The Ar-2 is a twin-engine Soviet dive bomber designed from an all-metal construction. Created at TsAGI under the leadership of A.A. Arkhangelsk on the basis of the SB bomber. The aircraft was created as an attempt to modernize the SB by converting it into a dive bomber. It was equipped with 2 M-105R engines. In 1939, the Ar-2 made its first flight.

As for combat capabilities, it was not inferior to the Pe-2 bomber in terms of them, but it also surpassed it in placing bombs in the fuselage, as well as in bomb load. Another tangible advantage was the presence of a bomb-discharge machine.

In 1940-1941. the aircraft was mass-produced. In total, approximately 200 cars were produced. In the first year of the Great Patriotic War it was used for attacks on the enemy's close rear and on ground troops.

Ar-2 design and equipment:

The nose of the MMN F-1 aircraft, which demonstrates good aerodynamics during tests;

motors received better hoods;

· the lining between the fourth and eighth frames is made of balinite plywood, which was glued to the wooden parts five, six, seven of the frame with glue VIM;

motors have better hoods;

install subframes of a better design;

used in the construction of the machine water radiators of finned-tubular type;

a more advanced oil supply system was installed - one air-oil and water-oil cooler for each motor;

· Variable pitch propellers VISH-22E were installed;

· Improved oil and gas tanks, the capacity of each is 330 liters;

automatic dive exit;

For better aiming during bombing without picking, sights OPB-1M and NKPB-3 were installed;

gratings are installed under the planes on the hydraulic control;

For better aiming of bombs at the target during a dive, an artificial horizon, PBP-1 and an overload signaling device were installed.

Armaments of the SB-RK:

• Bomb load - 1 ton (1.5 tons - maximum). FAB-500 - up to three units or FAB-250 up to four units in a dive or twelve units up to one hundred kilograms of horizontal bombing.
• ShKAS machine gun with a mechanical sight in a ball mount on the nose, ammunition calculation for five hundred rounds.
• ShKAS machine gun with K-8T type climate control sight in the rear TSS-1 mount. Ammunition - 1000 rounds.
• ShKAS machine gun with an OP-2L sight. Ammunition - six hundred shots.
• Chemical weapons are represented by two VAP-500s (up to 1,000 kg) of a pouring type and two UHAP-500s (up to 100 kg) of a universal type. The ability to use any mixtures and substances that are in service.

After the first tests, experts identified the main defects:

• the temperature of the oil and water in flight never dropped below 95 degrees;
• insufficient longitudinal stability.

On AP-2 aircraft, they continued to install modernized models of units and equipment. The results of the latest state tests of the machine were as follows:

• weight - 6.6 tons;
• range when armed with two FAB-250s at a speed of 390 km per hour and at an altitude of 5 km - 1000 km;
• high ceiling - 10 km;
• climb 5 km - in about 7 minutes;
• runway runway - 340 m;
• the maximum flight speed - 475 km per hour - was achieved at an altitude of 4.7 km.

Tests of the AR-2 showed that it is quite possible to continue flying with one throttled motor.

The main disadvantage of the machine is the disadvantages of creating a rotorcraft group. Due to the destruction of engine systems during testing, they often failed. The cooling system had low limiting values, it was rather problematic to use the machines in winter. There was no way to properly drain the water from the water radiators. Overheating of water and oil remained unresolved. It is worth noting that in the future, the design bureau of A. Arkhangelsky nevertheless improved the propeller group on the plane.

The production of the AR-2 was discontinued in 1941 in favor of mass production of the Pe-2. And although many leaders and specialists of the fleet and aviation considered the AR-2 as the main dive bomber, and the Pe-2 as a fast fighter for its long-range escort, everything turned out the other way around - with the subsequent stop of the production of the Ar-2.

The opinion that the Arkhangelsk Ar-2 bomber is not much different from its fellow SB has long been rooted among fans of the history of domestic aviation - it is generally accepted that its combat use at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War was just as unsuccessful. The words "Soviet dive bomber" evoke strong associations with the Petlyakov Pe-2, and often only with it. However, the documents say that where the Ar-2 was quite well mastered, it was used successfully, and it was used successfully as a dive bomber ...

Mastering the aircraft: too little time

The 132nd high-speed bomber aviation regiment began to form on March 4, 1940 in Kirovograd as part of the first large deployment of the Red Army Air Force. Basically, the unit was completed by May 15, and despite the fact that most of the personnel had only recently arrived from flight schools, the regiment, consisting of 48 crews on SB bombers, was ready for combat operations during the day in simple weather conditions from medium altitudes. War with Romania during the "liberation campaign" in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in the summer of 1940, as you know, did not happen, so the regiment continued to put together units and train personnel in calm conditions.

In total, by October 28, 1940, the regiment's flight time was 2104 hours 30 minutes (4030 landings), or, on average, 33 hours per crew. 298 bombings were carried out, of which 206 were carried out (an average of 4 per crew), and 325 aerial firings, of which 176 were carried out (an average of 3 for each navigator and gunner-radio operator).

The Ar-2 aircraft from the 132nd SBAP, left at the Kirovograd airfield due to a technical malfunction. Photo reconstruction (artist Vladimir Kamsky)

By the beginning of 1941, about 200 Ar-2 dive bombers had accumulated at the Moscow Aviation Plant No. 22, which, after the elimination of factory flaws, were to go to the Air Force combat units. Soon the production of this aircraft was stopped in favor of the Pe-2 bomber, and it was decided to use Arkhangelsky's aircraft as an "intermediate" machine for practicing dive bombing before the deployment of the production of "pawns". For this purpose, several units were selected in the border districts, the Moscow Military District and the Air Force of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, which the first Soviet dive bombers received. In the Odessa military district, the choice fell on the 132nd SBAP, and the regiment received 24 Ar-2s in exchange for part of its SBs (one in February, 12 in March and 11 in May).

On May 14, 1941, the regiment was withdrawn to summer camps to the Yekaterinovka airfield. By June 22, 1941, the 132nd SBAP had 59 combat-ready crews and 60 combat aircraft of three types: 23 Ar-2 (19 serviceable), 32 SB (30 serviceable) and 5 Pe-2 (all serviceable). Ar-2s were operated by the 3rd and 4th squadrons, the 2nd and 5th squadrons flew on the SB, and the personnel of the 1st squadron began retraining on the Pe-2.

The regiment's combat training in 1941 was rather mediocre even compared to the previous year: until June 1, the regiment's crews flew only 1,102 hours and 27 minutes (2,393 landings). Against this background, retraining on the Ar-2 was carried out quite intensively: in March, the flight time was 47 hours, in April 31 hours, in May 115 hours (a total of 363 landings). 121 cross-country flights were made (of which 12 were at night), 84 bombings (64 completed), 153 aerial firing at cones (113 completed).

However, the crews did not really start bombing from a dive - only one such bombing was noted, although it was successful. Apparently, in this regard, in the order for combat training of the district headquarters for June 1941, the instruction for the 3rd and 4th squadrons of the regiment to work out dive bombing by June 10 was especially noted. Unfortunately, data on the raid and combat training of the OdVO Air Force for June 1941 have not yet been found, but, judging by subsequent events, this order was fulfilled, and at least part of the crews of the 3rd and 4th squadrons by June 22, 1941 years of dive bombing worked.

War: do what you must and come what may

The first day of the war for the 45th SAD, which was in the second echelon of the OdVO Air Force, which included the 132nd SBAP, passed quite calmly. There were no Luftwaffe raids on airfields in the Kirovograd area on June 22, but the regiments of the division, which were in the process of formation and retraining for new materiel, did not receive combat orders. However, the command of the Air Force of the OdVO, which became the command of the Air Force of the 9th Army, which was in a difficult situation due to the small number of combat-ready strike aviation units, decided to transfer the 132nd SBAP to the Odessa region to strengthen its strike force.

The order was received at about 17:00 on the first day of the war, and by the evening of June 23, the regiment, with combat-ready crews (29 SB and 16 Ar-2), was relocated to the Razdelnaya airfield, 60 km north-west of Odessa, and by the evening was fully prepared for combat military operations. On the remaining seven Ar-2s in Ekaterinovka, the technical staff eliminated numerous design and production shortcomings, and these vehicles, as soon as they were ready, were merged into the combat strength of the regiment.

On the morning of June 24, the regiment began to carry out combat missions, mainly to destroy enemy crossings and troops in the area of ​​​​Skulyany - Yassy. Actually, in the area of ​​​​Skulyany there was a center for building troops of the German 11th Army, which, with its central 54th army corps, crossed the border river Prut on June 23 and captured a bridgehead on the eastern bank, starting to advance deep into Soviet territory.

The planes of the 132nd SBAP were supposed to reinforce units of the 20th SAD, which began to operate against enemy troops on the morning of the second day of the war, having completed 77 sorties. June 24 work Soviet aviation reached its climax - in total, attack aircraft completed more than 200 sorties that day, of which 39 were on the 132nd SBAP (15 SB and 24 Ar-2).

The initiative was made by nine Ar-2s of the 4th squadron (leading squadron commander Major N. A. Zobov), which at 11:50 bombed the accumulation of enemy equipment in the Skulyany area from a dive in squadrons. The crews searched for tank columns on the Skulyany-Faleshty road, but the targets, identified as four groups of tanks of 6-8 units each, were found only on the outskirts of Skulyan, 100-200 meters from the road to Falesti.

According to the reports of the pilots, the dive was carried out at an altitude of 3000 meters, the withdrawal was carried out at an altitude of 1500. A total of 32 FAB-100 bombs were dropped (one crew did not drop a bomb). According to the reports of the crews, 14 enemy tanks and 100 infantrymen were destroyed. In the target area, the group was attacked by a flight of enemy fighters of an unknown type, but losses and damage were avoided.

The 3rd squadron of the regiment, led by the commander captain M.A. Makarin, discovered targets on the Romanian coast in the area locality Kirpitsy at 12:05. The crews determined that it was large group tanks camouflaged along the road to Skulyany, after which at 12:10 nine Ar-2s dropped 36 FAB-100s from a dive. Despite the fire of anti-aircraft artillery and the attack of a single fighter, the aircraft were not damaged, and the crews noted the destruction of 10 tanks and 150 enemy soldiers.

The commander of the 4th squadron of the 132nd SBAP, Major Nikolai Alexandrovich Zobov (on the left, in the photo in the rank of captain) and the commander of the 3rd squadron of the 132nd SBAP, Captain Mikhail Aleksandrovich Makarin (right)

The same 3rd Squadron distinguished itself in the afternoon, becoming the only unit of the regiment that completed the second sortie on June 24th. At 18:45, six Ar-2s attacked from a dive a motorized column (re-identified as tanks) just 5 kilometers from Falesti, on the Skulyany-Faleshty road. The victims of 24 FAB-100s were allegedly 8 tanks and 50 enemy soldiers. In the target area, the crews noted strong anti-aircraft fire.

By the morning of June 25, the situation of the Soviet troops had not improved. It was not possible to throw the Germans into the river, so the 4th squadron of the 132nd SBAP received an order to destroy the crossings in the Skulyan area. At 06:15, six Ar-2s, led by Major N. A. Zobov, dropped 23 FAB-100s from a dive. According to the report of the commander, the crews achieved direct hits and destroyed the crossing. The anti-aircraft artillery opened fire after the Soviet aircraft left their dive and did not inflict any damage, and a couple of fighters identified as "SET-15" also failed - apparently, they meant the Romanian P.11f. All Ar-2s returned to their airfield without loss.

However, military luck is changeable, and for a start, the weather let down the Soviet pilots. After 09:00, the target area was covered with clouds, and the six Ar-2s of the 3rd Squadron, which entered the target area at 10:05, were forced to drop 24 FAB-100s from a horizontal flight from a height of 3000 meters without seeing the target. Naturally, the crews did not observe the results of the bombing, but the anti-aircraft guns and fighters did not annoy them either.

The second flight of the eight of the 4th squadron at 11:50 was a failure. Actually, everything went wrong already at the start, when a bomb fell from the holder due to a malfunction of the electrical wiring at the take-off plane of Lieutenant Alyabyev, and the squib worked. As a result, the plane was badly damaged and had to make an emergency landing. Further - more: the weather in the target area became even worse, due to a continuous downpour, the squadron slipped much to the west of the target and restored orientation only over Iasi. When trying to turn around on the target, the group was attacked by six Bf 109s. The crews urgently dropped bombs and tried to leave, but the German pilots showed perseverance and enviable skill: despite the clouds and rain, they pursued the Soviet bombers for about 120 kilometers, from Iasi to the Dniester, constantly attacking , although Soviet aircraft periodically entered the clouds and flew at maximum speed. As a result, only the planes of Major N. A. Zobov and Lieutenant V. P. Antonenko returned to their airfield, and the remaining five Ar-2s were shot down. Fortunately, 10 of the 15 downed crew members soon returned to the regiment.

Feldwebel Rudolf Schmidt demonstrates victory marks on the steering wheel of his fighter. The 12th, 13th and 14th victories were declared over the Ar-2 of the 4th squadron of the 132nd SBAP in the battle on June 25, 1941

A successful battle was carried out by pilots of six Bf 109Es from 5./JG 77, who took off at 11:00 Berlin time. According to Jochen Prien, at 11:42–12:13 they claimed 10 victories over the Martin Bombers, while three victories each were credited to Lieutenant Rott (Oblt. Frank-Werner Rott) and sergeant major Schmidt (Fw. Rudolf Schmidt), and Corporal Marshhausen (Gefr. Günther Marschhausen) and non-commissioned officer Kindlein (Uffz. Kindlein) - two each.

The Soviet crews put up active resistance: according to the report of the gunners of the returned aircraft, one of the attackers was shot down by the flagship gunner-radio operator ml. Sergeant Pyotr Alexandrovich Gorbachev. According to German data, on this day, the aircraft of the "hero of the day" Sergeant Schmidt (Bf 109E-4 W.Nr. 5365) was lost from anti-aircraft artillery fire. With a high degree of probability, we can say that he was shot down by the crew of the Martin Bomber, which he declared at 12:07. In fact, the plane of Major N. A. Zobov received three holes.

Bf 109E fighters from 5./JG 77, summer 1941 (artist Igor Zlobin)

Actually, this battle was not something out of the ordinary: on the eve of the III. / JG 77 fighters, with approximately the same result, they “thinned out” the SB group of the 45th SBAP. The question of the reasons for the losses should have been asked not to the crews, who fought back quite adequately and were able to inflict damage on the enemy, but to the command of the division and the Air Force of the 9th Army. They were unable to organize cover for the bombers, although it was not difficult to guess that the intensive use of Soviet attack aircraft over the Skulyany-Faleshty region would force the enemy to cover it with fighters. Looking ahead a little, we note that the losses of the 4th squadron of the 132nd SBAP affected the actions of the command, and the next day the groups of the 132nd SBAP began to cover the fighters of the 20th SAD. Alas, due to the fact that the interaction was not established, this task could not be properly completed, which predetermined the heavy losses of parts of the 45th SAD on June 26.

The commanders of the 3rd and 4th squadrons of the 132nd SBAP drew correct conclusions from the losses of June 25. In subsequent sorties, both units suffered minimal combat losses: in total, nine Ar-2s for 317 sorties were lost in the air before being withdrawn to the rear, and four more aircraft were written off due to various damage. At the same time, from June 26 to July 18, the regiment lost only three Ar-2s, and another car did not return from a reconnaissance flight. She acted in isolation from the main forces of the regiment in the interests of the headquarters of the Air Force of the 9th Army, to which a pair of Ar-2s was attached (the number of sorties performed by these crews was not noted in the documents of the regiment). One aircraft of the 4th Squadron on July 12 was mistakenly shot down by its MiG-3 fighter. Thus, for 317 sorties, there are eight Ar-2s shot down by the enemy, which gives one loss for about 40 sorties - an excellent figure for the summer of 1941!

The intensity of the combat operations of the dive bombers of the 132nd SBAP can be assessed by the following indicators. Operating from the Razdelnaya airfield from 24 to 28 June, the 3rd and 4th squadrons of the regiment carried out 67 sorties, of which the crews bombed from a dive in 51 sorties. Downed losses amounted to six Ar-2s. From the Pechera airfield (10 km southwest of Nemirov), the regiment operated from July 2 to July 9 against the troops of the German 11th Army advancing on Mogilev-Podolsky, and on July 10–11, turning 180 °, bombed the mechanical units of the 3rd motorized corps 1st Panzer Group, advancing from Zhytomyr to Kyiv. Aircraft of the 3rd and 4th squadrons completed 142 sorties during this time, in 75 of which the crews bombed from a dive. Downed losses amounted to only two Ar-2s.

The air battle on July 10, which took place during a bombing mission against German tanks and motorized infantry advancing along the Zhitomir-Kyiv highway, was indicative. In the Rozhev area, 12 Ar-2s dropped 72 FAB-100s on the enemy from a dive, the crews reported the destruction of 10 tanks, two armored vehicles and 11 vehicles. The enemy put up serious opposition: first, the Soviet dive bombers were fired upon by intense anti-aircraft fire, and then they were attacked by four Bf 109s. repulsed almost all attacks.

The most experienced aces of the I./JG 3 headquarters, led by the group commander Hauptmann Hans von Hahn (Hptm. Hans von Hahn) and Lieutenant Buchholz (Oblt. Max Buchholz), not only failed to defeat the group, but even upset it, and the only their prey was the downed Ar-2 st. Lieutenant V.V. Melnikov from the 4th squadron. Even hit by anti-aircraft guns, the plane returned to the airfield, where it made an emergency landing on its stomach (due to damage to the hydraulic system, the landing gear did not come out). It is interesting that both German aces announced another victory (23rd and 19th, respectively), but the Soviet shooters were not particularly shy either: according to the results of the battle, the already known to us ml. Sergeant P. A. Gorbachev and Art. Sergeant V.S. Greidzler was credited with one downed Bf 109, although in reality not a single German fighter was damaged. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in two weeks of fighting, the skill of the Ar-2 crews reached a high level, and their interception undoubtedly became a difficult task even for the best aces of the Luftwaffe.

I./JG 3 CO Hauptmann Hans von Hahn accepts congratulations on the 24th aerial victory. July 12, 1941, Polonnoe airfield. The 23rd victory mark is drawn on the steering wheel after the battle with the Ar-2 of the 132nd SBAP on July 10

Having relocated on the night of July 11 to the Zyatkovtsy airfield near the town of Gaisin (50 km west of Uman), the 132nd regiment from July 12 began to work on the tanks of the 48th motorized corps of the 1st tank group advancing on Berdichev. In total, up to July 18, 77 sorties were carried out, mainly against targets in the Lyubar, Polonnoye, Berdichev and Kazatin regions. Unfortunately, for this period, there are no generalized data on the number of dive bombings in the combat log of the regiment.

Actually, already on July 16, the main part of the regiment left the combat area for reorganization to the rear, and the remaining group, led by the commander of the 5th squadron, Captain Kasyanov (nine Ar-2s and three SBs), came under the direct control of the Air Force command of the 6th Army . This group fought for only two days, and already on July 19 it was transferred to Kirovograd, where, having transferred planes to other units of the Air Force of the Southern Front, it departed after the regiment to the rear. Actually, this event allowed us to get an idea of ​​how the Ar-2s of the 132nd SBAP looked like: at least three cars were subsequently left at the Kirovograd airfield due to malfunctions and fell into the photographic lenses of German soldiers.

Successful combat operations and small losses of the Ar-2 squadrons are especially clearly visible against the background of their colleagues: the regiment's command, the 1st, 2nd and 5th squadrons flying on the SB, completed only 195 sorties before leaving for the regiment, losing at In this case, in air battles and from anti-aircraft artillery fire, 22 bombers, three more were written off as a result of combat damage, and three were broken in accidents and disasters due to the fault of personnel. It is not surprising that after the regiment was reorganized into a two-squadron one, it was the commanders of the units armed with the Ar-2 who became the commanders of the newly formed squadrons. In addition, for personal heroism, Captain Makarin and Major Zobov were awarded the Order of the Red Star.

Ar-2 aircraft belonging to the 132nd SBAP, left at the Kirovograd airfield due to malfunctions

In the documents of the regiment and division, the 3rd squadron of the 132nd SBAP and its commander, Captain M.A. Makarin, are especially noted. The squadron remained combat-ready throughout the hostilities and suffered minimal combat losses - two Ar-2s, one of which was shot down by anti-aircraft guns on June 27, and the second on July 4 by Messerschmitts from 7./JG 77. The commander himself completed 24 in less than a month sorties, which is undoubtedly an outstanding result. Further fate was favorable to him: having completed on the Kalinin Front in the winter of 1941-1942. 32 more sorties, Makarin was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, received the rank of major and was soon appointed regiment commander in the Far East. Mikhail Alexandrovich took part in military operations against Japan as commander of the 36th BAP, then served in various positions, and retired with the rank of colonel.

Even greater results were achieved by the commander of the 4th squadron, Major N. A. Zobov - over the same period, the brave commander and pilot completed 29 sorties. In addition, it should be noted that formally it was he who held the championship in dive bombing in combat conditions. Major Zobov was an experienced commander. He participated in the hostilities in Republican Spain, for which he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner in 1937. Unfortunately, his fate was tragic: Nikolai Aleksandrovich did not return from a sortie on February 21, 1942 on the Kalinin Front. Before his death, he managed to complete 36 more sorties, for which he was awarded the second Order of the Red Star.

Here is how the command of the 45th air division assessed the actions of the 132nd SBAP:

“The regiment basically conducted all its combat work on the ground troops and mainly on the enemy’s motorized mechanized units in movement along roads and in places where they accumulate, as well as on crossings on the river. Prut in the district of Skulyany - Stefanesti and on the river. Dniester in the district of Kamenetz-Podolsky. According to the reports of the crews, for the most part, the gaps lay in the vicinity of the targets and on the target itself. Our ground units defending the river. Prut in the Stefanesti region, observed heavy losses of the enemy’s motorized mechanized units located in this area from the bombing. The regiment from the ground units was grateful for the successful assistance.

Despite the obvious successes in using the first serial dive bomber of the Red Army Air Force in the 132nd SBAP, I would also like to note its significant shortcomings, which reduce the effectiveness of dive strikes: the crews used FAB-100 bombs almost exclusively, and, as a rule, when bombing from a dive combat load was only four such bombs. Large-caliber ammunition was used in a few cases, so the claimed successes, especially in terms of destroyed crossings, seem rather doubtful.

Ar-2 bomber belonging to the 132nd SBAP, destroyed at the Kirovograd airfield

In addition, for more effective use dive-bombers on enemy troops needed observers-aircraft controllers, who, being in advanced ground units, would correct Ar-2 strikes. They simply did not exist at that time, so the bulk of the strikes fell on the rear of the enemy, at best, on the forward detachments of the advancing enemy mechanized columns, and the German troops fighting directly on the front line were practically not hit. This, of course, did little to help the defending or counterattacking units of the Red Army, which were left without real air support.

Suspension of the FAB-100 air bomb in the Ar-2 bomb bay - the device of the PB-3 bomb rack is clearly visible (photo from the report on the testing of diving bombing from the Ar-2 aircraft)

Another unfortunate omission was that the wealth of dive bombing experience of the 132nd SBAP was neither analyzed nor used for the purpose of training other units armed with dive bombers. Now it is no longer a secret that most of the regiments equipped with Pe-2 dive bombers, even in 1942-1943, did not use these aircraft for their intended purpose and did not bomb from a dive.

Unused Opportunities

As an afterword, several factors should be cited that, in the author's opinion, served as the reason for such a rapid development of the new aircraft by personnel, including the use of its capabilities as a dive bomber.

First of all, this is the origin of the Ar-2 from the serial SB aircraft, with which it had similar flight characteristics. Ar-2 was simple in piloting technique, including take-off and landing, and, therefore, accessible for training even to poorly trained young flight personnel of the Red Army Air Force, which was the most advantageous difference from the strict and subject to far from every pilot Pe-2. Considering that the majority of bomber aviation cadets in 1939-1941 graduated from flight schools on the SB or CSS, retraining on the Ar-2 turned into a mere formality.

The design of the Ar-2 provided for one more feature: this aircraft initially received a special PB-3 bomb rack, which made it possible to drop bombs from a dive not only from the external load, but also from the bomb bay. The design of the PB-3 made it possible to hang the following combinations of bombs on it: 2 × FAB-50, or 2 × FAB-100, or 2 × FAB-250, or 2 × BrAB-220, or 2 × BetAB-150, or 1 × FAB -500. Such a suspension did not impair aerodynamics and maintained maximum horizontal speed, unlike the Pe-2, which did not have such a device, and the “pawn” could drop bombs from a dive only from an external suspension.

From February 15 to March 18, 1941, an experimental squadron of dive bombers of the Air Force research and testing range for aircraft armaments carried out the testing of dive bombing of the Ar-2 aircraft, on the basis of which a test report was drawn up and detailed instructions for the training of personnel, which was sent to units being re-equipped with a new dive bomber. The main heights of dive entry were recognized as 3000, 2500 and 2000 meters at an entry speed of 270 to 315 km/h, the recommended dive angles were 60, 70 and 80°. There is no reason to doubt that it was precisely as a result of thoughtful training based on theoretical and practical data that the personnel of combat units were able to as soon as possible master the technique of dive bombing. This is confirmed by the documents of the 132nd SBAP, according to which the dive was carried out at altitudes of 3000–2500–2000 meters (the minimum entry height), which is fully consistent with the instructions.

One can only regret that the release of a very successful aircraft, the first Soviet dive bomber Ar-2, was limited to two hundred copies.

Unlike Ar-2, further fate The 132nd SBAP was quite successful: in 1942, the personnel of the regiment was one of the first to master the latest Tu-2 bombers, went through the entire Great Patriotic War, and in 1945 received the honorary name "Berlin" for distinction in the battles for the capture of the capital of Nazi Germany.

When preparing the material, we used:

• fund of the 132nd BAP TsAMO RF;
• fund of the 45th GARDEN of TsAMO RF;
• fund of the Air Force Directorate, inventory 11294, d.138–139;
• Jochen Prien. "Jagdfliegerverbände der deutschen Luftwaffe 1934-1945. Unternehmen "BARBAROSSA", einsatz im Osten - 22.06 bis 05.12.1941".

Continuation. Beginning in AiK No. 2,3,4 / 2003

External suspension of four 230-kg bombs on Ar-2

Parallel fine-tuning of the SB-RK 2M-105 Design Bureau of Arkhangelsk began to develop a new high-speed short-range bomber SBB. At first, the new aircraft had index C (under this designation, the aircraft model was purged at TsAGI), but soon the aircraft index was changed to B. The aircraft was conceived as a cardinal modification of the serial SB with increased flight performance and continuity in production technology. When designing it, the experience of creating MMN, SB-RK was used. and later Ar-2. The SBB crew included a pilot, a navigator and a gunner-radio operator.

The main advantage of the new aircraft was the significantly improved aerodynamics. The general layout and combat scheme of the bomber B were similar to the SB aircraft, but with a two-fin tail. In order to "maximize the speed of the aircraft," the load per unit area of ​​the wing in the normal version of the combat load was increased to 149 kg / m 2 and up to 162 kg/m 2 in overload. In this regard, the wing area was reduced to 40 m G. The wing has become shorter and slightly narrower in comparison with the SB wing. At the same time, to ensure the necessary landing speed, it was supposed to use TsAGI flaps, which were a cross between conventional flaps and Fowler flaps. The wing profile was chosen as a high-speed NACA-22 type with a relative thickness at the root of 14.7% and at the tip of 8%.

The design of the SBB assumed the widespread use of open profiles instead of pipes, stamping, load-bearing skin. The skin of the SBB aircraft, and especially the wing, was smooth with flush riveting. The nose of the wing and its upper part between the spars of the wing had a sheathing of bakelite plywood glued to a metal frame. It was assumed that such a wing design should provide the necessary strength and good aerodynamics.

The fuselage was carried out in the form of a well-streamlined "airship form", which, according to experts. was the most advantageous in terms of aerodynamics.

Water radiators were located inside the center section of the wing with an entrance in the center section toe and an exit at the rear. Moreover, it was supposed to use aluminum ribbed type radiators of the design of the Leningrad SKB NKAP.

The tail support was carried out retractable in flight.

The design of the aircraft provided for a significant simplification of technology in comparison with the SB aircraft. Open profiles were used at SBB. including spars (instead of pipes on the SB). Open riveting was used throughout the car. A number of elements were made by stamping. The number of welded assemblies was reduced with their replacement by stamped ones from duralumin and steel.

The spars of the center section were steel channels with shelves interconnected by braces made of pipes, and in some places by a sheet.

The legs of the spars of the detachable part of the wing were made of two pressed corners riveted together with a side bent in section. The upper and lower belts were interconnected by a smooth sheet, supported by vertical corners-racks.

The ribs were stamped from sheet duralumin. The upper wing skin between the spars, working in compression, was reinforced from the inside with corrugation. This section of the upper skin of the center section "was not cut", but passed through the fuselage entirely through. For the same purpose, in order not to make any cutouts in the lower part of the wing, they refused to retract the landing gear into the wing.

For the "correct operation" of the bearing part of the skin, the docking of the weaning with the center section was carried out not at four points, but along the entire contour of the bow in the area between the spars.

The use of load-bearing skin ensured greater survivability of the aircraft and made it possible to better "perform the surface and maintain the wing profile."

The margin of safety according to the calculation was provided in the case of A. equal to 8 instead of 7 for the SB aircraft.

The M-105 with a TK-2 turbocharger was considered as the main motor of the SBB power plant. In addition to it, it was supposed to use the M-106 engine.

By this time, the M-105 had already passed 50-hour state tests, and the TK-2 turbocharger was installed on the SB aircraft with M-103 engines for flight tests.

In the future, in order to further improve the aerodynamics of the aircraft, it was supposed to install the M-105TK upside down. In this case, the layout of the engine installation and the radiator was improved and space was freed up in the wing to accommodate gas tanks instead of radiators. On this issue, there was an agreement with the engine builders of the 26th plant. However, in the future, such an option for a motor installation was abandoned, as it did not have significant advantages for a bomber aircraft over a traditional engine installation.

In both versions, it was supposed to use three-blade propellers of the 3-SMV-2 type variable in flight with a diameter of 3.25 m.

Normal bomb load was 600 kg, overload - 1000 kg (of which inside the fuselage - 800 kg). The nomenclature of air bombs included air bombs of calibers from 2.5 to 250 kg. At the same time, small fragmentation and incendiary bombs of 2.5-15 kg caliber, as well as chemical ampoules, were loaded into cassettes of small bombs. High-explosive bombs of 250 kg caliber and pouring aircraft devices of the VAP-200 type were hung only on external bomb racks. The reloading version of the bomb load was obtained using 10 FAB-100s, of which 8 were located in the fuselage, and a couple of “hundredths” were placed on external bomb racks.

Small arms included one UltraShKAS normal-caliber machine gun in the navigator's bow mount and one UltraShKAS or ShBAK-12.7 heavy machine gun on the kingpin at the gunner-radio operator. The ammunition load of the navigational machine gun was 600 rounds, and the gunner-radio operator - 800 rounds for the UltraShKAS and 300 rounds for the ShVAK.

SBB-1

The normal flight weight of the SBB with M-I05TK engines was 5961 kg, and with the M-106 engine - 5851 kg. The estimated maximum flight speed with M-105TK engines was to be 455 km/h near the ground and 612 km/h at an altitude of 9000 m. With M-106 engines - 587 km/h at an altitude of 7000 m.

The rate of climb of the bomber with the M-I05TK was expected to be higher than in the version with the M-106 engines - the SBB 2M-I05TK climbed to a height of 5000 m in 5.5 minutes, and the SBB 2M-I06 in 6 minutes.

In both variants, the takeoff run with normal flight weight without the use of flaps was 350 m. Landing speed did not exceed 118 km / h.

The flight range of the SBB at a speed of 0.8 from the maximum did not exceed 880 km in the variant with M-I05TK engines and 970 km for the variant with M-106 engines. In the reloading option for fuel, the maximum flight range with a take-off weight of 6466 kg could be no more than 1500 km.

To increase the flight range, the project provided for the suspension under the wing of outboard drop fuel tanks for 520 kg of fuel. In this case, the takeoff weight of the aircraft reached 7025 kg.

In general, as follows from the analysis of the flight tactical data of the SBB aircraft presented in the project, all the declared data were quite real, although overestimated in some respects. To the comments of the military on this matter, the Arkhangelsk Design Bureau promptly made the necessary changes to the project. According to additional materials, the maximum speed of the SBB 2M-I05TK-2 at an altitude of 8500 m was supposed to be 600 km / h, the flight range with 600 kg of bombs at 0.8 maximum speed was 800 km and the ceiling was 10500 m. But even these figures raised doubts. The head of the aircraft department of the 7th Main Directorate of the NKAP, I.I. Mashkevich, in his letter addressed to the Deputy Head of the 11th Main Directorate of the NKAP, Leontiev, indicated that: "...According to the flight data, a remark should be made regarding speed. The drag coefficients are taken underestimated, and therefore they need to be increased ... then the maximum speed with an efficiency of 0.7 instead of 0.76 is obtained at 9000 m as follows: ... 570 km / h. The rest of the data does not cause any comments. "

The conclusion on the preliminary design of the SBB was approved by the Head of the Air Force of the Spacecraft Army Commander of the 2nd rank A.D. Loktionov and the Member of the Military Council of the Air Force of the Spacecraft Divisional Commissar F.A. , with an overload of 1500 km without external suspension at a speed of 0.9 V poppy ".

In November 1939, after discussing the layout of the SBB, a decision was made to build the aircraft. According to the Decree of the Defense Committee of March 4, 1940, two copies of the B-1 and B-2 were built. The first option corresponded to the high-speed bomber variant, and the second to the dive bomber. The B-2 aircraft differed from the B-1 in a wider fuselage and a somewhat different layout of the forward fuselage.

An experimental copy of the B-1, which was powered by serial M-105 engines. was completed by October 1940, after which factory tests began. On October 20, the B-1 was taken to the airfield of the 22nd plant, ground work and taxiing were carried out. Mindful of the sad experience of testing SPB 2M-105. accompanied by disasters and numerous forced landings due to the fault of the M-105 engines. The first flights of the B-1 under the factory test program were decided to be performed from a large airfield. The aircraft was transported to the Central Airfield, where test flights were made on October 30. The flights showed the readiness of the B-1 for the first flight, however, due to the lack of a TsAGI conclusion on flutter, they did not dare to release the aircraft on the first flight. After receiving the conclusion from TsAGI, the pilot Yu. K. Stankevich on November 6 performed the first flight on the B-1. After completing 6 flights, which were generally successful, they decided to overtake the car in the summer back to the airfield of the 22nd plant in Fili. On November 26, 1940, after landing at the Fili airfield, the left landing gear strut broke while taxiing.

In the meantime, at the end of October 1940, M.A. Lipkim lifted the BB-22PB dive bomber into the air. which, with a flight weight of 5962 kg, showed a speed of 533 km / h at an altitude of 5100 m. The bomb load of the "twenty-second" included 4 FAB-100 or 2 FAB-250.

Preparations were in full swing for factory testing of the lead serial dive bomber PB-100 manufactured by plant No. 39. The first flights under the factory test program were scheduled for the first decade of December.

It was at this time, on November 18, 1940, that a meeting of the joint commission of the NKAP, Air Force and TsAGI was held, during which, based on a comparison of the main characteristics of the PB-100 bombers, SB-RK. BB-22G1B and B, it was concluded that it was expedient to launch the PB-100 aircraft as the main dive bomber of the Air Force KA aircraft and to keep the BB-22 series in the BB-22 series (for safety net, since it was built from non-deficient materials). With regard to the B-1 aircraft, it was indicated that the latter, compared to the PB-100, with the same engines and initial defensive weapons, has significantly better takeoff and landing characteristics and rate of climb. However, no decisions on B-1 (on the termination or on the intensification of work on the aircraft) were made by the commission. According to the commission's conclusion, "... aircraft B, compared to the PB-100, is one year late and has not yet passed the tests."

Such cautious behavior of the commission is quite understandable. On the one hand, the members of the commission may have already understood that in the event of war, the well-established technology of the B bomber and its good take-off, landing and aerobatic qualities would play an almost decisive role in the rapid deployment of mass production of combat vehicles and the training of wartime flight personnel. , which has in all respects a weak initial flight training. In addition, the launch of the Pe-2 bomber, which was rather difficult for the Soviet aviation industry, into mass production still concealed many pitfalls, but it was still not necessary to expect good results from the BB-22PB 2M-105. But, on the other hand, how the B-1 would behave in the future, and especially its motor installation, was still not completely clear. The members of the commission wisely decided not to take risks - "Better a tit in the hand than a crane in the sky." The decision on the B-1 was postponed "for later", and Arkhangelsky was left with a chance to bring his bomber to flight-combat condition.

SPB Polikarpov

Bomber Yakovlev Yak-4

Aircraft "100" Petlyakova

Pe-2 dive bomber

Taking advantage of the accident, the Arkhangelsk Design Bureau decided, along with the repair of the landing gear, to make a number of changes to the aircraft design based on the results of the first test flights. In its updated form, the B-1 bomber again went on a test flight only on February 20, 1441. From March 24 to July 9, 1941, factory tests were carried out, during which test pilot Yu. K. Stankevich reached an altitude of 4900 m maximum speed 540 km/h. It was expected that after the elimination of some design flaws, the speed of the bomber would increase to 560-565 km / h.

Then, in February 1941, Ar-2 N ° 1/511 entered the state tests at the Air Force Research Institute N° 1/511 with improvements made to its design based on the results of state tests of the lead Ar-2. The M-I05P motors on this aircraft were moved forward 150mm to improve longitudinal stability. VISH-22E propellers with a diameter of 3.1 m were installed. The motor reduction was changed to 0.59 (instead of 0.66). In addition, thinner brake grilles and jet exhaust pipes were installed on the aircraft. The aircraft's workmanship and surface finish have been greatly improved. These improvements made it possible to obtain a maximum speed near the ground of 443 km / h and 512 km / h at an altitude of 5000 m.

Seemingly. it is worth continuing to work on improving the aerodynamics of the Ar-2 and strengthening its weapons, thus ensuring the required flight and combat qualities of the aircraft in the series, as well as at an accelerated pace to bring the B-1 to the flight-combat state. However, fate decreed otherwise.

By this time, the lead Pe-2 (in accordance with the order of the SCAP No. 704 dated 00.12.40 PB-100 was renamed rt Pe-2 - author) had already successfully passed the tests, showing good results - with a flight weight of 7536 kg, the maximum speed was altitude of 5100 m was the coveted 540 km / h. ceiling - 8700 m. flight range 1200 km. Normal bomb load - 600 kg, overload - 1000 kg.

Starting from the new year, aircraft factories No. 39 and No. 22, designed for the Pe-2 series. began to roll out products onto the airfield. The leadership of the NKAP and the Air Force gained confidence in the early solution of all technological and organizational problems associated with the launch of the "pawn" in a large series.

On January 29, 1941, an experimental dive bomber "103" 2AM-37 designed by the NKVD OTB made its first flight under the factory test program. At the same time, the construction of an improved copy of this Yuzu 2AM-37 aircraft was in full swing at the 156th aircraft plant - the completion of work was planned for March.

According to the GKO Decree N? 401 dated October 11, 1940, the maximum speed of these variants of the "103" aircraft was to be 580-600 km / h at an altitude of 7000 m. Normal bomb load -1000 kg (overload up to 3000 kg), flight range with normal bomb load - 2500 km. small arms and cannon armament - 2 ShVAK cannons and 5 ShKAS machine guns.

The first results of factory tests of the "103" aircraft gave hope that the Air Force would soon be able to receive a strike aircraft, which, in terms of its flight and combat data, surpasses all combat vehicles of this class known at the beginning of 1941 and will completely solve "the task of arming the Red Army's BIS with front-line dive bombers ".

As a result, by the Decree of the Defense Committee of February 2, 1941, the serial production of the Yak-4 (by order of the NKAP No. 704 of December 9, 1940, BB-22 2M-105 was renamed the Yak-4) at aircraft factory No. 81 was discontinued. The serial production of the Arkhangelsk bomber, the Ar-2 2M-105, was also discontinued. At the 22nd aircraft plant, V. M. Petlyakov’s dive bomber Pe-2 was firmly established.

Bomb rack for dive bombing PB-3 for Ar-2

On April 1, 1941, A. I. Shaxyrin signed Order No. 291 "On the design and construction of the MoV-2 aircraft with the AM-38 engine designed by G. M. Mozharovsky and I. V. Venevidov." The design was entrusted to plant No. 32, and the construction was assigned to plant No. 89. Since A. A. Arkhangelsky had previously participated in the development of a preliminary design for this attack aircraft, on April 10, an order from the NKAP N? 309, according to which the entire design team of A. A. Arkhangelsky was transferred to the 32nd plant to ensure the design and construction of MoV-2.

Despite the difficulties associated with moving and settling in a new place, in the summer of 1941 the second version of the SBB was built - the B-2 dive bomber. It was assumed that, compared with the B-1, its maximum speed at the estimated altitude would be 40-60 km / h more.

At the same time, due to the success of the 103 and YuZU bombers during tests at the Air Force Research Institute of the KA, the interest of the military and the NKAP in aircraft B was steadily declining, and the outbreak of the war interrupted all work on this aircraft. A. A. Arkhangelsky himself, by order of the NKAP No. 823 dated August 9, 1941, was transferred to aircraft factory No. 156 to organize the repair and restoration of serial SB bombers. Later, the design bureau of A. A. Arkhangelsky was evacuated to Omsk in October 1941, and the B-1 aircraft was sent to the rear in December 1941. What happened to him next is unknown.

As you can see, the creation of a modern front-line bomber of the KA Air Force on the eve of a big war took place under the slogan "give speed", and certain successes were achieved in this direction. However, it must be admitted that the "high-speed" development of Soviet bomber-type aircraft was to the detriment of their basic combat qualities. Passion for speed at the then level of development of the Soviet aircraft industry, mainly engine building, naturally led to a serious decrease in the combat load of bombers, and hence to a decrease in "the power of bombing attacks on the enemy." So, the main Soviet front-line bomber Pe-2 had a very modest normal bomb load for such an aircraft - only 600 kg (for an overload of 1000 kg), and a high-speed short-range dive bomber BB-22PB and even less - 400 kg (for an overload of 500 kg).

At the same time, in the pre-war period, serious research was not carried out at all to find the optimal forms and methods for the combat use of aviation in modern warfare. As a result, work on determining the optimal directions for the development of aviation (the composition and organizational structure of the combat forces of aviation) and analyzing the combat effectiveness of aircraft did not receive due attention. various types in a future war. Accordingly, the appearance (flight performance data and structural diagram aircraft, the number of engines, the composition of the crew, the composition of weapons and the layout of its placement on the aircraft, required size ammunition load, etc.) of promising combat aircraft (fighter, front-line bomber, attack aircraft, etc.) and no recommendations were developed for improving the aircraft already in service with the Air Force.

In turn, the lack of a sound concept for the construction of the Red Army Air Force led to the fact that neither the military. neither the leadership of the country nor the NKAP on the eve of the war had a clear and precise understanding of what kind of combat aircraft, in what quantity and in what ratio it is necessary to equip the Air Force with spacecraft. And most importantly, there was no unity of views on these issues.

As a result, when making decisions on the creation of new generation combat aircraft, as well as on putting into service or decommissioning the Air Force of one or another aircraft, only some indicators were taken into account and compared. characterizing separately the flight and combat qualities of aircraft. In fact, all decisions were taken blindly by the Defense Committee, the UVVS and the NKAP and for the most part without taking into account the specific combat situation in which combat vehicles would have to fight.

Meanwhile, from the point of view of a combined arms commander, it is important not how fast, for example, a bomber flies, or what ceiling it has, but what damage a bomber can inflict on the enemy when performing a specific combat mission in the interests of ground forces. That is, for a combined arms commander, the important characteristics of a bomber are: the weight and composition of the bomb load, the effectiveness of the aircraft weapons used (air bombs, incendiary mixture, etc.) against specific targets, the accuracy of bombing and firing. On the other hand, the bomber solves a specific combat mission in the face of opposition from enemy fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery. And from these positions, the following are important: speed, maneuverability, ceiling, the effectiveness of defensive weapons, the combat survivability of the aircraft, etc.

In this regard, for the sake of completeness in describing the development of the Soviet concept of a high-speed attack aircraft, it is interesting to compare the pre-war serial and experimental dive bombers of the KA Air Force and the Luftwaffe - Ar-2, Pe-2. BB-22PB, "YUZU", SPB and Jn88A-4, in terms of their potential combat effectiveness in the fighting on the eastern front.

We will evaluate the combat effectiveness of bomber aircraft based on the probability that the latter will complete a specific combat mission to destroy targets in the interests of ground forces, or the probability of a bomber's combat success. In this case, the probability of a bomber's combat success is determined by the probabilities for the bomber not to be shot down by enemy fighters and anti-aircraft artillery on approach to the target and over the target, the probability of entering the target area with a given error. the probability of detecting the target visually and the probability of hitting the target during bombing.

Tupolev "103U" aircraft

German twin-engine dive bomber J1188А-4

All calculations for the compared aircraft were carried out for same conditions their combat use. Typical ground targets and conditions for ground and air battles on the eastern front were taken as initial data. Two methods of combat use of bombers were considered: dive bombing on a small-sized hard-to-vulnerable target (long-term defensive structures with a ceiling thickness of not more than 70 cm, bridges, warehouses, etc.), for the destruction of which the use of large-caliber bombs (250 kg and above) was required , and bombing from level flight at an area weakly protected or unprotected target (a column of infantry, vehicles and lightly armored vehicles, artillery and mortar guns in position, etc.). In all cases, the maximum characteristics of the aircraft were taken into account in the calculations.

The probabilities of the bomber reaching the target area and its detection in the calculations were taken equal to one. When calculating the probability of hitting a target during bombing, the characteristics of the vulnerability of the target in relation to specific types of weapons used were taken into account. Flight and shooting training of pilots and navigators is good.

When assessing the probability of a bomber being shot down by anti-aircraft artillery fire, it was assumed that the distribution of anti-aircraft artillery (Air guns) in the enemy's tactical defense zone was uniform. Since the working heights of front-line bombers on the eastern front were 2000-3000 m, only medium-caliber ZA barrels were taken into account in the calculations. Accounting for the anti-aircraft maneuver of the bomber was carried out by introducing an additional error in the aiming of anti-aircraft crews.

When calculating the probability of a bomber being shot down by a fighter, the following assumptions were made, which simplify the calculations, but do not affect the overall conclusion for comparative evaluation the combat effectiveness of bombers of various types:

the German Bf 109F-1 was taken as the enemy fighter, the detection and attack of the bomber by the enemy fighter is carried out from the loitering position in the air.

the probability of detecting a bomber by an attacking fighter pilot in the patrol zone is performed visually and is taken equal to 1,

when calculating the probability of a fighter launching an attack on an enemy bomber from the side of the rear hemisphere (i.e. approach and combat turn with access to the attack curve at the distance of opening fire), the dive characteristics, rate of climb and time of steady turn (radius) were taken into account, while in all calculations, it was assumed that the maximum overload on the attack curve, at which the pilot could conduct aimed fire, does not exceed 4 units,

- the probability of shooting down a bomber by a fighter was estimated taking into account the return fire of the bomber's air gunner,

- shooting and flight training of fighter pilots is good, shooting training of an air gunner is good,

- taking into account the anti-fighter maneuver of the bomber was carried out by introducing an additional error in aiming,

- the conditions of air battles (distribution of the firing angle, firing distance and burst length, maximum overload during an attack, etc.) were taken as typical for the period of air battles during the Great Patriotic War,

- sights: for fighters - optical, for an air gunner of a bomber - mechanical,

- fighter shooting in all cases - accompanying.

Calculations show that in standard conditions fighting on the eastern front, when solving the combat mission of destroying small-sized hard-to-reach targets, the Ar-2 dive bomber was almost 5.5 times more effective than the BB-22PB bomber, 1.4 times the Pe-2, and 1.3 times the German Ju88A-4.

When solving a combat mission to destroy an area weakly protected target from all serial Soviet bombers the best result was again shown by Ar-2. At the same time, the Pe-2 lagged behind the Ar-2 by 1.3 times, and the BB-22PB by almost 2.5 times. At the same time, the Ar-2 was inferior to the "Junkers" in terms of efficiency in this type of "combination" by about 1.3 times.

The experienced dive bomber "103U" 2AM-37 was superior in combat effectiveness to both Ar-2 and Ju88A-4 in solving any problems of air support for troops. Unlike its opponents, "103U" was able to carry three FAB-1000s (the maximum capacity of bomb racks) and "throw" them from a dive.

Unfortunately, the outbreak of the war did not allow the aircraft to be quickly brought to the flight-combat state - the AM-37 engine was removed from mass production, and the M-82A engine installed on the aircraft instead suffered from many "childhood" diseases. As a result, the first three serial Tv-2 2M-82 (by order of the NKAP No. 234 dated March 28, 1942, aircraft "103" were given the designation Tu-2) only got to the front in September 1942, and rhythmic and high-quality mass production ( already with M-82FM engines) was established only by the middle of 1944. However, the bomber lost the "ability" to bomb from a dive - the brake grids with the control system were removed from the aircraft. The car began to be classified as a medium bomber, designed "to perform the tasks of daytime bombing from level flight on the enemy's near rear."

A clear outsider in solving any combat mission is the BB-22PB. It should be recognized that the adoption by the Air Force of the spacecraft of the BB-22 aircraft in the version of the bomber is a gross mistake by the Air Force, the NKAP and the Defense Committee. It did not represent a real combat value, but a lot of effort and money was spent on its introduction into mass production and development in parts.

A serious mistake is also the termination of serial production of the Ar-2 bomber in favor of launching the Pe-2 bomber into mass production.

The apparent main drawback of the Ar-2 - the lower maximum flight speed compared to the Pe-2 - was completely "closed" by optimizing the tactics of the combat use of the dive bomber, the best organization interaction with cover and control fighters in combat. as well as training the flight crew of bomber regiments in air combat with enemy fighters singly and as part of a group. The example of the Luftwaffe pilots convinces of this. which, having attack aircraft with mediocre flight performance, achieved high combat effectiveness mainly due to the rational tactics of their combat use, excellent organization of interaction with their fighter aircraft and ground forces, and good flight and combat training of crews.

The main thing. The Ar-2 had excellent take-off and landing qualities and was more accessible than the Pe-2 for the development of young wartime sergeants. As you know, the Pe-2 did not tolerate high leveling at all - in this case, the chassis was guaranteed to break. The “pawns” broken down on the landings accounted for up to 30% of the defective machines in parts.

In any case, Ar-2 throughout the war could show better combat effectiveness in solving any combat mission of front-line bomber aviation than the main dive bomber of the Air Force KA, the Pe-2 aircraft.

As follows from the analysis of the potential combat effectiveness of the compared bombers, the German Ju88A-4 bomb weapon system was more consistent with the distribution of typical ground targets. against which aviation had to operate on the eastern front in the initial period of the war than the bomb armament of Soviet bomb carriers.

The main caliber of the "Junkers" was a 5 () -kg bomb - 28 pieces on board, while the bomb armament system of Soviet bombers was mainly designed for the suspension of 100-kg bombs (6-12 pieces). It was in this version of the suspension that the maximum load capacity of Soviet aircraft was used. When using bombs of a smaller caliber, Soviet bomb carriers turned out to be underloaded. For example, when hanging bombs of 50 kg caliber, the Pe-2 "did not get" 100 kg to the normal bomb load and 500 kg to the maximum.

At the same time, based on the characteristics of the vulnerability of typical ground targets in the initial period of the war (mechanized columns, artillery batteries in positions, etc.). the main type of aerial bombs was to be fragmentation bombs of 25 kg caliber and high-explosive 50 kg caliber bombs. as well as fragmentation bombs of smaller caliber. For example, the reduced area of ​​destruction of armored personnel carriers and light tanks when dropped from a height of 500-1000 m ten FAB-50m was about 400 m 2 , and six FA B-100 - only 180 m 2 .

In the directive of the Commander of the Air Force of the Spacecraft, Colonel-General of Aviation P. F. Zhigarev No. 14501 / 12153 of 01/25/42 on the results of the inspection of the combat operations of the air units of the Western and South-Western fronts in January 42, it was indicated on this occasion that: " ... In most aviation units air force On the Western and Southwestern fronts, the illiterate use of small arms, cannon and bomber weapons was noted ... The caliber and type of bombs used often do not correspond to the nature of the target. Standard charging is used: FAB-100 or FAB-50 even for targets that require destruction by their fragmentation bombs ... "

Carried out by the head of the department of small arms and cannon armament of VVA aircraft named after. N. E. Zhukovsky by military engineer 1st rank E. B. Lunts in February-March 1942, analysis of the combat experience of units of the Western and South-Western fronts (19th, 46th, 47th and 63rd garden) . 6th and 7th and a to air defense for the period June-December 1941 showed that in many cases bombs were used mainly based on the convenience and speed of preparing aircraft for combat sorties, while the security of targets and the effectiveness of action were not taken into account at all bombs (destructive power of fragments, high-explosive action, etc.).

According to Luntz. during the first 6 months of the war, all types of aviation spent 41.6% of sorties on the combat mission of destroying tanks, motorized troops, artillery in positions and manpower of the enemy, 2.5% on actions at enemy airfields and on railway . objects - 1.6%. The remaining sorties were associated with the performance of combat missions without the use of bombs.

That is, instead of using fragmentation bombs of the AO-25s, AO-25m type and high-explosive bombs of the FAB-50 type. FAB-50m bomber air units used bombs of the FAB-100 type - 56% of the weight of all air bombs dropped on the enemy.

At the end of his report, Professor Lunts proposed "... to decommission the FAB-100" and "... to prohibit units in pursuit of tonnage from using bombs that do not correspond to the nature of the target (for example, FAB-100 instead of FAB-50m or AO-25)".

On the other hand, at the beginning of the war there were few enemy ground targets, which required the use of large-caliber air bombs (bunkers, bunkers, bridges, warehouses, etc.), and to make changes to the design of combat aircraft in order to ensure maximum loading of bombs caliber 50-25 kg was "troublesome", and risky. So, in order to remedy the situation, it was necessary to urgently create more effective 100-kg bombs in terms of fragmentation. The most successful, as you know, were the high-explosive fragmentation OFAB-YuO and the incendiary ZAB-YuOTsK. OFAB-YuO had a powerful high-explosive effect at break and gave a lot of heavy fragments, which at a distance of up to 10 m from the point of detonation could penetrate the German tank armor up to 30 mm thick and disabled 155 mm field guns. In turn, the incendiary "weaving" - easily pierced the ceilings of buildings, knocking out windows and doors with a high-explosive blow, thereby providing air flow for the spread of fire.

The situation changed in 1944-45, when the Red Army and the KA Air Force faced a particularly strong defense of the Wehrmacht. As you know, the German fortified areas were a target that was rather difficult for aviation to reach due to the high saturation of air defense systems. small size and high strength of long-term reinforced concrete defensive structures. The usual density was up to 6 bunkers and bunkers per 1 km of the front, although in some cases their number reached 20 per 1 km of the front. The SD strip along the front ranged from 30 to 140 km. and the total number of bunkers and bunkers - from 60 to 900. At the same time, the capabilities of the main front-line bomber of the Air Force KA Pe-2 were still insufficient - two FAB-250 standard bomb loads (4 FAB-250 "dragged" rarely) did not provide the required the probability of hitting the fortifications of the Wehrmacht, and the Tu-2 2M-82 bomber. as noted above, by this time it had already lost its diving properties.

That's when the finest hour of the Arkhangelsk Ar-2 dive bomber could come - his ability to carry 6 FAB-250s or three 500-kg bombs and "throw" them from a dive could be more useful than ever to the Red Army. By this time, the Ar-2 would have already gone a certain way to improve its flight performance by strengthening defensive weapons, improving aerodynamics, increasing the power of the power plant and combat survivability. Naturally, the Ar-2 could not completely replace the Tu-2, but would complement it with success.

It remains only to regret that as of June 1, 1941, the units of the Air Force KA had only 164 Ar-2 2M-Yu5 aircraft, of which: 147 (3 faulty) aircraft - in parts of the Military Districts, the rest - in parts of the Center and at plant 22. In the context of the strategic retreat of the Red Army and the frankly poor organization of combat operations by aviation and ground forces, the Ar-2 bombers could not show all that they were capable of. In addition, due to the lack of the required cover by their fighters and insufficient training of the flight crew, most of the Ar-2 was lost already in the first months of the war - according to official data from the Air Force Headquarters of the KA, the combat losses of the Ar-2 in 1941 amounted to 95 aircraft.

It should be noted that the leadership and specialists of the Air Force of the Navy of the spacecraft, when developing a plan for equipping fleet aviation in 1941 with modern combat aircraft, considered the Ar-2 as the main type of dive bomber, and the "pawn" - mainly as a long-range escort fighter. But no one "heard" their opinion ...

If we take into account that the Su-2 short-range bomber in the conditions of a big war "according to the rules" turned out to be untenable as a type of combat aircraft, and the Il-2 AM-38 armored attack aircraft did not fully meet the requirements of modern warfare, then we have to state: the combat strength On the eve of the war, on the eve of the war, the armament of strike aviation of the Air Force turned out to be inconsistent with the nature and conditions of hostilities. Since the beginning of the war, this circumstance, combined with the insufficient level of combat training of the flight personnel of the units and the operational-tactical training of the command staff of aviation formations and headquarters, as well as the leadership of the Air Force and the Red Army, led to the low effectiveness of air support for their troops and heavy losses from enemy fire .

Drawings for the article by Oleg Rastrenin about the Ar-2 aircraft were made by Sergey Ershov

SB with M-100 motors

Arkhangelsk

The war in Spain showed the insufficient speed of the Soviet "high-speed bombers". An attempt to extend the life of the SB was the creation of an experimental MMN aircraft with M-105 engines. It was presented for state tests in September 1939. It differed from the SB bis 3 aircraft in engines, a more perfect shape of the forward fuselage, reduced by 8.5 sq.m. the area of ​​the detachable parts of the wing, a significantly increased area of ​​the flaps and horizontal tail, as well as the design of the detachable parts of the wing using beam spars and ribs stamped from a sheet.

Based on the experience of creating and flight testing the MMN aircraft, the Arkhangelsky brigade developed the latest modification of the SB - the dive bomber SB-RK (expanded wing, wing radiators or SB with radiators placed in the wing), which completed the development of one of the most popular and famous combat aircraft world in the 1930s. It was as a dive bomber that the SB-RK type showed good results. The Red Army Air Force did not have such machines at that time, and the experience of fighting at the beginning of World War II in Poland and Finland showed both the need to hit small targets and the advantages of Germany, which had a specially designed single-engine dive bomber Ju-87.

Outwardly, the RK differed from the SB in the presence of aerodynamic brake grilles under the wing on its front spar, an improved shape of the engine nacelles, and a reduced height of the vertical tail.

Brake grids, made of steel pipes, had an oval cross section. When entering into a dive, after opening the valve of the air system, the brake grids deviated to a position perpendicular to the flow. The release of the gratings was signaled to the pilot by mechanical indicators - "soldiers" emerging from the wing skin in the area between the 10th and 11th ribs. Entering into a dive was carried out by simultaneously deflecting up the trimmers of the elevators. When the bomb release button or the duplicate command button was pressed, the trimmers returned to their original position.

The front part of the fuselage of the SB-RK was completely redesigned, with an increased view to the pilot and navigator, providing direct communication between them (i.e., the pilot and navigator could exchange gestures or transmit something to each other). The pilot is shifted to the left to get a forward view when entering a dive through the glazing of the navigation cockpit, his instrument panel is mainly grouped on the right side of the cockpit. The pilot's canopy opens back up. The navigator has a significantly increased glass area and a second control with a folding steering wheel is installed.

Armament. The aircraft was armed with 4 ShKAS machine guns (two of them at the rear upper and lower points) and could carry up to 1500 kg of bombs (with external suspension).

The NU-type bow gun mount (called NU-DBZF in a number of documents, since I am developing primarily for a new modification of the DB-ZF bomber) has one ShKAS machine gun with a supply of 500 rounds of ammunition. The ShKAS machine gun in this installation was mounted in a special ball head, the so-called. "Apple", allowing firing forward in a cone of 50 °. The machine gun is powered by a flexible sleeve from a cartridge box on the starboard side of the navigational cockpit.

The upper aft machine gun mount designed by Toropov with shelling only the rear hemisphere received the designation TSS-1 (high-speed aircraft turret), equipped with a K-8T collimator sight, has a supply of 1000 rounds of ammunition. The turret was a semi-circle (sector), along which a carriage with a machine gun head moved. In the stowed position, the machine gun was mounted on the port side, in the lantern there was a small cutout for this position. Upper lantern, so-called. "Turtle", when firing, moved back on rollers along the rails and partially rose up to protect the shooter from the oncoming air flow. The shelling from the TSS-1 could be carried out 90 ° to the left and right, up to 60 °, down to 30 °.

For the defense of the lower hemisphere, a retractable MV-2 turret with a ShKAS machine gun, with an OP-2L sight, with a supply of 600 rounds of ammunition, was installed on the SB-RK. The MV-2 was mounted on a special frame (cradle), which rose up in the stowed position. In the central part of the frame, in the area of ​​​​the machine gun handle, there was a copier limiter that prevented it from getting into its crutch wheel. When transferring the MV-2 to a combat position, the two lower glazed doors opened, after which the machine gun, together with the cradle, fell out. Aimed shooting from the MV-2 made it possible to fire at 30 ° to the sides, vertically from 4-5 to 55 °.

To drop bombs of 250 kg or 500 kg caliber, new NP-1 holders were equipped under the SB-RK center section. The bombs were fastened in the area of ​​​​the center of gravity for one central lock and were additionally fixed with the help of side stops.

For aiming, the navigator was equipped with the NKPB-3 sight (for bombing at night and at low altitudes) and the OPB-1M sight. The pilot was equipped with a PBP-1 collimator sight, designed for dive bombing.

The weight of the empty aircraft was 4430 kg, the flight weight - 6650 kg, and with overload - 7800 kg. Its speed at an altitude of 4700 m was 480 km / h, cruising was 320 km / h, it gained 3000 m in 7.25 minutes. The ceiling was 10100 m. The flight range was 1500 km.

In accordance with the government decree on the renaming of combat aircraft, in the order of the NKAP dated December 9, 1940, the SB-RK was renamed Ar-2 (the first letters of the surname of the chief designer and the even number "2", with which the numbering of all aircraft of which -or design bureaus, if they were bombers, attack aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft and transporters). This is explained by the fact that all work on SB aircraft, starting from the design, was carried out by the team of A.A. Arkhangelsky - until 1936 under the leadership of A.N. Tupolev, and from the spring of 1938 independently at the factories.

Despite the fact that the flight speed of the Ar-2 increased due to more powerful engines, a smaller wing area and improved aerodynamics of the airframe (as well as rate of climb and ceiling), the available information about the tests of the Messerschmitt Bf109E fighter purchased in Germany said that this was clearly not enough. Ar-2 was inferior to him in speed by more than 60 km / h. By the way, the German influence also affected the Ar-2 and not only in the concept of its appearance: such technical solution, as an automatic device for entering and withdrawing an aircraft from a dive, similar to that installed on the Ju 88 - was mastered in production at the Moscow plant N 213 and was used on it and the Pe-2.

According to an extract from the control journal of the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry of the USSR "Dynamics of Aircraft Production" in 1940, 71 Ar-2s were produced. Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On the program for the production of aircraft and aircraft engines in 1941" N 2466-1096ss of December 7, 1940 established the program for the production of 1000 Ar-2 2M-105 in 1941 for the People's Commissariat of Aviation Industry, including 300 in the first quarter, 300 in the second, 250 in the third and 150 in the fourth. From the first quarter of 1942, the release of this aircraft was no longer expected. An extract from the control log of the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry of the USSR for the production of aircraft in 1941 indicates that 122 Ar-2s were manufactured at the 22nd aviation plant in the first quarter, including 100 in January, 20 in February, and in March - 2. "Plan of current military orders for NPO, NKVMF and NKVD for aviation weapons for the II quarter of 1941" (Appendix N1 to the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of the USSR N 908-383ss of April 12, 1941) contained information on the supply of 3 Ar -2 for the People's Commissariat of Defense. There are detailed data from the "Plan for the retraining of the flight personnel of the Red Army Air Force units on the new materiel for 1941." dated February 19, 1941 on the receipt by the relevant units of the Ar-2 aircraft and on the timing of the retraining of these units. 11 formations were to complete their studies by May 1, 1941. The new-generation Pe-2 bomber that replaced the Ar-2 was created in a big hurry, by converting a high-altitude long-range fighter into a dive bomber. It retained the great speed of its prototype, but compared to the older SB and Ar-2 had a small bomb load and a relatively short range.

* According to other sources 12.640 m
** According to other sources 7.1 min