began to threaten the torpedo platform where the torpedoes were located.

Simultaneously with the fight against the fire, the ship was towed by the approaching destroyer Conscious, and then by the missile ship Bedovy. The purpose of towing is to bring the "Brave" from great depths to shallow water in the area of the Sevastopol raid. On the ship, the option of launching the bow engine, which was in service, was considered, but after studying the possible consequences, they abandoned this decision: the explosion could have deformed the shaft line; a large number water and to the loss of the remaining small margin of buoyancy. By the time the ships arrived for towing, three compartments had already been flooded.

As the subsequent diving survey of the sunken ship showed, the assumptions of the commander and commander of the BCH-5 ship were justified: the stern part was almost torn off and “hanging on the line of shafts”, as the divers put it, there were large gaps in the ship’s hull from both sides.

Unsinkability calculations made at the BCh-5 CP showed that the ship was in critical condition. On the orders of the chief of staff of the fleet, the destroyer Conscious approached the board, secret documentation and equipment were loaded onto it, some staff officers and part of the personnel were transplanted. On this destroyer was the commander of the brigade of ships, which included the "Brave", Captain 1st Rank L. Makarov, but he did not go on board the damaged ship.

Meanwhile, the fire spread to the stern, reached the aviation fuel storage - the last, fifth, explosion occurred, a large column of smoke and fire rose, similar, according to eyewitnesses, to a nuclear explosion. After that, it became clear that there was no hope of saving the ship, and the commander directed all efforts to save the personnel. The commander requested permission to evacuate the crew even earlier after the fire was re-intensified and in the complete absence of extinguishing agents, but he was not given from the fleet command post, despite requests. This permission was given to the commander by the chief of staff of the fleet.

The commander announced over the broadcast (it, like lighting, communications, water extinguishing and drainage equipment worked until the very last minutes of the ship’s life): “All personnel should leave combat posts, go to the upper deck to evacuate the ship, put on life jackets.” The personnel went to the upper deck. The senior assistant commander organized the abandonment of the ship: on command, sailors and foremen jumped into the water in groups, when one group sailed, the first mate gave the command to the other - “into the water!”. Thus, almost all personnel left the ship, after which the senior assistant reported this to the commander. The commander packed the "Journal of Combat Operations", "The logbook" in a plastic bag, handed them to the senior assistant with the words: "Keep these documents, our future life depends on their content. Jump into the water, swim a little and wait for me, watch me, because everything can be, I'm tired, and the water is cold. The first mate jumped into the water from the forecastle exit area, from the upper deck of the port side.

After that, the commander went into his cabin, took a party card from the safe, with difficulty got out and climbed onto the navigation bridge, inspecting his ship for the last time. By this time, the ship was sinking astern, the trim to the stern increased, the roll to the port side reached 30 °. On the navigation bridge I.P. Vinnik discovered two young sailors who were afraid to go down and jump overboard, as they could not swim well. (I did not use the expression in vain - "almost all the personnel left the ship"). The commander ordered them to put on life jackets, handed one of them a secret map with combat training grounds and led the sailors down to the upper deck. The descent was very difficult, as the trim and roll continuously increased. Coming out on the upper deck in the forecastle area, the commander ordered the sailors to jump into the water. They were afraid, because the tank had already risen high above the water due to the trim, but still one of them jumped off, and the second commander simply gently pushed off the side. Both sailors were lifted by the launches of neighboring ships. They were the last to see the commander on the sinking ship.

Subsequently, the commander reported to the members of the state commission: “When I pushed the sailors into the water, I saw that they were sailing away from the side, I decided to jump myself. He took off his shoes, looked down, it was already a little high above the water, only here the thought came to my mind: “But I have two children” and resolutely jumped down like a “soldier”. I tried to move away from the ship, but I was always drawn to the side. With great effort, I broke away from the ship, and when I sailed 50-60 meters, I looked back: the ship stern went completely under water, the bow stood at 60 ° up, the ship slowly sank. After some time, a boat approached me, lifted me on board and taken to a rescue tug, where I undressed and dried off.

They searched for the commander for a long time, believing that he could remain on the ship, but then they found out that he was on the lifeguard.

The "Brave" sank at a depth of 127 m at a distance of about 20 miles from the Chersonese lighthouse. The towing ships managed to take it away from great, more than 1000 m depths, but they failed to bring it to shallow water, which would allow saving the badly damaged ship ...

In total, 24 people died on the ship, all as a result of explosions or its consequences. (The reader will surely pay attention to the fact that in an approximately similar critical situation with the battleship Novorossiysk, the commander of the Courageous did not make a single mistake in managing the ship, correctly assessing the changing real situation, taking all possible measures to combat the survivability of the ship and, when it became inevitable, he organized the evacuation of personnel without losing a single person - all the losses occurred during the first explosion and fire ... By the way, the tragic example of the "Brave" confirms that in the preparation of officers and crews of ships for the fight for damage from the sad lessons " Novorossiysk "conclusions were made effective. I can confirm this not only by the example of the "Brave", but also by my service on the ships of the Black Sea Fleet for three decades after the death of the "Novorossiysk". And it's not the fault of the sailors of the "Brave", and then the submarine "Komsomolets" that a number of technical problems of the safety of ships and the struggle for their survivability were not resolved in high managerial x and design and research areas).

Analyzing the activities of officers, midshipmen, foremen and sailors of the ship during the accident, it can be stated with confidence (this was also confirmed by the reports of all commissions) that the crew in this difficult and critical situation showed high moral and political qualities, psychological stability, good skills in the struggle for the survivability of the ship, which made it possible for a long time (about 5 hours and 40 minutes) to fight for the survivability of the ship in the conditions of flooding of three or more compartments, strong fires, when the metal melted and flowed down like wax from a candle. By the way, after the accident, a strict and meticulous commission checked all the class specialists, of course, with passion, and was forced to confirm their compliance with the requirements.

Many examples of high professionalism, courage and heroism of the crew members can be cited. So, having received an order from the commander to flood the cellars of depth charges in the area of \u200b\u200bthe personnel canteen, midshipman E.A. Medvedev, foreman 2nd article Kozleneev and several sailors, operating in a heavily smoky room, flooded the cellars with fire hoses, preventing a possible explosion of about 5 tons of explosive and preventing flooding of the huge dining room, which preserved the stability of the ship. Petty officer 2nd article Garibyan, sailor Nikitenko, in the area of \u200b\u200ba strong fire near the stern pipes, threw overboard cylinders with acetylene and oxygen, on which the paint had already caught fire. Lieutenant A.V. Bezmeltsev, who arrived from the school in August, set a personal example for his subordinates by active and courageous actions to extinguish fires, was in the most dangerous areas of fire fighting on the upper deck (now he is the commander of a brigade of ships, a captain of the 1st rank). Also a recent graduate of the school, Lieutenant V.M. Yarchuk, an artilleryman, together with midshipman Kozlov, sailor Osetrov and others, resolutely fought the fire, using all available means, created a reliable line of defense against fire and prevented its spread in the interior beyond 164 frames to the bow. Acting commander of the electromechanical combat unit, senior lieutenant-engineer V.E. Martyanov skillfully and competently directed the actions of personnel in the fight for damage, timely analyzed the state of the ship, made necessary calculations and gave substantiated reports to the commander of the ship.

The commander of the hold group, lieutenant-engineer B.N. The ghoul, in difficult conditions of heavily smoky premises, led, on the orders of the commander, from the PEJ (post of energy and survivability) the two sailors remaining in it, when the fire came close to this post and it was not possible to stay there.

The foreman of the 2nd article Achmiz, having discovered that his subordinate, the sailor Urup, remained in the tower, which was threatened by fire, returned for him, but there was another explosion, and he died.

After the command to “leave the ship”, Senior Lieutenant V.N. Kostin, the commander of the missile battery, with a list of more than 30 ° and a strong increasing trim, made his way to the officers' wardroom, took out the banner of the "Best Ship of the Connection" and was one of the last to leave the ship.

The highest patriotism, genuine heroism and great love for the ship was shown by the sailor Prochakovsky, a galley worker. He was at the moment of another explosion in the galley, the doors and the hatch jammed, the fire approached. An attempt to pull the sailor through the porthole failed, he got stuck in it. Seeing that the fire threatened his comrades, the sailor Prochakovsky shouted: “Comrades, everything is clear with me! Save the ship! The commander of the ship ordered to cut out the porthole along with the sailor, but neither gas welding nor electric welding could do this. The sailor, injured and with severe burns, was given painkillers, but the advancing fire did not allow him to continue work to save him ... Sailor Prochakovsky was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Star for his courage and heroism.

High organizational and professional quality showed senior assistant commander captain-lieutenant V.V. Balashov. The commander sent him to the most dangerous and critical areas to clarify and assess the situation and organize work to combat fires, water, and flood the cellars.

Unfortunately, during the accident, three people from the crew of the ship violated combat instructions, and one of them showed cowardice. The foreman of the prelaunch training team, midshipman A.I. Shuportyak, being at his combat post, hearing crackling and noise and seeing the fire in the 8th missile cellar, was confused, did not turn on the cellar irrigation, gave the command: “All up!” and left the post with his subordinates. The commander of the aft missile battery, Senior Lieutenant V.M. Pyatkin, having received a report from midshipman Shuportyak that a fire broke out in the 8th cellar from the operation of a rocket engine, did not report to the command post of the artillery warhead, leaving his command post, without giving any order to the personnel, he ran himself to turn on the irrigation of the cellar, but did not have time, an explosion had already occurred. The orderly in the cockpit, having heard the rumble and rattle in cellar No. 8, did not report to the watch officer, but ran out of the cockpit after midshipman Shuportyak, thereby violating the instructions of the orderly in the cockpit. Although, in fact, these violations of the instructions did not entail any additional disastrous consequences, since the investigation and experiments carried out after the accident showed that the rocket main engine runs for 22 seconds, and the first drops of cellar irrigation from the irrigation system appear after 50 seconds, i.e. . irrigation, if turned on, would not have prevented the explosion, the midshipman's panic-stricken team objectively saved the lives of three or four people - but, nevertheless, violations of the instructions were made. And here is another violation - the absenteeism on alert to their combat posts of five cadets-probationers of the school cost them their lives during the first explosions ...

From the first to the last minutes, the Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet, Rear Admiral V.Kh. Sahakyan. I knew Vladimir Khristoforovich for many years, even from the squadron, where he was the commander of the missile ship "Badovy", the first in the Black Sea Fleet and in the entire * Navy, then the commander of the unit, which included ships of 61 projects, similar to the "Brave" . He was an experienced sailor, I had to sail with him many times in the Black and Mediterranean Seas. He had a sharp mind and feeling. new, was an excellent organizer, already in the position of chief of staff of the fleet did a lot to improve the combat readiness of the fleet, develop and introduce new operational and tactical methods in the fleet, more advanced methods of training ships and crews. And again, an involuntary comparison with the situation at Novorossiysk allows us to conclude in favor of Rear Admiral V. Sahakyan: without trying to replace the ship’s commander, he controlled the situation, considered and approved the commander’s decisions, thereby taking responsibility for them, organized and led the rescue forces in the "Brave" area. Left the ship a few minutes before his death. Subsequently, V.Kh. Sahakyan was appointed to the post of chief operational management Headquarters of the Navy. Unfortunately, a serious illness and death did not allow this talented sailor to fully reveal himself ...

With the arrival of the crew in Sevastopol, first the naval, then the central (Ministry of Defense) commission began to work. It was found that the main cause of the death of the ship was the explosions of anti-aircraft missiles in the aft missile cellar. There were 16 missiles, 8 per drum, they exploded in groups. There were 6 versions of the spontaneous operation of the propulsion engine squib, which led to the outbreak of fire, explosion and fire. The most likely ones were:

1. Induction of currents in the circuit of the squib from the simultaneous operation of the ship's radar (radar station), the operation of firing systems, radar stations for surface and air surveillance of small missile ships located nearby, preparing for rocket firing, and induction of currents from cable bundles of electrical lines passing in the missile cellar at a distance of 1-1.5 m from the squib chain in the rocket. The interviewed personnel confirm that the main engine has started to work, because. the explosion occurred 20-25 seconds after the start of its operation. In connection with this version, I recalled one episode from a long-standing, eight years before this accident, visit of the Black Sea Fleet destroyer "Pushy" to Ethiopia, the port of Massawa. The visit was official, on the ships (and the Emperor of Ethiopia Haile Selassie invited ships of only the “great maritime powers” - the USSR, the USA, England and France) to the Day of the Ethiopian fleet - illumination was arranged. At 24:00, it was turned off, after that I had a chance to go to the upper deck and, to my surprise, I saw brightly burning lights of the ship's illumination. The first thought - "gape, not turned off." It turned out that information about the past day of the visit was being transmitted to Moscow and Sevastopol, and such currents were induced from the operation of the transmitter that they "lit" the illumination of hundreds of electric bulbs. So the ships are really oversaturated with electromagnetic fields of various origins.

The second version assumed the possibility of short circuiting the squib circuit due to a short circuit in one of the cellars of the missile system.

The third version is the possible spontaneous combustion of gunpowder in the rocket engine from the friction of powder dust (due to long-term storage, the “powder tubes” could crack, and when the body was shaken, the gunpowder ignited).

Much time after the accident, it became known that an experiment conducted in the laboratory with the creation of an electronic environment similar to the situation on August 30, 1974, confirmed the first, main version: the rocket exploded from the induction of currents in the squib circuit of the propulsion engine.

The commander of the ship (more precisely, his former commander, who was performing his old duties), captain 2nd rank I. Vinnik, upon arrival in Sevastopol, was summoned to the fleet headquarters to the then Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Admiral of the Fleet Soviet Union S.G. Gorshkov. It is noteworthy - for that time - that the commander was "delivered" to the headquarters of the fleet by the head of the political department and the head of the special department for connecting ships ...

The commander reported in detail the circumstances of the death of the ship and the actions of the personnel. Many questions were asked. At the end of the report, the Commander-in-Chief said: “Commander, feel calm. Our state is able to build a new ship, and you are a good fellow for saving people.” When subsequently one of the members of the commission suggested checking the crew on damage control issues, S.G. Gorshkov interrupted him with the words: “Stop mocking the personnel and injuring them, they showed within six hours that they can fight for survivability.”

During the report, I. Vinnik asked the Commander-in-Chief not to disband the crew of the Brave, which was done: as already mentioned, all personnel were assigned to the patrol ship, and the first lieutenant captain V. Balashov was appointed its commander.

In the order of the Minister of Defense on the occasion of the death of the Otvazhny BPC, it was stated that “... the commander acted correctly in the most difficult situation, correctly determined the defense lines and organized the struggle for the ship's survivability, took the necessary measures to save the crew and was the last to leave the ship ... ". Nevertheless ... it was ordered: “The commander of the ship, Captain 2nd Rank Vinnik I.P. remove from his position ... "(motives -" complacency "and" little attention to the training of personnel in the fight for damage. "But simply - the ship died, people died and someone has to answer. Who? Of course, the commander ...).

Ivan Petrovich Vinnik continued his service in the Black Sea Fleet, later became the commander of a brigade of large ships, he was awarded the rank of captain of the 1st rank, in 1987 he retired from the reserve due to age, continues to be active, now labor activity in the Black Sea Fleet.

Every year on August 30, the crew members of the “Brave” living in Sevastopol (they used to come from other cities as well ...) gather at the memorial sign in honor of the dead, at the Communards cemetery, recall their campaigns, difficult naval service, commemorate their friends and comrades ...

Further fate"Brave": it was carefully examined by divers, due to the danger of a spontaneous explosion of the ammunition remaining on it, it was necessary to refuse to lift the ship, the explosive ammunition was destroyed by specially laid charges that initiated its detonation.

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