creations
Early 40s. The 22nd Aircraft Plant, in accordance with the decision of KO No. 230 of July 29, 1939, switches in January 1940 to the production of SB aircraft of a modernized version with installed M-105 engines, and two months later with M-106 engines. The motors provided the aircraft with a speed of 500 km / h and a flight altitude of up to 6.5 kilometers.

At this time, tests began on the second aircraft with M-104 "MMN" engines and on the SB aircraft number 20/207, which provided for an installation for filling fuel tanks with gas. There were tests of aircraft SB number 18/206 with M-103, with TK-2 compressors installed. There was a development of the installation of compressors on aircraft with the M-105.

The following Decree No. 240 of 06/01/40 obliges designers to test 3 SB aircraft with M-105TK-2 engines installed before the beginning of September. But the difficulties that arose did not allow the three aircraft to be equipped with new engines on time. New engines received two of them, and none of them pass the test. Turbochargers "did not work" on other test samples. High-altitude aircraft production schedules have been heavily adjusted. The design bureau of A. Arkhangelsky was supposed to test two SB aircraft with M-105TK-2, and send one aircraft with 2M-J05TK-2 for state tests, after which, immediately begin manufacturing 20 SB 2M-105TK-2 aircraft, which will go to military tests. And to speed up the installation of turbochargers on SB with 2M-103 engines. In addition to work on engines and a turbocharger, other developments and tests were carried out - weapons systems, equipment and bombing. Flight tests were carried out, during which they practiced diving aircraft equipped with M-104 and M-103 engines. To ensure bombing in a dive, a bomb limiter was developed to exit the aircraft from a dive. It was installed on the serial aircraft SB number 11/248, with 2M-103 engines installed.

In mid-July 1940, military tests of 5 SBs with 2M-105 engines and VISH-22E propellers and several DB-3 with VISH-23 propellers, made in a dive version, begin. The 2nd sample of SB-RK number 1/281 was equipped with the first copies of the brake movable gratings and a Ju88 type machine for exiting a dive. This equipment began to be produced at plant 213 located in Moscow. Since July 27, this aircraft has been undergoing 2-week tests. In addition to dive bombing, rocket-type projectiles began to be fired from aircraft. According to the results of these tests, rocket weapon systems for aircraft began to be developed in a forced mode. Aircraft armed with missile batteries, in a dive at an angle of 45/60 degrees, would have to destroy such armored and hard-to-reach objects as tanks, river and sea-based ships, etc. RBS systems were executed under 82, 132 and 203 mm caliber ammunition. With the standardization of rocket ammunition, it was possible to replace the armor-piercing warhead with a concrete-piercing one, which would ensure the destruction of protected fortification-type structures. Objects with conventional protection - gun mounts, vehicles, air defense objects and manpower - were planned to be destroyed by 132-mm high-explosive fragmentation rocket projectiles. The main advantage of the RBS over the same bombs is the increased accuracy of diving and the power of the warhead. Firing involved the use of a volley of two, four, eight and one shells. It was volley fire that was most preferable when firing RBS. The main carriers of the RBS systems were to be I-15bis, I-16 with 8 RBS caliber 82 mm, "SB aircraft with 22 RBS caliber 132 mm", DB-3 with 9 RBS caliber 203 mm. Placement - wing and fuselage, depending on the aircraft and its purpose. Installation and dismantling of launchers from the RBS on the aircraft - 1-3.5 hours by technical personnel.

Tests of aircraft SB number 221 with rocket armor-piercing and fragmentation shells RS / RBS - 132, installed under the wing of the aircraft, took place at the training ground from 26.06.40 to 04.08.40. Dive shooting with angles of attack of 45-50 degrees was practiced, the range of application was 1.5-1.7 kilometers. The KVO of the RBS-132 shells turned out to be 1.4 times less than the KVO of the RS-132 - 30 (39) meters in the lateral direction, 39 (55) meters in range. And although the shooting was considered successful, the RBS-132 is forbidden to be used from aircraft - when the projectiles were launched from a gas jet, the ailerons of the aircraft were deformed. It was considered inappropriate to somehow change the very design of the RBS suspension. But the Pe-2, Il-2 and Su-2 aircraft in the middle of 1941 are undergoing field tests already without such "troubles".

The above events are not accidental - it was against the backdrop of ongoing events that the modernization of SB aircraft was going on. Aerodynamic improvements for the SB-RK - the results of tests of the MMN 2M-105 and SB-RK 2M-105, which took place in mid-1939 and 1940, and the SBB aircraft, which was tested as part of the SB modifications. According to the decision of the KO dated 06/01/1940 number 240, aircraft plant number 22 by 08/15/1940 should build three SB-RK aircraft with improved aerodynamics of the reference sample. They were supposed to show a maximum altitude speed of 490 km / h, and have a safety margin of at least 8.5.

Design and equipment of the reference SB-RK:
- the bow was installed from the MMN F-1 aircraft, which showed good aerodynamics during tests;
- a reduced (in height) cockpit lamp for the gunner-radio operator "turtle" was installed;
- sheathing between frames 4 and 8 was made of balinite plywood glued to the wooden parts of frames 5,6,7 with VIM glue;
- install sub-frames of improved design;
- motors received improved hoods;
- used in the construction of the aircraft water radiators of finned-tubular type;
- a new oil supply system was installed - one water-oil and one air-oil radiators, for each motor;
- modernized oil-benzo tanks, the installed tanks have a capacity of 330 liters each;
- installed propellers (D=3m) with variable pitch VISH-22E;
- for aiming during bombing without picking, NKPB-3 and OPB-1M sights were installed;
- to carry out the aiming of bombs at the target during a dive, a PBP-1, an attitude indicator and an overload signaling device were installed;
- install brake grids under the planes on hydraulic control;
- automatic dive exit;

Armament SB-RK:
- ShKAS machine gun with a mechanical type sight in a ball mount on the nose, 500 rounds of ammunition;
- ShKAS machine gun with a K-8T collimator sight in the rear TSS-1 installation of the upper version. Ammunition thousand shots;
- ShKAS machine gun with an OP-2L sight in the lower turret of a retractable MV-2 type. Ammunition 600 shots;
- bomb load one ton, maximum 1.5 tons. FAB-250 - up to 4 units or FAB-500 up to 3 units in a dive, and FAB-500 up to 3 units or FAB-250 up to units, or 12 units of aerial bombs up to 100 kilograms of horizontal bombing;
- chemical weapons - 2 VAP-500 (up to 1000 kilograms) of the pouring type and 2 UHAP-500 (up to 100 kilograms) of the universal type. It is possible to use any type of substances and mixtures that are in service;

The first tests of the SB-RK reference sample begin in the autumn of 1940. After a dozen flights, the main defects were revealed:
- the temperature of water and oil in flight did not fall below 95 degrees;
- longitudinal stability was insufficient.
The aircraft continued to install improved models of equipment and assemblies. State tests end at the beginning of 1941. Reference sample of the SB-RK by order number 704 dated 09.12. 1940 is renamed the AR-2 aircraft. State test results:
- AR-2 - weight 6.6 tons;
- high-rise ceiling 10 kilometers;
- range when armed with 2 FAB-250 at an altitude of 5 kilometers and a speed of 390 km / h - a thousand kilometers;
- climb 5 kilometers - just over 7 minutes;
- the maximum speed was reached at an altitude of 4.7 kilometers - 475 km / h;
- runway runway - 340 meters.

Longitudinal instability was solved by "re-centering" - the factory 30.5-32.7 percent MAR had to be replaced with 27.25 percent MAR. In addition, tests have shown that it is quite possible to continue flying with the 1st throttled motor. Indicators of dives carried out at state tests:
- the number of dives carried out - 25;
- dive angles - 40 75 degrees;
- speed before diving - up to 300 km / h;
- climbed height before diving - 4 kilometers;
- exit speed from a dive - 550 km / h;
- average value overloads - 4.5.
- the time of the straight section, which provides targeted bombing -9 seconds.

The main disadvantages of the aircraft are the disadvantages of creating a rotorcraft group. During tests, due to the destruction of engine systems, they often failed, the cooling system had low limit values, and it became problematic to operate the machines in winter. Water radiators were made without the normal ability to drain water. The issue of oil and water overheating remained unresolved. Note that in the future, the design bureau of A. Arkhangelsky nevertheless brought to mind the rotorcraft group on the AR-2.

February 1941. Ar-2 enters state tests under the number 1/511. Changes made to this aircraft:
- the motors are moved forward by 15 centimeters to ensure longitudinal stability;
- install screws VIT1T-22E (D=3.1 m);
- exhaust pipes and brake grilles are made thinner;
- Improved the overall quality of aircraft manufacturing.
Ultimately, this led to an increase in the speed of the aircraft: at an altitude of 5 kilometers, it showed 512 km / h. But the creation of this aircraft was not a priority, other aircraft undergoing testing and development were held under the peculiar slogan "increase in speed." As a result, bombers with increased speed characteristics could not be fully used for their intended purpose - the payload was at least halved.

At the beginning of WW2, the Red Army had about 160-165 Ar-2 2M-105 aircraft. Due to the unsatisfactory organization of interaction between aviation and ground forces, poor training of command and flight personnel, the "pursuit of victory", the lack of tactics for using bombers, the capabilities of the Ar-2 aircraft were not fully used. And the lack of fighter cover tactics led to the fact that by the end of 1941, most of the Ar-2 was lost.

In 1941, the production of the AR-2 was discontinued in favor of the mass production of the Pe-2 bomber. And although many experts and leaders of aviation and navy considered the Ar-2 as the main dive bomber, and the Pe-2 as its long-range escort fighter, everything happened, on the contrary, with the subsequent stop of the production of the Ar-2. In total, from 1939 to 1941, about 200 Arkhangelsk dive bombers were built.

TTX PB Ar-2:
- wing span 18 meters;
- length 12.5 meters;
Height 3.5 meters;
- empty weight / norm / max - 4.5 / 6.6 / 8.1 tons;
- DU - two PD "M-150R", total power 2200 hp;
- team - 3 people;
- armament 7.62 mm ShKAS machine gun - 4 units, payload (air bombs) - up to 1.6 tons.

Ar-2

The appearance of a dive bomber among the Germans could not go unnoticed by the leadership of our Air Force, and it puzzled the designers with the problem of creating a domestic analogue. One of the ways to solve this problem was to create a diving modification of our Sat.
This modification was originally called RK- extended wing. The wing was not so much expanded as reduced in scope. its span has decreased by 2.3 m, and its area - by 8.5 sq.m. At the same time, the aileron area decreased from 2.317 to 1.686 sq.m. The area of ​​the center landing flap, on the contrary, was increased in order to reduce landing speed.
Externally SB-RK different from Sat the presence of aerodynamic brake grilles under the wing on its front spar, an improved shape of the engine nacelles, a reduced height of the vertical tail. New engines were also very noticeable. So, if on Sat M-103 engines with a capacity of 960 liters were used. s., then on SB-RK two M-105R engines were installed, each of which produced 1050 hp. The M-105 differed from the M-103 in that it had an increased compression ratio, a two-speed centrifugal supercharger, and two exhaust valves per cylinder. some sources claim that the M-105 had a smaller displacement than the R-103. However, in fact, the cylinder diameter from 150 to 148 millimeters was reduced even during the transition from the M-103 to the M-103A. The letter "P" in the engine index indicated a changed gear ratio of the gearbox - 0.59 instead of 0.666 for the basic version of the M-105P, which, in addition, was also designed to install an air gun in the collapse of the cylinders. The motor with the index "P" was intended not for fighters, but for bombers. Exactly the same motors with the index "P" were subsequently installed on . Lamellar radiators for cooling the engines are installed inside the detachable part of the wing with air intakes located in their leading edge. The regulation of the flow of cooling air was carried out by movable flaps marked out on the upper surface of the wing. In connection with the installation of radiators, the capacity of the wing fuel tanks was reduced to 330 liters compared to 405 liters on Sat.

Not only the pilot, but also the navigator could fly the aircraft, which increased the combat survivability of the vehicle. brake grids.
Brake grids made of steel pipes of oval section. When entering into a dive, after opening the air system valve, brake grids deflected to a position perpendicular to the flow. The release of the gratings was signaled to the pilot by mechanical indicators - “soldiers” emerging from the wing skin in the area between the 10th and 11th ribs. Entering into a dive was carried out by simultaneously deflecting up the trimmers of the elevators. When the bomb release button or the duplicate command button was pressed, the trimmers returned to their original position.
Front fuselage SB-RK. completely redesigned, with increased visibility to the pilot and navigator, providing direct communication between them, that is, the pilot and navigator could exchange gestures or transmit something to each other. The pilot was moved to the left to get a forward view during the dive approach through the navigation cockpit windows, his instrument panel is mainly grouped on the right side of the cockpit. The canopy of the pilot's cabin opened back with a lift up. The navigator has a significantly increased glass area and a second control with a folding steering wheel is installed.

The aircraft was armed with four machine guns, two of which were located at the rear upper and lower points, and could carry up to 1500 kg of bombs (with external suspension).
Bow gun mount of the "NU" type (in a number of documents it is called NU-DBZF, because I am developing primarily for a new modification of the bomber DB-3f ) has one machine gun with a supply of 500 rounds of ammunition. The machine gun in this installation was mounted in a special ball head, the so-called "apple", which allows firing forward in a 50 ° cone. The machine gun is powered by a flexible sleeve from a cartridge box on the starboard side of the navigational cockpit.
The upper aft machine gun mount designed by Toropov with shelling only the rear hemisphere received the designation TSS-1 (high-speed aircraft turret), equipped with a K-8T collimator sight, has a supply of 1000 rounds of ammunition. The turret was a semi-circle (sector), along which a carriage with a machine gun head moved. In the stowed position, the machine gun was mounted on the port side, in the lantern there was a small cutout for this position. The upper lantern - the so-called turtle - when firing was moved back on rollers along the rails and partially rose up to protect the shooter from the oncoming air flow. The shelling from the TSS-1 could be carried out 90 ° to the left and right, up to 60 °, down to 30 °.
For the defense of the lower hemisphere on SB-RK. installed retractable turret MV-2 with a machine gun, with an OP-2L sight, with a supply of 600 rounds of ammunition. The MV-2 was mounted on a special frame (cradle), which rose up in the stowed position. In the central part of the frame, in the area of ​​​​the machine gun handle, there was a copier limiter that prevented it from getting into its crutch wheel. When transferring the MV-2 to a combat position, the two lower glazed doors opened, after which the machine gun, together with the cradle, fell out. Aimed shooting from the MV-2 made it possible to fire at 30 ° to the sides, vertically from 4-5 to 55 °.
For dropping bombs of 250 kg or 500 kg caliber under the center section SB-RK. new holders NP-1 were equipped. The bombs were fastened in the area of ​​​​the center of gravity for one central lock and were additionally fixed with the help of side stops.

For aiming at the navigator SB-RK there was an NKPB-3 sight (for bombing at night and at low altitudes) and an OPB-1M sight. The pilot, on the other hand, used the PBP-1 collimator sight, designed for dive bombing.
The weight of the empty aircraft was 4430 kg, the flight weight - 6650 kg, and with overload - 7800 kg. Its speed at an altitude of 4700 m was 480 km / h, cruising was 320 km / h, it gained 3000 m in 7.25 minutes. The ceiling was 10100 m. The flight range was 1500 km.
In accordance with the government decree on the renaming of combat aircraft, in the order of the NKAP dated December 9, 1940 No. SB-RK. was renamed to Ar-2 by the first letters of the designer's last name. This constructor was Alexander Alexandrovich Arkhangelsky who designed not only SB-RK, but at one time he headed a team that designed himself Sat.
Arkhangelsky was the eternal right hand of Tupolev, and remained the right hand of his son after the death of Andrei Nikolaevich. Ar-2 became the only aircraft produced under his name.
Admission Ar-2 into military formations began in the second half of 1940. A distinctive feature was the transfer of single copies of aircraft simultaneously with conventional and diving Sat.
In 1940, the troops received about fifty dive bombers (still under the designation SB-RK). In 1941, before the German attack, deliveries amounted to 120 Ar-2. Thus, by the start of hostilities, most of the 192 dive bombers built Ar-2 was in the army.
One of the first in the fall of 1940 received Ar-2(still under the designation SB-RK.) 13th sbap of Colonel Ushakov. In June 1941, the 13th Sbap was armed with 51 Sat and Ar-2.
On June 22, 1941, the Borisovshchizna airfield, where the 13th Sbap was based, was repeatedly bombed, as a result of which most of the aircraft were lost. By the beginning of July, the regiment had completely lost its military equipment and its personnel were sent for retraining on.
18 Ar-2 had the 73rd BAP of the Air Force of the Baltic Fleet, based in Pörnov (now Pärnu). On June 30, the 73rd bap took part in the attack of German motorized columns in the Dvinsk region (now Daugavpls). The 2nd squadron of Captain Syromyatnikov from the 73rd bap flew twice that day, consisting of seven or eight Ar-2 and carried out the combat mission without loss on its part. July 10, 1941 Five Ar-2 On the 73rd bap, sea transports were bombed in Pernovo, which had been abandoned shortly before by the troops of the Red Army, and on July 13, 1941 11 Ar-2 participated in striking a German naval convoy in the Ust-Dvinsk region (now Daugavgriva). June 30 b Ar-2 at 7.37 in the morning she struck from a dive on German transports from a height of 2500 m. On July 20, the crews Ar-2 sank a German destroyer, and on the 23rd in the area of ​​​​the island of Nagu caused serious damage to the Finnish battleship. The combat activity of the 73rd bap continued until October 1941. Before the withdrawal for reorganization, the regiment lost 15 aircraft Ar-2.
In the future, the regiment fought near Leningrad on airplanes.
In the spring of 1941 aircraft Ar-2 entered service with the 27th Fighter (?!) Air Regiment of the Moscow Military District, which was then based at the Moscow Central Airfield on Khodynka. On June 23, 1941, the 2nd Squadron of this regiment in full strength flew to the Western Front in order to counter the advance of enemy mechanized columns. In total, the squadron completed 89 sorties, 41 of them were dives. During the fighting, the squadron did not lose a single Ar-2, but 15 crew members were killed. Mostly gunners-radio operators died, but it happened that pilots were killed or wounded. In this case, dual control came to the rescue, and the navigator brought the car to the airfield.

Until the end of 1941, 95 of the 192 aircraft produced were lost. Ar-2. The surviving dive-bombers were transferred from regiment to regiment, until, finally, the last planes participating in the battles in the Moscow direction fell into the 1-inbap (night bomber aviation regiment). The latest information about the actions of the Ar-2 as part of the 1st NBAP dates back to February 1942, when the twin-engine bombers were transferred to the rear units.

Pilots of the 1st nbap against the background of one of the Ar-2
During the summer battles of 1941, about a dozen Ar-2 went to the Germans at the airfields they captured. The condition of these aircraft was quite good, as they were abandoned with minimal damage or even intact, but without fuel and weapons. Judging by the German photographs, at least one aircraft was restored to flying condition and put into service.

Ar-2 from 33th sbap captured by the Germans at the airfield

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The dive bomber has become one of the most effective means of air warfare and is rightfully one of the symbols of WW2. With this name, the infamous "Thing" Ju-87 and Ju-88 are immediately recalled. Of the Soviet dive bombers, we immediately recall the Pe-2, less often the Tu-2. But we undeservedly forget one of the most interesting machines, a deep modernization of the legendary SB, and besides, it was really in service - the Ar-2 dive bomber. Which was a real alternative to the Pe-2 and could become the main dive bomber of the Soviet Air Force in WWII.

The Red Army Air Force did not have such machines at that time, and the experience of fighting at the beginning of World War II in Poland and Finland showed both the need to hit small targets and the advantages of Germany, which had a specially designed single-engine dive bomber Ju-87.

The war in Spain showed the insufficient speed of the Soviet "high-speed bombers". An attempt to extend the life of the SB was the creation of an experimental MMN aircraft with M-105 engines. It was presented for state tests in September 1939. Work was underway to increase the flight range of serial SBs, as well as intensive tests of SBs with various weapon systems, equipment, etc. In particular, specialists from the NIP AV VVS, together with the Scientific Research Institute of the VVS and TsAGI, during 1939 carried out work on developing methods of bombing from a dive on the SB. TsAGI developed a special PB-3 bomb rack, which ensured the safe removal of air bombs from the bomb bay during dive bombing. During testing, PB-3 "worked flawlessly."

At the beginning of 1940, the Arkhangelsk design bureau at the 22nd aircraft plant continued intensive work to improve the security system both in terms of the current modernization of the aircraft and its components, and in terms of the implementation of two main areas of modernization: small - mainly due to improving the aerodynamics of the aircraft (result - achievement of a maximum speed of 500 km / h) and large - due to changes in the design of the aircraft (result - achievement of a maximum speed of 600 km / h).

According to the Decree of the CO under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 230 dated July 29, 1939, aircraft factory No. 22 was obliged from January 1940 to completely switch to the production of modernized SB aircraft with M-105 engines, "Ensuring their release in an amount not less than the program of 1939", and from March - to produce all SBs with M-106 engines with a maximum speed of 500 km / h at an altitude of 6500 m.

In January 40, the 2nd copy of the MMN aircraft with M-104 engines, the SB No. 20/207 aircraft with an installation for filling gas tanks with inert gas, began to fly.

On July 15, 1940, military trials of five serial SB bombers with 2M-105 with VISH-22E propellers in a dive version began. PB-3 bomb racks were installed on the SB 2M-105.

Simultaneously with the Security Council, DB-3 bombers with VISH-23 propellers, also in a dive version, were also tested.

On the second copy of the SB-RK No. 1/281, for the first time, movable brake grilles and a Ju 88-type automatic aircraft withdrawal from a dive were installed. These devices were put into production at the Moscow plant No. 213. Tests of this variant of the SB-RK were carried out from July 27 to August 11, 1940.

In addition to "training" SB aircraft in dive bombing, the SB tried to "teach" them how to shoot missiles from a dive.

State tests of the experimental SB-RK, the standard for the series, were completed in January 1941. The leading test engineer was military engineer 1st rank M.I. Efimov, test pilots - Major V.I. Zhdanov and captain A.M. Khripkov. The test report was signed by the Head of the Research Institute of the Air Force of the Spacecraft, Major General A.I. Filin on January 20, 1941 and on January 31 was approved by the Head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force of the Spacecraft, Lieutenant General P.V. Rychagov. In December, by order of the NKAP No. 704 of December 9, 1940, the experimental SB-RK was renamed Ar-2.

The bomber armament of the aircraft had a number of improvements compared to the serial SB, in particular, the possibility of hanging large-caliber bombs was increased: when bombing from a dive - up to 4 FAB-250 (two on the outer holders and two on the inner) or 3 bombs of the FAB-500 type ( two outside and one inside), and when bombing from level flight - up to 3 FAB-500 or 6 FAB-250 bombs (four outside and two inside) or 12 100 kg bombs (4 outside and 8 inside).

The normal bomb load was increased to 1000 kg, and the maximum overload load was increased to 1500 kg. We note in particular that the bomb armament system ensured the release of 1500 kg of bombs both from level flight and from a dive. During a dive, bombs were dropped both from bomb racks inside the fuselage and from 4 outer racks of the NP-1 type, designed by plant No. 22, completely recessed into the wing. On the NP-1 holders, the bombs were fastened near the center of gravity by one central yoke and fixed with additional stops.

As a general shortcoming, the use of defensive machine guns of normal caliber was indicated, the effectiveness of which in air combat no longer met modern requirements. However, all Soviet serial bombers of this time had this drawback, and could not be considered fundamental.

The conclusions of the report on state testing of the aircraft noted that:

“The Ar-2 aircraft, made on the basis of the SB aircraft, is much better in terms of flight and tactical data than the serial SB aircraft, but lags behind modern foreign and domestic twin-engine medium bombers in terms of speed. ... The flight properties of the Ar-2 aircraft are similar to those of the SB aircraft, and the control of the aircraft is even easier. In terms of controllability and visibility for the pilot, the aircraft is convenient for piloting in formation. …Airplane. Ar-2 can be allowed to operate in the units of the Red Army Air Force, subject to limited use of the power of the M-105 engines ... "

The Arkhangelsk design bureau and plant No. 22 were required to bring the propeller group “to perfection”, ensure the longitudinal stability of the aircraft in all operating modes, bring the armament and eliminate the machine’s defects noted in the act and in the state test report.

In February 1941, Ar-2 No. 1/511 entered the state tests at the Research Institute of the Air Force of the KA with improvements made to its design based on the results of state tests of the lead Ar-2. The M-105R engines on this aircraft were moved forward by 150 mm to improve longitudinal stability. VISH-22E propellers with a diameter of 3.1 m were installed. The motor reduction was changed to 0.59 (instead of 0.66). In addition, thinner brake grilles and jet exhaust pipes were installed on the aircraft. The aircraft's workmanship and surface finish have been greatly improved. These improvements made it possible to obtain a maximum speed near the ground of 443 km / h and 512 km / h at an altitude of 5000 m.

It would seem that it is worth continuing to work on improving the aerodynamics of the Ar-2 and strengthening its armament, thus ensuring the required flight and combat qualities of the aircraft in the series, as well as at an accelerated pace to bring the B-1 to the flight-combat state. However, fate decreed otherwise.

By this time, the lead Pe-2 (in accordance with the order of the NKAP No. 04 dated 09.12.40 PB-100 was renamed Pe-2 - author) had already successfully passed the tests, showing good results - with a flight weight of 7536 kg, the maximum speed was the altitude of 5100 m was the coveted 540 km / h, the ceiling - 8700 m, the flight range of 1200 km. Normal bomb load - 600 kg, overload - 1000 kg.

Starting from the new year, aircraft factories No. 39 and No. 22, intended for the Pe-2 series, began to roll out products onto the airfield. The leadership of the NKAP and the Air Force gained confidence in the early solution of all technological and organizational problems associated with the launch of the "pawn" in a large series.

On January 29, 1941, an experimental dive bomber "103" 2AM-37 designed by the NKVD OTB made its first flight under the factory test program. At the same time, the construction of an improved copy of this 103U 2AM-37 aircraft was in full swing at the 156th aircraft plant - the completion of work was planned for March.

According to GKO Decree No. 401 of October 11, 1940, the maximum speed of these variants of the 103 aircraft was to be 580-600 km / h at an altitude of 7000 m, the normal bomb load was 1000 kg (up to 3000 kg in overload), the flight range from normal bomb load - 2500 km, small arms and cannon armament - 2 ShVAK cannons and 5 ShKAS machine guns.

The first results of factory tests of the 103 aircraft gave hope that the Air Force would soon be able to receive a strike aircraft, which, in terms of its flight and combat data, surpasses all combat vehicles of this class known at the beginning of 1941 and will completely solve “the task of arming the Red Army Air Force with front-line dive bombers ".

As a result, by the Decree of the Defense Committee of February 11, 1941, the serial production of the Yak-4 (by order of the NKAP No. 704 of December 9, 1940, BB-22 2M-105 was renamed the Yak-4) at aircraft factory No. 81 was discontinued. The serial production of the Arkhangelsk bomber, the Ar-2 2M-105, was also discontinued. The dive bomber V.M. was firmly established at the 22nd aircraft factory. Petlyakov - Pe-2.

As you can see, the creation of a modern front-line bomber of the KA Air Force on the eve of a big war took place under the slogan “give speed”, and certain successes were achieved in this direction. However, it must be admitted that the "high-speed" development of Soviet bomber-type aircraft was to the detriment of their main combat qualities. Passion for speed at the then level of development of the Soviet aircraft industry, mainly engine building, naturally led to a serious decrease in the combat load of bombers, and therefore to a decrease in "the power of bombing attacks on the enemy." So, the main Soviet front-line bomber Pe-2 had a very modest normal bomb load for such an aircraft - only 600 kg (for an overload of 1000 kg), and a high-speed short-range dive bomber BB-22PB and even less - 400 kg (for an overload of 500 kg).

At the same time, in the pre-war period, serious research was not carried out at all to find the optimal forms and methods for the combat use of aviation in modern warfare.

In turn, the lack of a sound concept for the construction of the Red Army Air Force led to the fact that neither the military, nor the leadership of the country and the NKAP on the eve of the war had a clear and precise understanding of what kind of combat aircraft, in what quantity and in what ratio it is necessary to equip the Air Force with spacecraft. And most importantly, there was no unity of views on these issues.

As a result, when making decisions on the creation of a new generation of combat aircraft, as well as on putting into service or decommissioning the Air Force of an aircraft, only some indicators were taken into account and compared, characterizing separately the flight and combat qualities of aircraft. In fact, all decisions were taken blindly by the Defense Committee, the UVVS and the NKAP and for the most part without taking into account the specific combat situation in which combat vehicles would have to fight.

Meanwhile, from the point of view of a combined arms commander, it is important not how fast, for example, a bomber flies, or what ceiling it has, but what damage a bomber can inflict on the enemy when performing a specific combat mission in the interests of ground forces. That is, for a combined-arms commander, the important characteristics of a bomber are: the weight and composition of the bomb load, the effectiveness of the used aviation weapons (air bombs, incendiary mixture, etc.) against specific targets, the accuracy of bombing and firing. On the other hand, the bomber solves a specific combat mission in the face of opposition from enemy fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery. And from these positions, the following are important: speed, maneuverability, ceiling, the effectiveness of defensive weapons, the combat survivability of the aircraft, etc.

In this regard, for the sake of completeness in describing the development of the Soviet concept of a high-speed strike aircraft, it is interesting to compare the pre-war production and experimental dive bombers of the Air Force of the KA and the Luftwaffe - Ar-2, Pe-2, BB-22PB, "103U", SPB and Ju 88A-4 , in terms of their potential combat effectiveness in the conditions of fighting on the eastern front.

Two methods of combat use of bombers were considered: dive bombing on a small-sized hard-to-vulnerable target (long-term defensive structures with a ceiling thickness of not more than 70 cm, bridges, warehouses, etc.), for the destruction of which the use of large-caliber bombs (250 kg and above) was required , and bombing from level flight at an area weakly protected or unprotected target (a column of infantry, vehicles and lightly armored vehicles, artillery and mortar guns in position, etc.). In all cases, the maximum characteristics of the aircraft were taken into account in the calculations.

Calculations show that in standard conditions fighting on the eastern front in solving the combat mission of destroying small hard-to-reach targets, the Ar-2 dive bomber was almost 5.5 times more effective than the BB-22PB bomber, the Pe-2 was 1.4 times more effective, and the German Ju88A-4 was 1 ,3 times.

When solving a combat mission to destroy an area weakly protected target from all serial Soviet bombers the best result was again shown by Ar-2. At the same time, the Pe-2 lagged behind the Ar-2 by 1.3 times, and the BB-22PB by almost 2.5 times. At the same time, the Ar-2 was inferior to the "Junkers" in terms of efficiency in this type of "combination" by about 1.3 times.

The experienced dive bomber "103U" 2AM-37 was superior in combat effectiveness to both Ar-2 and Ju 88A-4 in solving any problems of aviation support for troops. Unlike its opponents, "103U" was able to carry three FAB-1000s (the maximum capacity of bomb racks) and "throw" them from a dive.

Unfortunately, the outbreak of the war did not allow to quickly bring the car to a combat-flying state - the AM-37 engine was removed from mass production, and the M-82A engine installed on the aircraft instead of it suffered from many "childhood" diseases. As a result, the first three serial Tu-2 2M-82 (by order of the NKAP No. 234 dated March 28, 1942, aircraft "103" were given the designation Tu-2) only got to the front in September 1942, and rhythmic and high-quality mass production ( already with the M-82FN engines) was established only by the middle of 1944. However, the bomber lost the “ability” to bomb from a dive - the brake grids with the control system were removed from the aircraft. The car began to be classified as a medium bomber, designed "to perform the tasks of daytime bombing from level flight on the enemy's near rear."

A clear outsider in solving any combat mission is the BB-22PB. It should be recognized that the adoption by the Air Force of the spacecraft of the BB-22 aircraft in the version of the bomber is a gross mistake of the UVVS, the NKAP and the Defense Committee. He did not represent a real combat value, but a lot of effort and money was spent on its introduction into mass production and development in parts.

A serious mistake is also the termination of serial production of the Ar-2 bomber in favor of launching the Pe-2 bomber into mass production.

The apparent main drawback of the Ar-2 - a lower maximum flight speed compared to the Pe-2 - was completely "closed" by optimizing the tactics of the combat use of the dive bomber, the best organization interaction with cover fighters and command and control in combat, as well as training the flight crew of bomber regiments in air combat with enemy fighters singly and as part of a group. This is confirmed by the example of the Luftwaffe pilots, who, having attack aircraft with mediocre flight data, achieved high combat effectiveness mainly due to the rational tactics of their combat use, excellent organization of interaction with their fighter aircraft and ground forces, and good flight and combat training of crews. .

Most importantly, the Ar-2 had excellent take-off and landing qualities and was more accessible than the Pe-2 for the development of young wartime sergeants. As you know, the Pe-2 did not tolerate high leveling at all - in this case, the chassis was guaranteed to break. The “pawns” broken down on the landings accounted for up to 30% of the defective machines in parts.

In any case, Ar-2 throughout the war could show better combat effectiveness in solving any combat mission of front-line bomber aviation than the main dive bomber of the Air Force KA, the Pe-2 aircraft.

The situation changed in 1944-45, when the Red Army and the KA Air Force faced a particularly strong defense of the Wehrmacht. As is known, the German fortified areas were a rather difficult target for aviation due to the high saturation with air defense systems, the small size and high strength of long-term reinforced concrete defensive structures. The usual density was up to 6 bunkers and bunkers per 1 km of front, although in some cases their number reached 20 per 1 km of front. The AD strip along the front ranged from 30 to 140 km, and the total number of bunkers and bunkers varied from 60 to 900. The FAB-250 was rarely "dragged") did not provide the required probability of hitting the Wehrmacht's fortifications, and the Tu-2 2M-82 bomber, as noted above, had already lost its diving properties by this time.

That's when the finest hour of the Arkhangelsk Ar-2 dive bomber could come - his ability to carry 6 FAB-250s or three 500-kg bombs and "throw" them from a dive could be more useful than ever to the Red Army. By this time, the Ar-2 would have already gone a certain way to improve its flight and combat qualities by strengthening defensive weapons, improving aerodynamics, increasing the power of the power plant and combat survivability. Naturally, the Ar-2 could not completely replace the Tu-2, but would complement it with success.

It remains only to regret that as of June 1, 1941, the Air Force units of the spacecraft had only 164 Ar-2 2M-105 aircraft, of which: 147 (3 faulty) aircraft - in parts of the Military Districts, the rest - in parts of the Center and on 22nd plant. In the context of the strategic retreat of the Red Army and the frankly poor organization of combat operations by aviation and ground forces, the Ar-2 bombers could not show all that they were capable of. In addition, due to the lack of the required cover by their fighters and insufficient training of the flight crew, most of the Ar-2 was lost already in the first months of the war - according to official data from the KA Air Force Headquarters, the combat losses of the Ar-2 in 1941 amounted to 95 aircraft.

It should be noted that the leadership and specialists of the Air Force of the Navy of the spacecraft, when developing a plan for equipping fleet aviation in 1941 with modern combat aircraft, considered the Ar-2 as the main type of dive bomber, and the "pawn" - mainly as a long-range escort fighter. But no one "heard" their opinion ...

And the nickname in the troops of the Ar-2 could be, for example, "Arkasha" ... ..

Continuation. Beginning in AiK No. 2,3,4 / 2003

External suspension of four 230-kg bombs on Ar-2

Parallel fine-tuning of the SB-RK 2M-105 Design Bureau of Arkhangelsk began to develop a new high-speed short-range bomber SBB. At first, the new aircraft had index C (under this designation, the aircraft model was purged at TsAGI), but soon the aircraft index was changed to B. The aircraft was conceived as a cardinal modification of the serial SB with increased flight performance and continuity in production technology. When designing it, the experience of creating MMN, SB-RK was used. and later Ar-2. The SBB crew included a pilot, a navigator and a gunner-radio operator.

The main advantage of the new aircraft was the significantly improved aerodynamics. The general layout and combat scheme of the bomber B were similar to the SB aircraft, but with a two-fin tail. In order to "maximize the speed of the aircraft," the load per unit area of ​​the wing in the normal version of the combat load was increased to 149 kg / m 2 and up to 162 kg/m 2 in overload. In this regard, the wing area was reduced to 40 m G. The wing has become shorter and slightly narrower in comparison with the SB wing. At the same time, to ensure the necessary landing speed, it was supposed to use TsAGI flaps, which were a cross between conventional flaps and Fowler flaps. The wing profile was chosen as a high-speed NACA-22 type with a relative thickness at the root of 14.7% and at the tip of 8%.

The design of the SBB assumed the widespread use of open profiles instead of pipes, stamping, load-bearing skin. The skin of the SBB aircraft, and especially the wing, was smooth with flush riveting. The nose of the wing and its upper part between the spars of the wing had a sheathing of bakelite plywood glued to a metal frame. It was assumed that such a wing design should provide the necessary strength and good aerodynamics.

The fuselage was carried out in the form of a well-streamlined "airship form", which, according to experts. was the most advantageous in terms of aerodynamics.

Water radiators were located inside the center section of the wing with an entrance in the center section toe and an exit at the rear. Moreover, it was supposed to use aluminum ribbed type radiators of the design of the Leningrad SKB NKAP.

The tail support was carried out retractable in flight.

The design of the aircraft provided for a significant simplification of technology in comparison with the SB aircraft. Open profiles were used at SBB. including spars (instead of pipes on the SB). Open riveting was used throughout the car. A number of elements were made by stamping. The number of welded assemblies was reduced with their replacement by stamped ones from duralumin and steel.

The spars of the center section were steel channels with shelves interconnected by braces made of pipes, and in some places by a sheet.

The legs of the spars of the detachable part of the wing were made of two pressed corners riveted together with a side bent in section. The upper and lower belts were interconnected by a smooth sheet, supported by vertical corners-racks.

The ribs were stamped from sheet duralumin. The upper wing skin between the spars, working in compression, was reinforced from the inside with corrugation. This section of the upper skin of the center section "was not cut", but passed through the fuselage entirely through. For the same purpose, in order not to make any cutouts in the lower part of the wing, they refused to retract the landing gear into the wing.

For " correct operation"of the bearing part of the skin, the docking of the weaning with the center section was carried out not at four points, but along the entire contour of the shackle in the area between the side members.

The use of load-bearing skin ensured greater survivability of the aircraft and made it possible to better "perform the surface and maintain the wing profile."

The margin of safety according to the calculation was provided in the case of A. equal to 8 instead of 7 for the SB aircraft.

The M-105 with a TK-2 turbocharger was considered as the main motor of the SBB power plant. In addition to it, it was supposed to use the M-106 engine.

By this time, the M-105 had already passed 50-hour state tests, and the TK-2 turbocharger was installed on the SB aircraft with M-103 engines for flight tests.

In the future, in order to further improve the aerodynamics of the aircraft, it was supposed to install the M-105TK upside down. In this case, the layout of the engine installation and the radiator was improved and space was freed up in the wing to accommodate gas tanks instead of radiators. On this issue, there was an agreement with the engine builders of the 26th plant. However, in the future, such an option for a motor installation was abandoned, as it did not have significant advantages for a bomber aircraft over a traditional engine installation.

In both versions, it was supposed to use three-blade propellers of the 3-SMV-2 type variable in flight with a diameter of 3.25 m.

Normal bomb load was 600 kg, overload - 1000 kg (of which inside the fuselage - 800 kg). The nomenclature of air bombs included air bombs of calibers from 2.5 to 250 kg. At the same time, small fragmentation and incendiary bombs of 2.5-15 kg caliber, as well as chemical ampoules, were loaded into cassettes of small bombs. High-explosive bombs of 250 kg caliber and pouring aircraft devices of the VAP-200 type were hung only on external bomb racks. The reloading version of the bomb load was obtained using 10 FAB-100s, of which 8 were located in the fuselage, and a couple of “hundredths” were placed on external bomb racks.

Small arms included one UltraShKAS normal caliber machine gun in the navigator's bow mount and one UltraShKAS or ShBAK-12.7 heavy machine gun on the kingpin at the gunner-radio operator. The ammunition load of the navigational machine gun was 600 rounds, and the gunner-radio operator - 800 rounds for the UltraShKAS and 300 rounds for the ShVAK.

SBB-1

The normal flight weight of the SBB with M-I05TK engines was 5961 kg, and with the M-106 engine - 5851 kg. The estimated maximum flight speed with M-105TK engines was to be 455 km/h near the ground and 612 km/h at an altitude of 9000 m. With M-106 engines - 587 km/h at an altitude of 7000 m.

The rate of climb of the bomber with the M-I05TK was expected to be higher than in the version with the M-106 engines - the SBB 2M-I05TK climbed to a height of 5000 m in 5.5 minutes, and the SBB 2M-I06 in 6 minutes.

In both variants, the takeoff run with normal flight weight without the use of flaps was 350 m. Landing speed did not exceed 118 km / h.

The flight range of the SBB at a speed of 0.8 from the maximum did not exceed 880 km in the variant with M-I05TK engines and 970 km for the variant with M-106 engines. In the reloading option for fuel, the maximum flight range with a take-off weight of 6466 kg could be no more than 1500 km.

To increase the flight range, the project provided for the suspension under the wing of outboard drop fuel tanks for 520 kg of fuel. In this case, the takeoff weight of the aircraft reached 7025 kg.

In general, as follows from the analysis of the flight tactical data of the SBB aircraft presented in the project, all the declared data were quite real, although overestimated in some respects. To the comments of the military on this matter, the Arkhangelsk Design Bureau promptly made the necessary changes to the project. According to additional materials, the maximum speed of the SBB 2M-I05TK-2 at an altitude of 8500 m was supposed to be 600 km / h, the flight range with 600 kg of bombs at 0.8 maximum speed was 800 km and the ceiling was 10500 m. But even these figures raised doubts. The head of the aircraft department of the 7th Main Directorate of the NKAP, I.I. Mashkevich, in his letter addressed to the Deputy Head of the 11th Main Directorate of the NKAP, Leontiev, indicated that: "... According to the flight data, a remark should be made regarding speed. The drag coefficients are taken underestimated, and therefore they need to be increased ... then the maximum speed with an efficiency of 0.7 instead of 0.76 is obtained at 9000 m as follows: ... 570 km / h. The rest of the data does not cause any comments. "

The conclusion on the preliminary design of the SBB was approved by the Head of the Air Force of the Spacecraft Army Commander of the 2nd rank A.D. Loktionov and the Member of the Military Council of the Air Force of the Spacecraft Divisional Commissar F.A. , with an overload of 1500 km without external suspension at a speed of 0.9 V poppy ".

In November 1939, after discussing the layout of the SBB, a decision was made to build the aircraft. According to the Decree of the Defense Committee of March 4, 1940, two copies of the B-1 and B-2 were built. The first option corresponded to the high-speed bomber variant, and the second to the dive bomber. The B-2 aircraft differed from the B-1 in a wider fuselage and a somewhat different layout of the forward fuselage.

An experimental copy of the B-1, which was powered by serial M-105 engines. was completed by October 1940, after which factory tests began. On October 20, the B-1 was taken to the airfield of the 22nd plant, ground work and taxiing were carried out. Mindful of the sad experience of testing SPB 2M-105. accompanied by disasters and numerous forced landings due to the fault of the M-105 engines. The first flights of the B-1 under the factory test program were decided to be performed from a large airfield. The aircraft was transported to the Central Airfield, where test flights were made on October 30. The flights showed the readiness of the B-1 for the first flight, however, due to the lack of a TsAGI conclusion on flutter, they did not dare to release the aircraft on the first flight. After receiving the conclusion from TsAGI, the pilot Yu. K. Stankevich on November 6 performed the first flight on the B-1. After completing 6 flights, which were generally successful, they decided to overtake the car in the summer back to the airfield of the 22nd plant in Fili. On November 26, 1940, after landing at the Fili airfield, the left landing gear strut broke while taxiing.

In the meantime, at the end of October 1940, M.A. Lipkim lifted the BB-22PB dive bomber into the air. which, with a flight weight of 5962 kg, showed a speed of 533 km / h at an altitude of 5100 m. The bomb load of the "twenty-second" included 4 FAB-100 or 2 FAB-250.

Preparations were in full swing for factory testing of the lead serial dive bomber PB-100 manufactured by plant No. 39. The first flights under the factory test program were scheduled for the first decade of December.

It was at this time, on November 18, 1940, that a meeting of the joint commission of the NKAP, Air Force and TsAGI was held, during which, based on a comparison of the main characteristics of the PB-100 bombers, SB-RK. BB-22G1B and B, it was concluded that it was expedient to launch the PB-100 aircraft as the main dive bomber of the Air Force KA aircraft and to keep the BB-22 series in the BB-22 series (for safety net, since it was built from non-deficient materials). With regard to the B-1 aircraft, it was indicated that the latter, compared with the PB-100, with the same engines and initial defensive weapons, has significantly better takeoff and landing characteristics and rate of climb. However, no decisions on B-1 (on the termination or on the intensification of work on the aircraft) were made by the commission. According to the commission's conclusion, "... aircraft B, compared to the PB-100, is one year late and has not yet passed the tests."

Such cautious behavior of the commission is quite understandable. On the one hand, the members of the commission may have already understood that in the event of war, the well-established technology of the B bomber and its good take-off, landing and aerobatic qualities would play an almost decisive role in the rapid deployment of mass production of combat vehicles and the training of wartime flight personnel. , which has in all respects a weak initial flight training. In addition, the launch of the Pe-2 bomber, which was rather difficult for the Soviet aviation industry, into mass production still concealed many pitfalls, but one still could not expect good results from the BB-22PB 2M-105. But, on the other hand, how the B-1 would behave in the future, and especially its motor installation, was still not completely clear. The members of the commission wisely decided not to take risks - "Better a tit in the hand than a crane in the sky." The decision on the B-1 was postponed "for later", and Arkhangelsky was left with a chance to bring his bomber to flight-combat condition.

SPB Polikarpov

Bomber Yakovlev Yak-4

Aircraft "100" Petlyakova

Pe-2 dive bomber

Taking advantage of the accident, the Arkhangelsk Design Bureau decided, along with the repair of the landing gear, to make a number of changes to the aircraft design based on the results of the first test flights. In its updated form, the B-1 bomber again went on a test flight only on February 20, 1441. From March 24 to July 9, 1941, factory tests were carried out, during which test pilot Yu. K. Stankevich reached an altitude of 4900 m maximum speed 540 km/h. It was expected that after the elimination of some design flaws, the speed of the bomber would increase to 560-565 km / h.

Then, in February 1941, Ar-2 N ° 1/511 entered the state tests at the Air Force Research Institute N° 1/511 with improvements made to its design based on the results of state tests of the lead Ar-2. The M-I05P motors on this aircraft were moved forward 150mm to improve longitudinal stability. VISH-22E propellers with a diameter of 3.1 m were installed. The motor reduction was changed to 0.59 (instead of 0.66). In addition, thinner brake grilles and jet exhaust pipes were installed on the aircraft. The aircraft's workmanship and surface finish have been greatly improved. These improvements made it possible to obtain a maximum speed near the ground of 443 km / h and 512 km / h at an altitude of 5000 m.

Seemingly. it is worth continuing to work on improving the aerodynamics of the Ar-2 and strengthening its weapons, thus ensuring the required flight and combat qualities of the aircraft in the series, as well as at an accelerated pace to bring the B-1 to the flight-combat state. However, fate decreed otherwise.

By this time, the lead Pe-2 (in accordance with the order of the SCCR No. 704 dated December 00, 1940, the PB-100 was renamed rt Pe-2 - author) had already successfully passed the tests, showing good results - with a flight weight of 7536 kg, the maximum speed was altitude of 5100 m was the coveted 540 km / h. ceiling - 8700 m. flight range 1200 km. Normal bomb load - 600 kg, overload - 1000 kg.

Starting from the new year, aircraft factories No. 39 and No. 22, designed for the Pe-2 series. began to roll out products onto the airfield. The leadership of the NKAP and the Air Force gained confidence in the early solution of all technological and organizational problems associated with the launch of the "pawn" in a large series.

On January 29, 1941, an experimental dive bomber "103" 2AM-37 designed by the NKVD OTB made its first flight under the factory test program. At the same time, the construction of an improved copy of this Yuzu 2AM-37 aircraft was in full swing at the 156th aircraft plant - the completion of work was planned for March.

According to the GKO Decree N? 401 dated October 11, 1940, the maximum speed of these variants of the "103" aircraft was to be 580-600 km / h at an altitude of 7000 m. Normal bomb load -1000 kg (overload up to 3000 kg), flight range with normal bomb load - 2500 km. small arms and cannon armament - 2 ShVAK cannons and 5 ShKAS machine guns.

The first results of factory tests of the "103" aircraft gave hope that the Air Force would soon be able to receive a strike aircraft, which, in terms of its flight and combat data, surpasses all combat vehicles of this class known at the beginning of 1941 and will completely solve "the task of arming the Red Army's BIS with front-line dive bombers ".

As a result, by the Decree of the Defense Committee of February 2, 1941, the serial production of the Yak-4 (by order of the NKAP No. 704 of December 9, 1940, BB-22 2M-105 was renamed the Yak-4) at aircraft factory No. 81 was discontinued. The serial production of the Arkhangelsk bomber, the Ar-2 2M-105, was also discontinued. At the 22nd aircraft plant, V. M. Petlyakov’s dive bomber Pe-2 was firmly established.

Bomb rack for dive bombing PB-3 for Ar-2

On April 1, 1941, A. I. Shaxyrin signed Order No. 291 "On the design and construction of the MoV-2 aircraft with the AM-38 engine designed by G. M. Mozharovsky and I. V. Venevidov." The design was entrusted to plant No. 32, and the construction was assigned to plant No. 89. Since A. A. Arkhangelsky had previously participated in the development of a preliminary design for this attack aircraft, on April 10, an order from the NKAP N? 309, according to which the entire design team of A. A. Arkhangelsky was transferred to the 32nd plant to ensure the design and construction of MoV-2.

Despite the difficulties associated with moving and settling in a new place, in the summer of 1941 the second version of the SBB was built - the B-2 dive bomber. It was assumed that, compared with the B-1, its maximum speed at the estimated altitude would be 40-60 km / h more.

At the same time, in connection with the successes of the 103 and YuZU bombers during tests at the Research Institute of the Air Force of the Spacecraft, the interest of the military and the NKAP in aircraft B was steadily declining, and the outbreak of the war interrupted all work on this aircraft. A. A. Arkhangelsky himself, by order of the NKAP No. 823 dated August 9, 1941, was transferred to aircraft factory No. 156 to organize the repair and restoration of serial SB bombers. Later, the design bureau of A. A. Arkhangelsky was evacuated to Omsk in October 1941, and the B-1 aircraft was sent to the rear in December 1941. What happened to him next is unknown.

As you can see, the creation of a modern front-line bomber of the KA Air Force on the eve of a big war took place under the slogan "give speed", and certain successes were achieved in this direction. However, it must be admitted that the "high-speed" development of Soviet bomber-type aircraft was to the detriment of their basic combat qualities. Passion for speed at the then level of development of the Soviet aircraft industry, mainly engine building, naturally led to a serious decrease in the combat load of bombers, and hence to a decrease in "the power of bombing attacks on the enemy." So, the main Soviet front-line bomber Pe-2 had a very modest normal bomb load for such an aircraft - only 600 kg (for an overload of 1000 kg), and a high-speed short-range dive bomber BB-22PB and even less - 400 kg (for an overload of 500 kg).

At the same time, in the pre-war period, serious research was not carried out at all to find the optimal forms and methods for the combat use of aviation in modern warfare. As a result, work on determining the optimal directions for the development of aviation (the composition and organizational structure of the combat forces of aviation) and analyzing the combat effectiveness of aircraft did not receive due attention. various types in a future war. Accordingly, the appearance was not determined (flight performance data and design scheme of the aircraft, the number of engines, the composition of the crew, the composition of weapons and the scheme of its placement on the aircraft, required size ammunition load, etc.) of promising combat aircraft (fighter, front-line bomber, attack aircraft, etc.) and no recommendations were developed for improving the aircraft already in service with the Air Force.

In turn, the lack of a sound concept for the construction of the Red Army Air Force led to the fact that neither the military. neither the leadership of the country nor the NKAP on the eve of the war had a clear and precise understanding of what kind of combat aircraft, in what quantity and in what ratio it is necessary to equip the Air Force with spacecraft. And most importantly, there was no unity of views on these issues.

As a result, when making decisions on the creation of new generation combat aircraft, as well as on putting into service or decommissioning the Air Force of one or another aircraft, only some indicators were taken into account and compared. characterizing separately the flight and combat qualities of aircraft. In fact, all decisions were taken blindly by the Defense Committee, the UVVS and the NKAP and for the most part without taking into account the specific combat situation in which combat vehicles would have to fight.

Meanwhile, from the point of view of a combined arms commander, it is important not how fast, for example, a bomber flies, or what ceiling it has, but what damage a bomber can inflict on the enemy when performing a specific combat mission in the interests of ground forces. That is, for a combined arms commander, the important characteristics of a bomber are: the weight and composition of the bomb load, the effectiveness of the aircraft weapons used (air bombs, incendiary mixture, etc.) against specific targets, the accuracy of bombing and firing. On the other hand, the bomber solves a specific combat mission in the face of opposition from enemy fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery. And from these positions, the following are important: speed, maneuverability, ceiling, the effectiveness of defensive weapons, the combat survivability of the aircraft, etc.

In this regard, for the sake of completeness in describing the development of the Soviet concept of a high-speed attack aircraft, it is interesting to compare the pre-war serial and experimental dive bombers of the KA Air Force and the Luftwaffe - Ar-2, Pe-2. BB-22PB, "YUZU", SPB and Jn88A-4, in terms of their potential combat effectiveness in the fighting on the eastern front.

We will evaluate the combat effectiveness of bomber aircraft based on the probability that the latter will complete a specific combat mission to destroy targets in the interests of ground forces, or the probability of a bomber's combat success. In this case, the probability of a bomber's combat success is determined by the probabilities for the bomber not to be shot down by enemy fighters and anti-aircraft artillery on approach to the target and over the target, the probability of entering the target area with a given error. the probability of detecting the target visually and the probability of hitting the target during bombing.

Tupolev "103U" aircraft

German twin-engine dive bomber J1188А-4

All calculations for the compared aircraft were carried out for the same conditions of their combat use. Typical ground targets and conditions for ground and air battles on the eastern front were taken as initial data. Two methods of combat use of bombers were considered: dive bombing on a small-sized hard-to-vulnerable target (long-term defensive structures with a ceiling thickness of not more than 70 cm, bridges, warehouses, etc.), for the destruction of which the use of large-caliber bombs (250 kg and above) was required , and bombing from level flight at an area weakly protected or unprotected target (a column of infantry, vehicles and lightly armored vehicles, artillery and mortar guns in position, etc.). In all cases, the maximum characteristics of the aircraft were taken into account in the calculations.

The probabilities of the bomber reaching the target area and its detection in the calculations were taken equal to one. When calculating the probability of hitting a target during bombing, the characteristics of the vulnerability of the target in relation to specific types of weapons used were taken into account. Flight and shooting training of pilots and navigators is good.

When assessing the probability of a bomber being shot down by anti-aircraft artillery fire, it was assumed that the distribution of anti-aircraft artillery (Air guns) in the enemy's tactical defense zone was uniform. Since the working heights of front-line bombers on the eastern front were 2000-3000 m, only medium-caliber ZA barrels were taken into account in the calculations. Accounting for the anti-aircraft maneuver of the bomber was carried out by introducing an additional error in the aiming of anti-aircraft crews.

When calculating the probability of shooting down a bomber by a fighter, the following assumptions were made, which simplify the calculations, but do not affect the general conclusion when comparing the combat effectiveness of bombers of various types:

the German Bf 109F-1 was taken as the enemy fighter, the detection and attack of the bomber by the enemy fighter is carried out from the loitering position in the air.

the probability of detecting a bomber by an attacking fighter pilot in the patrol zone is performed visually and is taken equal to 1,

when calculating the probability of a fighter launching an attack on an enemy bomber from the side of the rear hemisphere (i.e. approach and combat turn with access to the attack curve at the distance of opening fire), the dive characteristics, rate of climb and time of steady turn (radius) were taken into account, while in all calculations, it was assumed that the maximum overload on the attack curve, at which the pilot could conduct aimed fire, does not exceed 4 units,

- the probability of shooting down a bomber by a fighter was estimated taking into account the return fire of the bomber's air gunner,

- shooting and flight training of fighter pilots is good, shooting training of an air gunner is good,

- taking into account the anti-fighter maneuver of the bomber was carried out by introducing an additional error in aiming,

- the conditions of air battles (distribution of the firing angle, firing distance and burst length, maximum overload during an attack, etc.) were taken as typical for the period of air battles during the Great Patriotic War,

- sights: for fighters - optical, for an air gunner of a bomber - mechanical,

- fighter shooting in all cases - accompanying.

Calculations show that under typical conditions of battles on the eastern front, when solving the combat mission of destroying small-sized hard-to-reach targets, the Ar-2 dive bomber was almost 5.5 times more effective than the BB-22PB bomber, the Pe-2 was 1.4 times more effective, and the German Ju88A -4 - 1.3 times.

When solving the combat mission of destroying an area weakly protected target, of all serial Soviet bombers, the Ar-2 again showed the best result. At the same time, the Pe-2 lagged behind the Ar-2 by 1.3 times, and the BB-22PB by almost 2.5 times. At the same time, the Ar-2 was inferior to the "Junkers" in terms of efficiency in this type of "combination" by about 1.3 times.

The experienced dive bomber "103U" 2AM-37 was superior in combat effectiveness to both Ar-2 and Ju88A-4 in solving any problems of air support for troops. Unlike its opponents, "103U" was able to carry three FAB-1000s (the maximum capacity of bomb racks) and "throw" them from a dive.

Unfortunately, the outbreak of the war did not allow the aircraft to be quickly brought to the flight-combat state - the AM-37 engine was removed from mass production, and the M-82A engine installed on the aircraft instead suffered from many "childhood" diseases. As a result, the first three serial Tv-2 2M-82 (by order of the NKAP No. 234 dated March 28, 1942, aircraft "103" were given the designation Tu-2) only got to the front in September 1942, and rhythmic and high-quality mass production ( already with M-82FM engines) was established only by the middle of 1944. However, the bomber lost the "ability" to bomb from a dive - the brake grids with the control system were removed from the aircraft. The car began to be classified as a medium bomber, designed "to perform the tasks of daytime bombing from level flight on the enemy's near rear."

A clear outsider in solving any combat mission is the BB-22PB. It should be recognized that the adoption by the Air Force of the spacecraft of the BB-22 aircraft in the version of the bomber is a gross mistake by the Air Force, the NKAP and the Defense Committee. It did not represent a real combat value, but a lot of effort and money was spent on its introduction into mass production and development in parts.

A serious mistake is also the termination of serial production of the Ar-2 bomber in favor of launching the Pe-2 bomber into mass production.

The apparent main drawback of the Ar-2 - a lower maximum flight speed compared to the Pe-2 - was completely "closed" by optimizing the tactics of the combat use of the dive bomber, better organizing interaction with cover fighters and control in battle. as well as training the flight crew of bomber regiments in air combat with enemy fighters singly and as part of a group. The example of the Luftwaffe pilots convinces of this. which, having attack aircraft with mediocre flight performance, achieved high combat effectiveness mainly due to the rational tactics of their combat use, excellent organization of interaction with their fighter aircraft and ground forces, and good flight and combat training of crews.

The main thing. The Ar-2 had excellent take-off and landing qualities and was more accessible than the Pe-2 for the development of young wartime sergeants. As you know, the Pe-2 did not tolerate high leveling at all - in this case, the chassis was guaranteed to break. The “pawns” broken down on the landings accounted for up to 30% of the defective machines in parts.

In any case, Ar-2 throughout the war could show better combat effectiveness in solving any combat mission of front-line bomber aviation than the main dive bomber of the Air Force KA, the Pe-2 aircraft.

As follows from the analysis of the potential combat effectiveness of the compared bombers, the German Ju88A-4 bomb weapon system was more consistent with the distribution of typical ground targets. against which aviation had to operate on the eastern front in the initial period of the war than the bomb armament of Soviet bomb carriers.

The main caliber of the "Junkers" was a 5 () -kg bomb - 28 pieces on board, while the bomb armament system of Soviet bombers was mainly designed for the suspension of 100-kg bombs (6-12 pieces). It was in this version of the suspension that the maximum load capacity of Soviet aircraft was used. When using bombs of a smaller caliber, Soviet bomb carriers turned out to be underloaded. For example, when hanging bombs of 50 kg caliber, the Pe-2 "did not get" 100 kg to the normal bomb load and 500 kg to the maximum.

At the same time, based on the characteristics of the vulnerability of typical ground targets in the initial period of the war (mechanized columns, artillery batteries in positions, etc.). the main type of aerial bombs was to be fragmentation bombs of 25 kg caliber and high-explosive 50 kg caliber bombs. as well as fragmentation bombs of smaller caliber. For example, the reduced area of ​​destruction of armored personnel carriers and light tanks when dropped from a height of 500-1000 m ten FAB-50m was about 400 m 2 , and six FA B-100 - only 180 m 2 .

In the directive of the Commander of the Air Force of the Spacecraft, Colonel-General of Aviation P. F. Zhigarev No. 14501 / 12153 of 01/25/42 on the results of the inspection of the combat operations of the air units of the Western and South-Western fronts in January 42, it was indicated on this occasion that: " ... In most aviation units air force The illiterate use of small arms, cannon and bomber weapons was noted on the Western and Southwestern Fronts ... The caliber and type of bombs used often do not correspond to the nature of the target. Standard charging is used: FAB-100 or FAB-50 even for targets that require destruction by their fragmentation bombs ... "

Carried out by the head of the department of small arms and cannon armament of VVA aircraft named after. N. E. Zhukovsky by military engineer 1st rank E. B. Lunts in February-March 1942, analysis of the combat experience of units of the Western and South-Western fronts (19th, 46th, 47th and 63rd garden) . 6th and 7th and a to air defense for the period June-December 1941 showed that in many cases bombs were used mainly based on the convenience and speed of preparing aircraft for combat sorties, while the security of targets and the effectiveness of action were not taken into account at all bombs (destructive power of fragments, high-explosive action, etc.).

According to Luntz. during the first 6 months of the war, all types of aviation spent 41.6% of sorties on the combat mission of destroying tanks, motorized troops, artillery in positions and manpower of the enemy, 2.5% on actions at enemy airfields and on railway . objects - 1.6%. The remaining sorties were associated with the performance of combat missions without the use of bombs.

That is, instead of using fragmentation bombs of the AO-25s, AO-25m type and high-explosive bombs of the FAB-50 type. FAB-50m bomber air units used bombs of the FAB-100 type - 56% of the weight of all air bombs dropped on the enemy.

In conclusion of his report, Professor Lunts proposed "... to decommission the FAB-100" and "... to prohibit units in pursuit of tonnage from using bombs that do not correspond to the nature of the target (for example, FAB-100 instead of FAB-50m or AO-25)".

On the other hand, at the beginning of the war there were few enemy ground targets, which required the use of large-caliber air bombs (bunkers, bunkers, bridges, warehouses, etc.), and to make changes to the design of combat aircraft in order to ensure maximum loading of bombs caliber 50-25 kg was "troublesome", and risky. So, in order to remedy the situation, it was necessary to urgently create 100-kg bombs that were more effective in terms of fragmentation. The most successful, as you know, were the high-explosive fragmentation OFAB-YuO and the incendiary ZAB-YuOTsK. OFAB-YuO had a powerful high-explosive effect at break and gave a lot of heavy fragments, which at a distance of up to 10 m from the point of detonation could penetrate the German tank armor up to 30 mm thick and disabled 155 mm field guns. In turn, the incendiary "weaving" - easily pierced the ceilings of buildings, knocking out windows and doors with a high-explosive blow, thereby providing air flow for the spread of fire.

The situation changed in 1944-45, when the Red Army and the KA Air Force faced a particularly strong defense of the Wehrmacht. As you know, the German fortified areas were a target that was rather difficult for aviation to take advantage of due to the high saturation of air defense systems. small size and high strength of long-term reinforced concrete defensive structures. The usual density was up to 6 bunkers and bunkers per 1 km of the front, although in some cases their number reached 20 per 1 km of the front. The SD strip along the front ranged from 30 to 140 km. and the total number of bunkers and bunkers - from 60 to 900. At the same time, the capabilities of the main front-line bomber of the Air Force KA Pe-2 were still insufficient - two FAB-250 standard bomb loads (4 FAB-250 "dragged" rarely) did not provide the required the probability of hitting the fortifications of the Wehrmacht, and the Tu-2 2M-82 bomber. as noted above, by this time it had already lost its diving properties.

That's when the finest hour of the Arkhangelsk Ar-2 dive bomber could come - his ability to carry 6 FAB-250s or three 500-kg bombs and "throw" them from a dive could be more useful than ever to the Red Army. By this time, the Ar-2 would have already gone a certain way to improve its flight performance by strengthening defensive weapons, improving aerodynamics, increasing the power of the power plant and combat survivability. Naturally, the Ar-2 could not completely replace the Tu-2, but would complement it with success.

It remains only to regret that as of June 1, 1941, the units of the Air Force KA had only 164 Ar-2 2M-Yu5 aircraft, of which: 147 (3 faulty) aircraft - in parts of the Military Districts, the rest - in parts of the Center and at plant 22. In the context of the strategic retreat of the Red Army and the frankly poor organization of combat operations by aviation and ground forces, the Ar-2 bombers could not show all that they were capable of. In addition, due to the lack of the required cover by their fighters and insufficient training of the flight crew, most of the Ar-2 was lost already in the first months of the war - according to official data from the Air Force Headquarters of the KA, the combat losses of the Ar-2 in 1941 amounted to 95 aircraft.

It should be noted that the leadership and specialists of the Air Force of the Navy of the spacecraft, when developing a plan for equipping fleet aviation in 1941 with modern combat aircraft, considered the Ar-2 as the main type of dive bomber, and the "pawn" - mainly as a long-range escort fighter. But no one "heard" their opinion ...

If we take into account that the Su-2 short-range bomber in the conditions of a big war "according to the rules" turned out to be untenable as a type of combat aircraft, and the Il-2 AM-38 armored attack aircraft did not fully meet the requirements of modern warfare, then we have to state: the combat strength On the eve of the war, on the eve of the war, the armament of strike aviation of the Air Force turned out to be inconsistent with the nature and conditions of hostilities. Since the beginning of the war, this circumstance, combined with the insufficient level of combat training of the flight personnel of the units and the operational-tactical training of the command staff of aviation formations and headquarters, as well as the leadership of the Air Force and the Red Army, led to the low effectiveness of air support for their troops and heavy losses from enemy fire .

Drawings for the article by Oleg Rastrenin about the Ar-2 aircraft were made by Sergey Ershov

SB with M-100 motors

Dive bomber Ar-2.

Developer: Design Bureau Arkhangelsk
Country: USSR
First flight: 1940

The main trump card for the use of dive missiles was the increased accuracy of fire and the power of the warheads of the projectiles developed at NII-3. Shooting was supposed to be carried out both singly and in a volley of two, four and eight shells. At the same time, it was believed that it was volley fire that would give the greatest effect.

As the main carriers of such weapons, it was proposed to use I-15bis or I-16 aircraft (8 RBS-82), as well as dive versions of two motor bombers SB (22 RBS-132) and DB-3 (9 RBS-203).

The placement of missiles on the SB was proposed to be combined: 10 RBS-132s were placed on launchers under the wing planes and 12 RBSs were placed in a special cassette holder located in the bomb bay of the aircraft and put forward when firing from the bomb bay into the air stream.

It was proposed to place the RBS-203 missiles on the DB-3 as follows: 3 rounds under the fuselage and 10 under the wing of the aircraft.

It was assumed that "mounting and dismantling of aircraft missile weapons(with the exception of electrical wiring in the wings of the aircraft) "in the field will be carried out by the technical staff of aviation units "within 1 hour to 3.5 hours, depending on the type of aircraft and the caliber of the RBS".

To work out the methodology for firing missiles from a dive, improve missile launchers, and work out the tactics of using missile aircraft, Slonimer and Kostikov asked that one SB, one DB-3 and a flight of I-15bis or I-16 aircraft be allocated for testing at the NIP AV VVS KA. The landfill near Noginsk needed to be equipped "concrete and armored platforms with dimensions of 50 × 50 m".

In the period from June 26 to September 4, 1940, field tests of SB No. 221, armed with rocket fragmentation and armor-piercing shells of the RS-132 and RBS-132 types, were carried out at the NIP AV VVS KA. Rocket guns RO-132 were mounted under the wing of the aircraft. Shooting was carried out from a dive at angles of 45°-50° from a distance of 1500-1700 m. It was found that the probable circular deviation of the RBS-132 when firing in the air was about 1.4 times less than when firing the RS-132, and exceeded 30 m in the lateral direction (instead of 40 m for the PC-132) and 39 m in range (instead of 55 m for the PC-132).

Despite the overall positive results of firing, it was decided to ban the use of the RBS-132 for firing from an SB aircraft. The fact is that when the RBS-132 was fired, both on the ground and in the air, the ailerons of the aircraft were deformed from a powerful gas jet. For this reason, during the firing range, the aileron of the aircraft was destroyed. It was considered inappropriate to make any changes to the design of the installation of rocket weapons under the wing of the aircraft.

It should be noted that field tests of RBSs on Su-2, Il-2 and Pe-2 aircraft in the summer of 1941 were more successful. Phenomena similar to those observed on the SB did not occur on these aircraft. As a consequence, RBSs were recommended "... to the introduction into service of the Air Force of the Red Army and the Navy for use on the Pe-2, Il-2 and Su-2 against enemy land and sea targets ..."

Against the backdrop of these events, work was underway to modernize the SB aircraft. The basis for further improvement of the aerodynamics of the SB-RK was the results of state tests of experimental aircraft MMN 2M-105 and SB-RK 2M-105, carried out, as mentioned above, respectively, in the periods from July 1 to August 16, 1939 and from May 11 to 16 1940, as well as the results of the design of the SBB high-speed short-range bomber, carried out as part of a large modification of the SB aircraft.

In accordance with the Decree of the CO under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 240 dated June 1, 1940, the 22nd aircraft plant was instructed to manufacture and present for testing 3 reference copies of the SB-RK aircraft with improved aerodynamics by August 15. Needed top speed "on the border of the engine altitude of 490 km / h and a margin of safety - 8.5".

On the reference SB-RK, the “standard” nose of the serial SBs was replaced with an aerodynamically more advanced F-1 nose, tested on the MMN aircraft, and a new convex canopy of the gunner-radio operator’s cockpit, reduced in height, was installed, the so-called “turtle”. In addition, a number of other improvements were made to the design of the aircraft.

The lining of the upper part of the center section between the 4th and 8th frames was made of balinite plywood, glued with VIAM glue to the wooden detachable parts of the 5th, 6th and 7th frames.

Significant changes were made to the propeller group. Installed new subframes, "new streamlined engine hoods", were installed "new finned-tubular water radiators ... in the wing in special tunnels", "a new oil system, including one oil-water and one air-oil cooler for each engine", as well as new oil tanks and console gas tanks with a capacity of 330 liters. VISh-22E variable-pitch propellers with a diameter of 3 m were used.

The new nose provided improved working conditions for the navigator and pilot, providing direct communication between them. The glazing area of ​​the navigational cockpit compared to the cockpit of the MMN aircraft was increased, and a second control with a folding steering wheel was installed. At the same time, in order to improve the visibility of the pilot through the glazing of the navigator's cockpit during landing and diving, the pilot's seat was shifted to the left, and the dashboard to the right.

Aiming during bombing from level flight was provided by NKPB-3 sights (for bombing at night and from low altitudes) and the OPB-1M sight installed in the navigator's cockpit.

For aiming at a target during dive bombing, the pilot had a PBP-1 sight. A dive horizon and an overload signaling device were installed on the pilot's dashboard.

The aircraft was equipped with brake grids under the planes with hydraulic control from the pilot like the Ju-88 aircraft, as well as a dive-out automatic, which operates automatically when bombs are dropped. When entering into a dive, after opening the command valve, the brake grids opened perpendicular to the flow. The release of the gratings was signaled by mechanical indicators, the so-called "soldiers", which rose from the skin between the 10th and 11th ribs. At the same time, the trimmers of the elevators were raised, deflecting the latter down. When the bomb release button or the additional command button was pressed, the trimmers returned to their original position.

The defensive small arms of the aircraft included three ShKAS machine guns: one with a mechanical sight in the nose ball mount (of the NU-DB-3f type) with 500 rounds of ammunition at the navigator, one with a K-8T collimator sight in the upper rear rifle mount TSS-1 (1000 cartridges) and one with an OP-2L sight on the lower MV-2 turret retractable inside the fuselage with 600 rounds of ammunition.

The navigator's bow mount allowed firing in a 50 ° cone, the TSS-1 mount - 90 ° left and right, 60 ° up and 30 ° down, the lower MV-2 mount - 30 ° left and right and from 4-5 up to 55° down.

The TSS-1 turret was a semi-circle along which a carriage with a machine gun head moved. In the stowed position, the machine gun was located on the left side; for this, a small cutout was made in the TSS-1 screen. When necessary, the transparent screen of the turret moved back along the rails and rose slightly upwards, protecting the shooter from the oncoming air flow.

The bomber armament of the aircraft had a number of improvements compared to the serial SB, in particular, the possibility of hanging large-caliber bombs was increased: when bombing from a dive - up to 4 FAB-250 (two on the outer holders and two on the inner ones) or 3 bombs of the FAB-500 type ( two outside and one inside), and when bombing from level flight - up to 3 FAB-500 or 6 FAB-250 bombs (four outside and two inside) or 12 100 kg bombs (4 outside and 8 inside).

The normal bomb load was increased to 1000 kg, and the maximum overload to 1500 kg. We note in particular that the bomb armament system ensured the release of 1500 kg of bombs both from level flight and from a dive. While diving, the bombs were dropped both from the bomb racks inside the fuselage and from 4 outer NP-1 type holders, designed by plant No. 22, completely recessed into the wing. On the NP-1 holders, the bombs were attached near the center of gravity by one central yoke and fixed with additional stops.

The chemical armament of the aircraft included two VAP-500 type air pouring devices (total 1000 kg) and two universal chemical aircraft devices of the UHAP-500 type (total 100 kg) only on external hangers. VAP and UHAP ensured the use of all types of toxic substances, incendiary and smoke-forming mixtures, which were in service with the Air Force.

In October 1940, factory tests of the first prototype of the SB-RK aircraft, the standard for the series, began. By November 4, 11 flights had been completed. The following were noted as the main defects of the aircraft: high temperature of water (95-100°C) and oil (110-115°C) and insufficient longitudinal stability. On October 29, the 2nd copy of the reference SB-RK was taken to the factory airfield, on which it was supposed to debug the weapon system. By this time, the construction of the 3rd reference SB-RK was coming to an end, which was supposed to be transferred to the Research Institute of the Air Force of the KA for the production of state tests. On this aircraft, in comparison with the first and second copies, some improvements were made: the cross section of the outlet from the water radiator tunnel was increased by reducing the number of shutters (5 instead of 6), the depth control was changed, an additional battery was installed in the forward fuselage of the F-1.

State tests of the experimental SB-RK, the standard for the series, were completed in January 1941. The leading test engineer was 1st rank military engineer M.I. Efimov, test pilots - Major V.I. Zhdanov and Captain A.M. Khripkov. The test report was signed by the Head of the Research Institute of the Air Force of the KA, Major General A.I. In December, by order of the NKAP No. 704 of December 9, 1940, the experimental SB-RK was renamed Ar-2.

In tests with a normal flight weight of 6600 kg, a maximum speed of 475 km / h was reached at an altitude of 4700 m. The climb time of 5000 m was 7.1 minutes. The practical ceiling at normal flight weight was 10,000 m, and at a flight weight of 7,100 with two FAB-250 bombs on an external sling - 9,000 m. km. The takeoff run with a flight weight of 7100 kg was 340 m.

It turned out that the aircraft, with operational balances from 30.5 to 32.7% of the MAR, is unstable in longitudinal respect. The aircraft became stable only at 27.25% CAH. At the same time, the lateral and directional stability at all operational alignments was satisfactory. The aircraft allowed to fly with one throttled motor.

For the entire period of state tests, 25 dives were made at angles from 40 ° to 75 ° with the brake bars retracted and released to remove the characteristics of the aircraft dive. In addition, a dive was carried out on the target with real bombing with the bodies of live bombs. The dive entry speed was 275-295 km/h, the initial entry altitude was 4,000 m, the dive start exit speed was 550 km/h, and the average withdrawal overload was 4.5 units.

Brake grids and automatic withdrawal from a dive during the tests worked flawlessly. When diving at an angle of 75 °, the duration of the straight section was 9 seconds, which ensured "... the possibility of targeted bombing".

The main disadvantages of the new machine were mainly related to the propeller group. For the entire time of testing on M-105 engines, the following took place: “destruction of the right pumping oil pump, as a result of which the motor had to be replaced; ... the formation of a crack in the lower crankcase cover on one engine, ... the pouring of gasoline from the carburetors, due to which there was a case of burning the intake pipe of the carburetors.

It was noted that "the cooling system in winter conditions operates at the upper limit of permissible temperatures for motors and will not at all ensure the normal operation of the aircraft in summer conditions." Draining the water from the water radiators turned out to be completely impossible.

The temperature of the oil coming out of the engine reached 110°C on climb at an outdoor air temperature near the ground of minus 10°C. This was the upper limit for the M-105 engines. The oil system proposed by the plant turned out to be completely unusable due to the frequent failure of oil-water radiators - 12 oil-water radiators were replaced during the entire testing period. The 1.5 atm shunt valves provided by the design did not protect the oil-water radiators from destruction.

All this made the Ar-2 water and oil system "...unsuitable for operation in the Red Army Air Force units".

As you can see, despite the fact that the M-105 engines were tested on the Ar-2 much later than on the SPB aircraft, and it was possible to analyze the results of the work of the Polikarpovites on fine-tuning this engine, the specialists of A.A. Arkhangelsky Design Bureau also had to face significant difficulties . In the future, the engine installation on the Ar-2 was nevertheless brought to an acceptable state for operation in parts.

Along with the advantages of the Ar-2 defensive small arms system, which had clear advantages over the existing one on the Security Council, specialists from the Air Force Research Institute also noted disadvantages. For nasal installation: “... the power supply unit and the withdrawal of links and sleeves have not been finalized - they often jam”. According to the upper installation TSS-1: “... it has major defects, without the elimination of which its combat use is not ensured: ... poor stability of the machine gun when firing; ...vibration of the sight; ... the link retraction is not debugged, which leads to frequent delays in firing.

As a general shortcoming, the use of defensive machine guns of normal caliber was indicated, the effectiveness of which in air combat no longer met modern requirements. However, all Soviet serial bombers of this time had this drawback, and could not be considered fundamental.

The conclusions of the report on state testing of the aircraft noted that: “The Ar-2 aircraft, made on the basis of the SB aircraft, is much better in terms of flight and tactical data than the serial SB aircraft, but lags behind modern foreign and domestic twin-engine medium bombers in terms of speed. ... The flight properties of the Ar-2 aircraft are similar to those of the SB aircraft, and the control of the aircraft is even easier. In terms of controllability and visibility for the pilot, the aircraft is convenient for piloting in formation. ... The Ar-2 aircraft can be allowed to operate in the units of the Red Army Air Force, subject to the limited use of the power of the M-105 engines ... "

The Arkhangelsk Design Bureau and Plant No. 22 were required to bring the propeller group “to perfection”, ensure the longitudinal stability of the aircraft in all operating modes, bring the armament and eliminate the machine defects noted in the act and in the state test report.

In February 1941, Ar-2 No. 1/511 entered the state tests at the Research Institute of the Air Force of the KA with improvements made to its design based on the results of state tests of the lead Ar-2. The M-105R engines on this aircraft were moved forward by 150 mm to improve longitudinal stability. VIT1T-22E propellers with a diameter of 3.1 m were installed. The motor reduction was changed to 0.59 (instead of 0.66). In addition, thinner brake grilles and jet exhaust pipes were installed on the aircraft. The aircraft's workmanship and surface finish have been greatly improved. These improvements made it possible to obtain a maximum speed near the ground of 443 km / h and 512 km / h at an altitude of 5000 m.

It would seem that it is worth continuing to work on improving the aerodynamics of the Ar-2 and strengthening its armament, thus ensuring the required flight and combat qualities of the aircraft in the series, as well as at an accelerated pace to bring the B-1 to the flight-combat state. However, fate decreed otherwise.

By this time, the lead Pe-2 (in accordance with the order of the NKAP No. 704 dated 12/09/1940, the PB-100 was renamed Pe-2) had already successfully passed the tests, showing good results - with a flight weight of 7536 kg, the maximum speed at an altitude of 5100 m amounted to the coveted 540 km / h, the ceiling - 8700 m, the flight range of 1200 km. Normal bomb load - 600 kg, overload - 1000 kg.

Starting from the new year, aircraft factories No. 39 and No. 22, intended for the Pe-2 series, began to roll out products to the airfield. The leadership of the NKAP and the Air Force gained confidence in the early solution of all technological and organizational problems associated with the launch of the "pawn" in a large series.

On January 29, 1941, an experimental dive bomber "103" with AM-37 engines designed by the NKVD OTB made its first flight under the factory test program. At the same time, the construction of an improved copy of this 103U 2AM-37 aircraft was in full swing at the 156th aircraft plant - the completion of work was planned in March.

According to GKO Decree No. 401 dated October 11, 1940, the maximum speed of these variants of the 103 aircraft was to be 580-600 km / h at an altitude of 7000 m, the normal bomb load was -1000 kg (in overload up to 3000 kg), the flight range with normal bomb load - 2500 km, small arms and cannon armament - 2 ShVAK cannons and 5 ShKAS machine guns.

The first results of factory tests of the 103 aircraft gave hope that the Air Force would soon be able to receive a strike aircraft, which, in terms of its flight and combat data, surpasses all combat vehicles of this class known at the beginning of 1941 and will completely resolve "the task of arming the Red Army Air Force with front-line dive bombers."

As a result, by the Decree of the Defense Committee of February 11, 1941, the serial production of the Yak-4 (by order of the NKAP No. 704 of December 9, 1940, BB-22 2M-105 was renamed the Yak-4) at aircraft factory No. 81 was discontinued. The serial production of the Arkhangelsk bomber, the Ar-2 2M-105, was also discontinued. V.M. Petlyakov’s Pe-2 dive bomber firmly established himself at the 22nd aircraft factory.

On April 1, 1941, A.I. Shakhurin signed order No. 291 “On the design and construction of the MoV-2 aircraft with the AM-38 engine designed by Mozharovsky G.M. and Venevidova I.V.” The design was entrusted to plant No. 32, and the construction to plant No. 89. Since A.A. Arkhangelsky had previously participated in the development of a draft design of this attack aircraft, on April 10, order No. 309 followed from the NKAP, according to which the entire design team of A.A. Arkhangelsky was transferred to the 32nd plant to ensure the design and construction of MoV-2.

As you can see, the creation of a modern front-line bomber of the KA Air Force on the eve of a big war took place under the slogan “give speed”, and certain successes were achieved in this direction. However, it must be admitted that the "high-speed" development of Soviet bomber-type aircraft was to the detriment of their main combat qualities. Passion for speed at the then level of development of the Soviet aircraft industry, mainly engine building, naturally led to a serious decrease in the combat load of bombers, and therefore to a decrease in "the power of bombing attacks on the enemy." So, the main Soviet front-line bomber Pe-2 had a very modest normal bomb load for such an aircraft - only 600 kg (for an overload of 1000 kg), and a high-speed short-range dive bomber BB-22PB and even less - 400 kg (for an overload of 500 kg).

At the same time, in the pre-war period, serious research was not carried out at all to find the optimal forms and methods for the combat use of aviation in modern warfare. As a result, work on determining the optimal directions for the development of aviation (composition and organizational structure of aviation combat forces) and analyzing the combat effectiveness of various types of aircraft in a future war did not receive due attention. Accordingly, the appearance (flight performance data and design scheme of the aircraft, the number of engines, the composition of the crew, the composition of weapons and the layout of their placement on the aircraft, the required size of ammunition, etc.) of promising combat aircraft (fighter, front-line bomber, attack aircraft) was not determined etc.) and no recommendations were developed for improving the aircraft already in service with the Air Force.

In turn, the lack of a sound concept for the construction of the Red Army Air Force led to the fact that neither the military, nor the leadership of the country and the NKAP on the eve of the war had a clear and precise understanding of what kind of combat aircraft, in what quantity and in what ratio it is necessary to equip the Air Force with spacecraft. And most importantly, there was no unity of views on these issues.

As a result, when making decisions on the creation of a new generation of combat aircraft, as well as on putting into service or decommissioning the Air Force of an aircraft, only some indicators were taken into account and compared, characterizing separately the flight and combat qualities of aircraft. In fact, all decisions were taken blindly by the Defense Committee, the UVVS and the NKAP and for the most part without taking into account the specific combat situation in which combat vehicles would have to fight.

Meanwhile, from the point of view of a combined arms commander, it is important not how fast, for example, a bomber flies, or what ceiling it has, but what damage a bomber can inflict on the enemy when performing a specific combat mission in the interests of ground forces. That is, for a combined-arms commander, the important characteristics of a bomber are: the weight and composition of the bomb load, the effectiveness of the used aviation weapons (air bombs, incendiary mixture, etc.) against specific targets, the accuracy of bombing and firing. On the other hand, the bomber solves a specific combat mission in the face of opposition from enemy fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery. And from these positions, the following are important: speed, maneuverability, ceiling, the effectiveness of defensive weapons, the combat survivability of the aircraft, etc.

In this regard, for the sake of completeness in describing the development of the Soviet concept of a high-speed attack aircraft, it is interesting to compare the pre-war serial and experimental dive bombers of the Air Force of the KA and the Luftwaffe - Ar-2, Pe-2, BB-22PB, "103U", SPB and Ju-88A- 4, in terms of their potential combat effectiveness in the fighting on the eastern front.

We will evaluate the combat effectiveness of bomber aircraft based on the probability that the latter will complete a specific combat mission to destroy targets in the interests of ground forces, or the probability of a bomber's combat success. In this case, the probability of a bomber's combat success is determined by the probabilities for the bomber not to be shot down by enemy fighters and anti-aircraft artillery on approach to the target and over the target, the probability of entering the target area with a given error, the probability of detecting the target visually, and the probability of hitting the target during bombing.

All calculations for the compared aircraft were carried out for the same conditions of their combat use. Typical ground targets and conditions for ground and air battles on the eastern front were taken as initial data. Two methods of combat use of bombers were considered: dive bombing on a small-sized hard-to-vulnerable target (long-term defensive structures with a ceiling thickness of not more than 70 cm, bridges, warehouses, etc.), for the destruction of which the use of large-caliber bombs (250 kg and above) was required , and bombing from level flight at an area weakly protected or unprotected target (a column of infantry, vehicles and lightly armored vehicles, artillery and mortar guns in position, etc.). In all cases, the maximum characteristics of the aircraft were taken into account in the calculations.

The probabilities of the bomber reaching the target area and its detection in the calculations were taken equal to one. When calculating the probability of hitting a target during bombing, the characteristics of the vulnerability of the target in relation to specific types of weapons used were taken into account. Flight and rifle training for pilots and navigators is good.

When assessing the probability of a bomber being shot down by anti-aircraft artillery fire, it was assumed that the distribution of anti-aircraft artillery (Air guns) in the enemy's tactical defense zone was uniform. Since the working heights of front-line bombers on the eastern front were 2000-3000 m, only medium-caliber ZA barrels were taken into account in the calculations. The bomber's anti-aircraft maneuver was taken into account by introducing an additional error into the aiming of anti-aircraft crews.

When calculating the probability of a bomber being shot down by a fighter, the following assumptions were made, which simplify the calculations, but do not affect the general conclusion when comparing the combat effectiveness of bombers of various types: the German Bf.109f-1 was taken as the enemy fighter, the enemy fighter detects and attacks the bomber from the position loitering in the air, the probability of detecting a bomber by a pilot of an attacking fighter in the patrol zone is performed visually and is taken equal to 1, when calculating the probability of a fighter launching an attack on an enemy bomber from the rear hemisphere (i.e. approach and combat turn with access to the attack curve on distance of opening fire) dive characteristics, rate of climb and time of steady turn (radius) were taken into account, while in all calculations it was assumed that the maximum overload on the attack curve, at which the pilot could conduct aimed fire, does not exceed 4 units c, - the probability of a bomber being shot down by a fighter was estimated taking into account the return fire of the bomber's air gunner, - the shooting and flight training of fighter pilots is good, the shooting training of the air gunner is good, - the bomber's anti-fighter maneuver was taken into account by introducing an additional error in aiming, - air conditions battles (the distribution of the firing angle, firing distance and burst length, limiting overloads during an attack, etc.) were taken as typical for the period of air battles during the Great Patriotic War, - sights: for fighters - optical, for an air gunner of a bomber - mechanical, - shooting fighter in all cases - accompanying. Calculations show that under typical conditions of battles on the eastern front, when solving the combat mission of destroying small-sized hard-to-reach targets, the Ar-2 dive bomber was almost 5.5 times more effective than the BB-22PB bomber, the Pe-2 bomber was 1.4 times more effective, and German Ju-88A-4 - 1.3 times.

When solving the combat mission of destroying an area weakly protected target, of all serial Soviet bombers, the Ar-2 again showed the best result. At the same time, the Pe-2 lagged behind the Ar-2 by 1.3 times, and the BB-22PB by almost 2.5 times. At the same time, the Ar-2 was inferior to the "Junkers" in terms of efficiency in this type of "combination" by about 1.3 times.

The experienced YuZU 2AM-37 dive bomber outperformed both Ar-2 and Ju-88A-4 in terms of combat effectiveness in solving any problems of air support for troops. Unlike its opponents, Yuzu was able to carry three FAB-1000s (the maximum capacity of bomb racks) and "throw" them from a dive.

Unfortunately, the outbreak of the war did not allow to quickly bring the car to the flight-combat state - the AM-37 engine was removed from mass production, and the M-82A engine installed on the aircraft instead suffered from many "childhood" diseases. As a result, the first three serial Tu-2 2M-82 (by order of the NKAP No. 234 dated March 28, 1942, aircraft "103" were given the designation Tu-2) only got to the front in September 1942, and rhythmic and high-quality mass production (already with M-82FN engines) was established only by the middle of 1944. However, the bomber lost the "ability" to bomb from a dive - the brake grids with the control system were removed from the aircraft. The car began to be classified as a medium bomber, designed "to carry out the tasks of daylight bombing from a horizontal flight on the enemy's near rear."

A clear outsider in solving any combat mission is the BB-22PB. It should be recognized that the adoption by the Air Force of the spacecraft of the BB-22 aircraft in the version of the bomber is a gross mistake of the UVVS, the NKAP and the Defense Committee. It did not represent a real combat value, but a lot of effort and money was spent on its introduction into mass production and development in parts.

A serious mistake is also the termination of serial production of the Ar-2 bomber in favor of launching the Pe-2 bomber into mass production.

The apparent main drawback of the Ar-2 - the lower maximum flight speed compared to the Pe-2 - was completely "closed" by optimizing the tactics of the combat use of the dive bomber, better organizing interaction with cover fighters and control in battle, as well as training the flight crew of bomber regiments in air combat with enemy fighters singly and as part of a group. This is confirmed by the example of the Luftwaffe pilots, who, having attack aircraft with mediocre flight data, achieved high combat effectiveness mainly due to the rational tactics of their combat use, excellent organization of interaction with their fighter aircraft and ground forces, and good flight and combat training of crews. .

Most importantly, the Ar-2 had excellent take-off and landing qualities and was more accessible than the Pe-2 for the development of young wartime sergeants. As you know, the Pe-2 did not tolerate high leveling at all - in this case, the chassis was guaranteed to break. The “pawns” broken down on the landings accounted for up to 30% of the defective machines in parts.

In any case, Ar-2 throughout the war could show better combat effectiveness in solving any combat mission of front-line bomber aviation than the main dive bomber of the Air Force KA, the Pe-2 aircraft.

As follows from the analysis of the potential combat effectiveness of the compared bombers, the bomb armament system of the German Ju-88A-4 was more consistent with the distribution of typical ground targets against which aviation had to operate on the eastern front in the initial period of the war than the bomb armament of Soviet bomb carriers.

The main caliber of the "Junkers" was a 50-kg bomb - 28 pieces on board, while the bomb armament system of Soviet bombers was mainly designed for the suspension of 100-kg bombs (6-12 pieces). It was in this version of the suspension that the maximum load capacity of Soviet aircraft was used. When using bombs of a smaller caliber, Soviet bomb carriers turned out to be underloaded. For example, when hanging bombs of 50 kg caliber, the Pe-2 "did not get" 100 kg to the normal bomb load and 500 kg to the maximum.

At the same time, based on the characteristics of the vulnerability of typical ground targets in the initial period of the war (motorized mech columns, artillery batteries in positions, etc.), the main type of bombs should have been fragmentation bombs of 25 kg caliber and high-explosive 50 kg caliber bombs, as well as fragmentation bombs of smaller caliber. For example, the reduced area of ​​destruction of armored personnel carriers and light tanks when dropped from a height of 500-1000 m of ten FAB-50m was about 400 m2, and six FAB-100 - only 180 m2.

In the directive of the Commander of the Air Force of the Spacecraft, Colonel-General of Aviation P.F. Zhigarev No. 14501/12153 dated 01/25/1942 on the results of an inspection check of the combat operations of the air units of the Western and South-Western fronts in January 42, it was indicated on this occasion that: “... In most aviation units of the air forces of the Western and South-Western fronts, an illiterate use of small arms, cannon and bomber weapons was noted ... The caliber and type of bombs used often do not correspond to the nature of the target. Standard charging is used: FAB-100 or FAB-50 even for targets that require destruction by fragmentation bombs ... "

Carried out by the head of the department of small arms and cannon armament of VVA aircraft named after. N.E. Zhukovsky by military engineer 1st rank E.B. Lunts in February-March 1942, analysis of the combat experience of units of the Western and South-Western fronts (19th, 46th, 47th and 63rd garden), The 6th and 7th IAK PVO for the period June-December 1941 showed that in many cases bombs were used mainly based on the convenience and speed of preparing aircraft for combat missions, while the security of targets and the effectiveness of the bombs (lethal fragmentation force, high-explosive action, etc.).

According to Lunts, during the first 6 months of the war, all types of aviation spent 41.6% of sorties on the combat mission of destroying tanks, motorized troops, artillery in positions and manpower of the enemy, 2.5% on operations at enemy airfields and by rail objects — 1.6%. The remaining sorties were associated with the performance of combat missions without the use of bombs.

That is, instead of using fragmentation bombs of the AO-25s, AO-25m type and high-explosive bombs of the FAB-50, FAB-50m types, bomber air units used bombs of the FAB-100 type - 56% of the weight of all bombs dropped on the enemy.

In conclusion of his report, Professor Lunts suggested “... remove the FAB-100 from service” and “... prohibit units in the pursuit of tonnage from using bombs that do not correspond to the nature of the target (for example, FAB-100 instead of FAB-50m or AO-25).”

On the other hand, at the beginning of the war there were few enemy ground targets, which required the use of large-caliber air bombs (bunkers, bunkers, bridges, warehouses, etc.), and to make changes in the design of combat aircraft in order to ensure maximum loading of bombs caliber 50-25 kg was "troublesome", and risky. So, in order to remedy the situation, it was necessary to urgently create 100-kg bombs that were more effective in terms of fragmentation. The most successful, as you know, were the high-explosive fragmentation OFAB-100 and the incendiary ZAB-100. OFAB-100 had a powerful high-explosive effect at break and gave a lot of heavy fragments, which at a distance of up to 10 m from the point of detonation could penetrate German tank armor up to 30 mm thick and disable 155 mm field guns. In turn, the incendiary "weaving" - easily pierced the ceilings of buildings, knocking out windows and doors with a high-explosive blow, thereby providing air flow for the spread of fire.

The situation changed in 1944-1945, when the Red Army and the KA Air Force faced a particularly strong defense of the Wehrmacht. As is known, the German fortified areas were a rather difficult target for aviation due to the high saturation with air defense systems, the small size and high strength of long-term reinforced concrete defensive structures. The usual density was up to 6 bunkers and bunkers per 1 km of front, although in some cases their number reached 20 per 1 km of front. The AD strip along the front ranged from 30 to 140 km, and the total number of bunkers and bunkers varied from 60 to 900. The FAB-250 was rarely "dragged") did not provide the required probability of hitting the Wehrmacht's fortifications, and the Tu-2 2M-82 bomber, as noted above, had already lost its diving properties by this time.

That's when the finest hour of the Arkhangelsk Ar-2 dive bomber could come - his ability to carry 6 FAB-250s or three 500-kg bombs and "throw" them from a dive could be more useful than ever to the Red Army. By this time, the Ar-2 would have already gone a certain way to improve its flight and combat qualities by strengthening defensive weapons, improving aerodynamics, increasing the power of the power plant and combat survivability. Naturally, the Ar-2 could not completely replace the Tu-2, but would complement it with success.

It remains only to regret that as of June 1, 1941, the Air Force units of the KA had only 164 Ar-2 2M-105 aircraft, of which: 147 (3 out of order) aircraft - in parts of the Military Districts, the rest - in parts of the Center and 22 -th plant. In the context of the strategic retreat of the Red Army and the frankly poor organization of combat operations by aviation and ground forces, the Ar-2 bombers could not show all that they were capable of. In addition, due to the lack of the required cover by their fighters and insufficient training of the flight crew, most of the Ar-2 was lost already in the first months of the war - according to the official data of the KA Air Force headquarters, the combat losses of the Ar-2 in 1941 amounted to 95 aircraft.

It should be noted that the leadership and specialists of the Air Force of the Navy of the spacecraft, when developing a plan for equipping fleet aviation in 1941 with modern combat aircraft, considered the Ar-2 as the main type of dive bomber, and the "pawn" - mainly as a long-range escort fighter. But no one "heard" their opinion ...

Modification: Ar-2
Wingspan, m: 18.00
Length, m: 12.50
Height, m: 3.56
Wing area, m2: 48.20
Weight, kg
- empty aircraft: 4516
- normal takeoff: 6660
-maximum takeoff: 8150
Engine type: 2 x PD M-105R
- power, hp: 2 x 1100
Maximum speed, km/h
-near ground: 443
-on high: 512
Cruise speed, km/h: 475
Practical range, km: 1500
Rate of climb, m/min: 765
Practical ceiling, m: 10500
Crew: 3
Armament: 4 x 7.62 mm ShKAS machine guns