I sometimes tell all sorts of worldly stories on AS. Flashbacks, flashbacks. Usually colleagues on the forum read not without pleasure.)))))

The passage you cited from Pelevin, as if it were a life story from the early 90s, inspired memories of other bankers and their stories. And not only about bankers.

But I'll start at the end of my story.

There is a lot of text, but only the very beginning, the first paragraphs, is relevant to what I write. And the last. So, who is lazy to read all about the "real business" of the 90s, it is absolutely not necessary to tear through the whole sheet. At the same time - this is my next spit in the direction of the liberals. Who cares so much about the "romantic" 90s, with their "freedom".

So, the president of the Nizhnevartovsk bank "Yugorsky" Oleg Kantor was brutally stabbed to death at a dacha in the Moscow region.

A small detail, not mentioned in the link - in a dacha located in a specially guarded residential village of the Administration of the President of Russia. They slaughtered like a pig, which the investigation could have paid attention to. Far away everyone knows how to cut. The crime remains unsolved.

Although the investigation did a gigantic job, which is described in sufficient detail and at the link. Only looking in the right direction.

As usual, any contract killing is the final stage of a long chain of events, most often deeply criminal events. Against the background of which the murder itself is an ordinary completion of the rest, especially grave ones.

Now I'll start from the beginning.

70% of Russian oil was produced in Nizhnevartovsk, Tyumen region. The Tyumen region, as a rule, is the place of registration of large oil companies (then many went over to Moscow). But in reality, the oil itself was produced in Nizhnevartovsk, and nearby.

In those days, the key role in the oil business was played not by the financiers Waxelberg-Friedmans, but former directors oil-producing enterprises, renamed in the 90s into "general". Their liberals, eager to redistribute property in their favor, contemptuously called "red directors." And exterminated in all sorts of ways. From dust to described in this comment. The "Red Directors" were oil practitioners who had risen from the bottom of the oil business. Their successors, from the "spouts", only more aggressive and boundless.

And one more detail - there can be many oil companies, and wells too. But the real well-being of an oil company is usually based on one company, and often on one well - in the sense of an oil field.

In Nizhnevartovsk, Megionneftegaz was such a pearl. FROM CEO Kuzmin. Manufacturing practitioner. "Red Director".

Another feature of those times was the huge difference in oil prices. domestic market, and the external market. But - to supply oil outside of Russia, an export license was required. Which was issued in Moscow by the Ministry of Fuel and Energy. And he was responsible for issuing licenses - the first deputy minister. The minister was Shafranik, a respected practical oil and gas worker, a friend of Chernomyrdin. But he was not allowed to issue licenses. Too much money. For every 10 thousand tons of export license, the first deputy minister had to pay 20 thousand dollars in cash. Moreover, there were many who wanted to bring, much more than those from whom they were ready to "accept" the offering.

The first deputy at that time was a creature of "thieves in law", and this cash went to the "common fund".

Well, it’s just that at that time such was the alignment of forces in power, and in the situation around energy carriers.

Kuzmin had access to Moscow. Powerful. Money in cash bags flew to Moscow by Aeroflot regularly. At X-ray inspections, neither in Nizhnevartovsk, nor in Moscow at Domodedovo and Sheremetyevo, nor at the frames at the entrance to the government building in the White House, law enforcement officers were not at all surprised by the scattering of packs of millions of dollars in ordinary shuttle bags. Then it was a common practice (I myself saw it many times, if cho). Well, that is, Kuzmin had absolutely no problems with obtaining export licenses. He, as was customary by the rules of the game of those times, neatly "shared".

Oil was exported, of course, according to the scheme through intermediaries (later Khodorkovsky brought this scheme to perfection). It also needed to be shared. And yet - every money business of those times had unspoken "partners". With whom everything was based on oral agreements - no one thought to sign any contracts in this completely shadow business.

The sale of a part of the export oil produced by Megionneftegaz according to the "left" scheme brought Kuzmin about 15 million dollars a month to his foreign accounts. Him, and his unofficial partners, in the amount of 6 people. Among them was Oleg Kantor and a business colleague named Fomin. How the shares were distributed "within" the community is unknown to me and never interested, but Kuzmin had enough. But some of the "partners", in particular, the two I mentioned, considered themselves deprived.

And Kuzmin was summoned to a showdown in Moscow. Kuzmin had an apartment there, where he always stayed during business trips. There was also an unofficial "official" apartment of Megionneftegaz, for living on business trips. Kuzmin arrived in Moscow late, after work (also 4 hours of summer), in the morning he expected to settle matters at the Ministry, and return to the enterprise the same day.

The meeting-dismantling of the "partners" took place at the "service" apartment late at night.

It was not possible to agree on changing the conditions for the division of production. The dissatisfied part of the partners remained with their shares. Meanwhile, they believed that due to the change in their opportunities within the office, they should have a larger share. Kuzmin explained to them that he produces oil, he extracts licenses, he also organizes foreign sales. Their functions in the general "business" are secondary, and their performance depends little on how their overall "weight" has changed in their own eyes. On that they parted.

In the morning, on the way from the entrance of his Moscow apartment to a waiting car with a personal driver, Kuzmin was shot dead.

Professionally. 16 shots, 16 shells from PM. In the professional community, the murder was taken into account.

Soon the ownership of Megionneftegaz was transferred to the newly created Tyumen Oil Company by financiers. The investigation into the case reached a dead end, as oil workers are not talkative people. Long tongue there for a long time not hanging out. Although it was not a secret for any of the interested parties that the killer was allegedly a lieutenant colonel of the FSB of the anti-corruption and terrorism unit (this is from there - the London lawless Litvinov, a creature of Berezovsky). Here I refer readers to the last paragraphs at my link. The explanation for the phenomenon with the "non-existent" FSB officer, which is incomprehensible there, is actually simple. The fact is that only employees of this department had the right to have two genuine service certificates, one normal, the other - "covers", for a non-existent surname. This explains the authenticity of the service certificates presented by them to the rest of the law enforcement officers, and the complete absence of such an employee in the payroll of the special service during subsequent checks.

As far as I have heard, internal security did not leave this story unattended. I did some research, but I couldn't prove anything. It seems that this "lieutenant colonel" was removed from the organs. As you understand, I add "would" so that fewer specific and unnecessary questions can arise for me. You never know what could be!))))))

Meanwhile, "after Kuzmin" the alignment of forces in the oil industry has changed. Someone Fomin took the post of first deputy minister (yeah, the same one, money). The power and influence of Kantor, the president of Yugorsky bank, increased noticeably. Unable to understand the change in the balance of power in his native diocese, Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, in a conversation "on a turntable" with his longtime friend and Minister of Energy Shafranik, in response to his complaints about the new first deputy, good-naturedly sanctioned: "Yes, drive him away!"

The minister ordered to issue an order for the dismissal of his own deputy.

The Minister of Fuel and Energy of Russia was beaten for a long time and diligently. In his own office. In the White House, in the government. For Fomin. For trying to encroach not on your piece.

Despite the fact that the Presidential Security Service (SBP) of Yeltsin, headed by Korzhakov (and directly in the White House by Colonel Streletsky), bugged all the premises in the White House. And accordingly, I recorded the whole process. Then they still had a joke that the White House was built of microconcrete - 40% concrete, 60% - microphones. Yes, that's how it was.

Shafranik reversed his decision, and no longer stuttered about the resignation of his new deputy. Then, years later, he left as president in the newly created serious oil company. For many years he was a respected businessman who largely determined the fate of the oil industry. As well as the leaders of the Tyumen Oil Company, created on the basis of Megionneftegaz.

Regarding the beating of Minister Shafranik, of course, there are no complaints in law enforcement not received. Of course... However, in the professional oil and gas community, as in the case of Kuzmin, everyone always somehow finds out everything. Although they keep their mouths shut, if, of course, they are dear to the owner. It’s more expensive for yourself ... Somehow everyone knew that brothers from the village of Kushchevskaya, Krasnodar Territory, came to beat the minister. Later, they became famous throughout the country as Tsapki.

But the redistribution of the oil and gas sector in the country began to gain momentum. And speed. It somehow became indecent for both Chernomyrdin and Lukoil and Gazprom to smear and handle Kantor, who was covered in blood up to his ears. Too much money already lay on personal accounts, it was already time to become respectable bourgeois, "the elite of Russia."

The first "bell" sounded for Kantor when Lukoil and Gazprom, and after them the rest of the energy industry, suddenly removed their accounts from the coolest and most moneyy "energy" bank in Russia at that time. Someone, and the owners and main shareholders of these companies, knew perfectly well who Oleg Kantor really was, and about his affairs. And in time and with impunity distanced themselves.

But before that, there was another unpleasant episode, in Switzerland. Perhaps, finally influenced the fateful decision of the "giants".

To one of the clients of the bank, who owed some amount (well, it happens, tough guys do not consider it necessary for themselves to hastily part with money, even if they have to), cheerful compatriots entered his Swiss hotel room. They put a gun down his throat and promised to blow his brains out on the nearest wall. And they weren't kidding. As a result, in a minute they got access to a secret account and "repaid the debt with interest", 47 million.

Naturally, the oil and gas workers did not like this much. At home on the reservation, the new elites could well protect themselves, fencing themselves off from the world and grateful compatriots with heavily armed security services.

But here abroad, where the stolen money obtained in the sweat of the face during the years of life-threatening business activities was stored, in the holy of holies, where foreigners did not allow other people's armed guards, and it was not comme il faut to dedicate the guards themselves to holy nominal accounts and other secrets of piggy banks, such frank rudeness was perceived extremely painfully by people from the "new elite".

Oleg Kantor had no place on this earth. A similar response came to the lawlessness. From the same village of Kushchevskaya, the same Tsapki (Does anyone else doubt why they did what they wanted with impunity at home for so many years? Do you understand what level of patrons they had?)

And Oleg Kantor died. Exactly as described in the link. For others as a reminder. All major clients from the "elitist", knowing or guessing about the future, fled from the coolest and most money bank in advance. The murder, of course, remains unsolved.

Why do I suddenly remember this old story?

Yes, the quote from Pelevin evoked the right associations.

Previous labor activity Oleg Kantor. On the eve of that day, as he immediately moved to the chair of the Chairman of the largest bank in Russia, Yugorsky.

An ice cream seller from a vending machine in one of the peripheral bars of Nizhnevartovsk.

MOSCOW, July 28 - RIA Novosti, Maria Saltykova. The Central Bank revoked the license from the bank "Ugra" - this case was the largest since the beginning of the mass purge of the industry by the regulator. According to RIA Rating, as of June 1, the bank ranked 29th in the list of Russian banks in terms of assets. Since 2013, the Bank of Russia has revoked the licenses of almost 400 out of 900 credit institutions. By what signs can one determine that a bank is on the verge of bankruptcy, - in the material of RIA Novosti.

1. The bank has too high deposit rates

The Bank of Russia every 10 days displays the average maximum rate, which banks are not recommended to exceed by more than 3.5%. To do this, the regulator monitors the maximum deposit rates in ten leading banks in terms of deposits three times a month. individuals. These now include Sberbank of Russia, VTB 24, Bank of Moscow, Raiffeisenbank, Gazprombank, Binbank, Alfa-Bank, FC Otkritie Bank, Promsvyazbank and Rosselkhozbank.

“We need to look at the level of the gap: if the deposit rate differs from the Savings Bank by 2% per annum (with other equal conditions) is normal, but if it’s 5-7%, it’s not good,” says Dmitry Tarasov, chief expert of the Frank Research Group analytical agency. If a bank has a high portfolio yield, for example, 30% per annum, it can afford to bet at 15 -18%, but in all other cases, if deposit rates are much higher than the market average, this indicates that the bank has lost other sources of liquidity replenishment.

How to find out: the average maximum rate in ten leading banks is published every 10 days on the website of the Central Bank. Now it is 7.5%.

2. Exotic conditions for opening a deposit

Since March 2016, the Central Bank has introduced a restriction on accepting deposits in Yugra. Despite this, the bank figured out how to get around it: it gave new depositors a share when opening a deposit, making them shareholders. "We have noticed signs of this violation in the Yugra bank," Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank of Russia Vasily Pozdyshev said on July 10. The same scheme was once used by Mosoblbank, which became the record holder in terms of the volume of off-balance sheet deposits - about 70 billion rubles (such deposits are not reflected on the bank's balance sheet, respectively - they are not covered by DIA insurance). True, no off-balance deposits were found in the bank "Ugra".

What to do: when a bank offers an additional complex product, be it shares, notes or something else, one must proceed from the level of one's financial literacy: if something is not clear, do not conclude an agreement. "There is no way to unambiguously determine that a bank is making a deposit with you that will not be reflected on its balance sheet," says Valery Piven, deputy director of the ACRA bank ratings group.

3. The bank quarrels with the Central Bank, the conflict comes to court with the regulator

The Central Bank never revokes a license without warning: as of the beginning of July, over the past 12 months, Yugra Bank has received about ten orders to supplement reserves from the regulator. In the case of another high-profile recall - from Master Bank - the credit institution lost its license a year after the Central Bank accused the bank of money laundering.

How to find out: in the heading "Bankruptcy Prevention of Credit Organizations" on the website of the Central Bank, banks are listed for which a moratorium has already been introduced or a temporary administration has been appointed. Messages about instructions to banking organizations also regularly appear on the regulator's website, this information is then published by business media and news agencies.

4. Bank credit ratings are deteriorating or non-existent

Ugra did not have ratings from any of the three largest international rating agencies - S&P, Fitch or Moody's. The bank's website reported only a BBB+ rating (sufficient creditworthiness) from the National Rating Agency. The bank also did not have ratings from two Russian agencies - ACRA and Expert RA (Expert RA issued a rating in 2014, but a year later it first lowered it, and then completely withdrew it).

How to find out: information about available credit ratings is usually published on the website of the bank itself. If it is not there, you can check the lists of banks indicating their rating in different agencies on the websites of specialized media, for example Banki.ru. But you need to understand that in order to open a deposit, you need to take into account other signs of the bank's reliability.

"Low credit rating does not necessarily mean that it is a weak organization. We need to follow the history of rating revisions, to see why the agency's view of the situation in the bank has changed for the worse," said Valery Piven, Deputy Director of the ACRA Banking Ratings Group.

5. Legal entities withdraw assets from the bank

According to the Central Bank, as of June 1, the total amount of deposits in Yugra was 181.5 billion rubles. Of these, about 170 billion rubles were insured in the deposit insurance system - these are funds of individuals whose deposits (no more than 1.4 million rubles) are protected by the DIA. The deposits of legal entities accounted for an insignificant amount for such a large bank - according to the Central Bank on July 7, it was only 2.2 billion rubles.

Legal entities usually more carefully evaluate the risks of investing in a bank, because their deposits are not insured in the DIA. If they have any suspicions, they immediately withdraw funds from the bank. At the same time, it is not the low share of assets of legal entities that should be alarming, but its sharp change, said Dmitry Tarasov from Frank Research Group. The structure of the bank's balance sheet depends on its economic model; here it is impossible to say what part the funds of legal entities should take in each case.

How to find out: look at bank statements. For example, for this you can use the rating on the Banki.ru portal. By clicking on the desired bank, you can see a table with numbers, where in the category "Balance figures" there are lines "Deposits of individuals" and "Funds of enterprises and organizations".

6. The deposit cannot be closed just like that - you have to apply and wait

If you are offered to leave an application to withdraw money or close a deposit, and in a few days, this indicates that the bank already has big problems. If the bank is also reducing hours of operation, this may indicate that he is trying to protect himself from the flow of customers who can withdraw their savings. Messages about such cases in Yugra began to appear on the media forums that write about banks, in the "Reviews" sections last year.

How to find out: monitor bank customer reviews on the Internet.

7. Large shareholders leave the bank, it is resold

Bulgar Bank, the first to close in 2017, was sold nine months before the license was revoked. The former owner, Tatar businessman Aidar Amirov, in an interview with the media assured that "the bank is stable and nothing threatens it." About the new owners - businessmen from Yaroslavl - almost never reported. By the end of 2016, the bank started having problems with making payments and issuing cash.

The Central Bank's order to create large additional reserves or to limit the acceptance of deposits is a "pre-infarction" stage of the bank's existence, Tarasov from Frank Research Group believes. The departure of shareholders or a change of owners is already the final stage before its closure, the expert noted.

How to find out: on the bank's website, you can find the composition of its owners and check what the business media write about them. You can also follow the change of bank owners in the section "Information on credit organizations on the website of the Central Bank.

The Central Bank introduced temporary administration to the Yugra Bank and imposed a moratorium on meeting the requirements of the bank's creditors, the regulator announced on its website on Monday, July 10.

This may be the largest insured event in the history of the Russian banking sector. As of June 1, Yugra attracted 181.3 billion rubles of public funds.

On May 15, an employee of one of the Yugra branches told a Vedomosti correspondent that it was possible to receive bank shares when placing a deposit: a sale and purchase agreement is signed, but in fact securities go as a gift. According to him, it was possible to get the shares by contacting the branch: no one told him that "this is cancelled." However, the next day, an employee of the same branch of the bank said that the bank does not have such a promotion, and did not have it, and all deposit offers are posted on the bank's website. In another branch of Yugra, the correspondent of Vedomosti was also informed that when opening a VIP deposit, shares are entitled to it as a gift.

Since October 2016, the bank has had restrictions on attracting household funds, which were the main source of liabilities for the bank. The Central Bank drew attention to the fact that the bank bypasses this restriction. In particular, the regulator drew attention to the fact that the bank raises funds from minority shareholders, and its large depositors received bank shares. At the end of April 2017, the Central Bank limited the bank's ability to attract deposits from shareholders with a share of less than 0.01%.

During this time, the bank was owned by 12 individuals, but market participants indicated that all these years the bank was de facto controlled by Moscow developers, the owners of Gorbushkin Dvor, Yuri and Alexei Khotin. The Central Bank has repeatedly demanded that the bank bring the shareholder structure in line and disclose the real owners. This happened only in January 2016, when Alexei Khotin appeared among the owners of Ugra. Now he is the majority shareholder of the bank - he owns 52.42% of the bank's shares through the Swiss Radamant Financial AG. At the end of June, the bank announced that it was changing its ownership structure: in capital Russian JSC "Direct Investments", the main owner will also be Khotin.

The failure in Yugra happened on April 25, the bank reported, explaining it by violations in the external power supply system: they “affected the operation of the equipment included in the software and hardware complex information systems". Bank depositors reported difficulties with the return of funds. It was impossible to get money in many branches of the bank, Vedomosti correspondents were convinced after visiting them and talking on the phone with their employees. This situation continued until the evening of April 27, then the work of the bank gradually improved. RAEX methodologist Yuri Belikov was sure that the bank had problems with liquidity. A person who knows this from a friend of Khotin also spoke about this.

Since October 2016, Ugra began to observe insignificant (18,000 -753,000 rubles) turnovers on accounting accounts authorized capital while its value remained unchanged (12.97 billion rubles), Belikov pointed out: in fact, there was a deconsolidation of blocks of shares on a small scale.

RAEX methodologist Yuri Belikov:
- At the same time, the number of shareholders who did not receive any control over the bank due to the intangibility of their blocks of shares increased. None economic sense for a company whose shares are not traded on the exchange, these transactions would not carry, but they can be a way to circumvent the restriction on raising funds from the public, with a high probability of operating against the bank.