The combat command and control system of the US ground forces in the "brigade and below" link. Tactical link management system ways to improve Tactical unit fragmentation

Colonel O. Yanov,
candidate of military sciences

The solution to the problem of practical implementation in the US Armed Forces of the key provisions of the "network-centric" concept of "combat operations management based on a single information and communication space" (UVBD EICP) lies in the plane of the integrated introduction of the latest digital technologies in the formation of information and computer networks of various scales integrated with each other - from local to global, with high mobility, throughput and rapid deployment.

Such a unified information and communication system in the US Armed Forces is being created taking into account centrally developed plans for the formation of an organizational structure, hardware and software, based on technological advances in the commercial sphere and adapted for use in adverse environmental conditions, both in control bodies and on board. combat and support platforms. In the opinion of American military scientists, the fulfillment of the above requirements should lead to the formation of such a new operational-strategic concept as the "theatre theater infosphere". which takes the form of a network of networks, "comprehensive, completely inseparable, covering all space from the surface of the Earth to space."

The main trends in the development of automated control systems in the coming years will be the following: a sharp reduction in the cost of automated control systems and communication systems at the "corps-division" link and above due to the use of dual-use technologies; ensuring the possibility of evolutionary modernization in accordance with the pace of technical progress of various types of automated control systems through the transition to open architectures for their construction, as well as solving the problem of interaction between automated control systems of the NATO bloc based on commercial technologies for interconnecting open systems (standard multi-level information exchange protocols) and the global Internet (operational strategic link), military technologies of the modified Internet and new programmable radio communications (tactical link - 2015); the creation of "computerized" formations and units of the US ground forces.

Automation of command and control processes at any level of command, especially tactical, as the most dynamic, is of great importance in two main areas:

Appearance of the AN/UYK-I2S Applique computer set

1. situational awareness 1 (SO) is a state of understanding of the general situation, developed on the basis of knowledge based on accurate and timely information about the location of friendly forces, enemy forces, allied and neutral forces, as well as the civilian population (in the terminology of the US DoD - non-combatants). Understanding the situation is reflected in the formation of a single relevant picture of the battlefield, decomposed into elements according to different levels of interest and needs;

2. Operational (combat) control- this is the process of directing the commander of subordinate forces in accordance with the task being performed. The commander performs the functions of combat control (CU) by planning, directing and controlling the actions of his forces in accordance with the task being performed.

The FBCB-2 ACS is a key component of the US ABCS ACS. The system hardware and software under the general name Applique is placed on the military equipment of the ground forces brigades of various types and functional purposes, as well as in divisional and corps-level command posts in order to ensure the actions of combat brigades. Communication between platforms equipped with ACS FBCB-2 terminals is supported by two communication systems: the TI information network (Tactical Internet), using the EPLRS and SINGARS radio communication systems, and the Inmarsat L-band mobile satellite communication system.

The FBCB-2 ACS provides each echelon of control with a single picture of the tactical situation of the battlefield in two echelons (upper and lower) and neighboring formations (right and left). ACS significantly increases the overall effectiveness of combat formations and ensures the timely provision of information about the situation, based on knowledge of the separation and deployment of friendly and enemy forces, as well as attached forces from the OOF (Air Force, Navy and MP formations). In addition, the rapid distribution of digital maps and video images of the area and their scaling is ensured. 2 .

Examples of installation of ACS FBCB-2 terminals on various platforms of the US Army: A - in a car, B - in a combat vehicle, C - in a command post of a command post of a brigade and battalions, D - in a battle tank

From a technical point of view, the FBCB-2 ACS is an AN / UYK-128 Applique hardened computer with touch screens connected by a mobile communication network using specialized software that can be installed on tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, reconnaissance and command and staff vehicles (KShM) CP brigade and below.

Each computer in the FBCB-2 network interacts with other computers through the Tactical Internet network using SINCGARS, NTDR, EPLRS radio stations and PSC-5 Spitfire satellite communication stations in the 225-400 MHz range installed on various transport platforms. To provide satellite communications in motion for the vehicles of the reconnaissance units of the brigade and the KShM command post of the US Army brigade, a specialized stabilized antenna is used.

A key element of the FBCB-2 ACS is its software, which provides the transmission of situational data and other information of a managerial nature to subscribers located on tens of thousands of US military vehicles. The user interface of the automated workstation (AWS) of the system operator is represented by a "desktop" with pictograms, which is displayed on a liquid crystal touch screen. By touching the icon with your hand, you can display a map of the current combat situation with the location of your forces and enemy forces. Information on the map is updated on a time scale close to real time. The user interface makes it possible to prepare in an automated mode a variety of formalized reports related to logistics, medical evacuation, notification of a radiation-biological and chemical attack, to prepare and transmit a short message about the observed actions of the enemy.

The FBCB-2 workstation operator can choose different methods and scales for displaying a digital map or a panoramic image (video image) of the area on the screen, displaying a part of a single (general) picture of the tactical situation intended for this operator, scaled for the corresponding control level.

Maps of different scales and with a personal background allow you to see the location of each vehicle in the brigade or only the vehicles of your platoon or company. In addition, the deployment of rear units, minefields, security corridors, etc. can be displayed on a digital map. Maps allow you to quickly navigate the terrain and in the environment at night or in conditions of limited visibility, as well as achieve a positional advantage over the enemy.

The FBCB-2 automated control system, through the Tactical Internet network, collects and communicates data on the combat situation on the move in almost real time. The FBCB-2 computer with an external receiver of the space radio navigation system (CRNS) and the SINCGARS ASIP radio station with an Internet controller are installed on each vehicle of the brigade. The vehicles of platoon commanders, company commanders, their deputies, battalion commanders, etc., up to the brigade level, are equipped with radio terminals of the EPLRS multifunctional data distribution and positioning system operating in packet radio mode and also included in the Tactical Internet network . They are also installed at the command posts of battalions and brigades.

Information about the combat situation, for example, about the location of the enemy, is entered by the squad leader into the AWP of the FBCB-2 automated control system and, using the SINCGARS ASIP radio station, via the Internet controller, is sent to the tactical radio terminal (TRT) of the EPLRS system of the platoon or company for further distribution over the FBCB-2 AWP network .

Each ground vehicle of the brigade transmits to the FBCB-2 network data on its location obtained using the Navstar CRNS.

In addition, on many platforms there are EPLRS TRT systems, which also automatically determine their own location based on the measurement of the difference in the time of transmission of radio signals. The software automatically selects the best prepared TRT position data from these two sources. In the event that dense foliage, weather conditions, terrain or other factors prevent the reception of a signal from the Navstar satellites, the position data received from the multifunctional EPLRS system is used.


Displaying the tactical situation against the background of an electronic map of the area

Displaying the tactical situation against the background of the video image of the area

ACS in the link "brigade and below" US Army FBCB-2 provides the following tasks:

Providing constantly updated as of the current time information about the combat situation, the state and actions of friendly troops and enemy forces, filtered by control link, echelon and location of the subscriber;
- determination of the geographic location of the subscriber (if he is in the air, the flight altitude is also determined);

Displaying a map of the tactical situation on the monitor screen;

Compilation and distribution in an automated mode in electronic format of formalized messages and confirmations of receipt of messages, orders and instructions, applications for fire support, target designations and orders for firing, warning signals, operational reports;

Formation and imposition on the electronic map of the combat situation of terrain elements, obstacles, reconnaissance data, operational standards, geometric data, schemes - applications to combat orders;

The exchange between the components of the FBCB-2 ACS and other elements of the ABCS ACS in a semi-automatic mode of selected data that is critical to the performance of a combat mission.

From other subsystems of the ABCS ACS, the FBCB-2 ACS receives the following data in electronic form, which are important for solving a combat mission:

From the ACS of the logistics support of the army corps CSSCS - the location of supply points;

From the automated control system for the actions of formations, units and subdivisions of the army corps MCS - combat orders and schemes - annexes to combat orders;

From ACS by field artillery fire AFATDS - reports of fire support;

From the automated control system for the processing and analysis of intelligence data - data with the results of intelligence;

From the ACS of the military air defense AMDPCS - air situation data, including warnings about the threat of an air attack;

ACS FBCB-2, in turn, transmits the following data to ACS ABCS:

In the CSSCS ACS - generalized to the company level information about the state of logistics;

In the MCS automated control system - situational awareness data and the geographical position of ground forces and army aviation units (in the air);

In the ASAS ACS - data on situational awareness and the geographical position of ground forces and army aviation units (in the air), as well as reconnaissance reports;

In the AFATDS ACS - requests for fire support and reports on the results of fire support.

Functionally, the FBCB-2 ACS covers all aspects of combat operations. ACS equipment is available in each platoon and company, on each platform of the control, communication and computerization system (C4), on all command post vehicles.

ACS FBCB-2 provides:

Distribution of data by tactical situation;

Increasing navigation capabilities, accuracy of determining the geographic location;

Coordination of actions of forces, clearly denoting the plan, intentions of the commander and maneuver schemes;

Improved logistics/materiel management;

The ability of the technical means of the control system to work in motion;

Better integration of various technical means of intelligence (sensors) into the complex of technical support of the control system;

Reducing the likelihood of hitting your own troops with your own fire;

Designation of subsequent goals (tasks);

Concentration of efforts / fire;

Improving the planning of hostilities;

Adding additional tools that can be used in the development and decision making.

Software. All FBCB-2 ACS computer platforms use the same application software. The processor unit of the AN/UYK-128 computer is interfaced with the Internet controller. Interaction of the AN/UYK-128 with the Internet controller is controlled by the TCP transmission control protocols and the UDP user data protocol.

The FBCB-2 ACS application software includes the EBC (Enhanced Battle Command) software package, which is a RAM-resident program and, together with other application software, ensures the interaction of the processor unit and the display unit and the operation of the computer. The EVS software package performs the functions of managing a database, communications, processing and displaying a map of a combat situation, processing messages to ensure the operation of application software interfaces, as well as transport and network level interfaces of the Tactical Internet network. The EBU software package in combat and auxiliary platforms interacts with an Internet controller located inside the vehicles. The EBC software package in each KShM of the command post interacts through the local network with the CP switch, and through the switch - with the Internet controller of the CP machine.

The picture of the tactical situation is constantly updated, and. using the settings of dynamic filters, without operator intervention, it is displayed on the computer screen of the ACS FBCB-2 in the form of a map of the combat situation. Many automatic functions minimize the need for the operator to enter data or commands through the keyboard. Any operator can contact any soldier of the brigade according to the task he is solving, and not according to his position in the network.

The functioning of the FBCB-2 ACS is impossible without the Tactical Internet communication system of the tactical control link (TLC). Together they form a single information-command system of the TCU, the components of which closely interact with each other.

The communication of the command post of the brigade with the higher authorities and the command post of neighboring brigades is carried out either through a small regional communication center (CS) of the Enhanced MSE "Enhanced MSE" public area communication system, which has a "grid" structure and is built on asynchronous delivery mode switches, or through a communication system JNN. Communication between the ACS FBCB-2 ACS located at the brigade's command post with the ACS FBCB-2 ACS in the brigade units is carried out via radio channels through the EPLRS TRT and SINCGARS SIP radio stations.

Data in the communication networks connecting the workstation of the FBCB-2 ACS are transmitted under the control of IP protocols adapted in accordance with the requirements and conditions for the operation of radio communication networks in the TCU. Within the CP of the brigade and battalion, all means of communication and means of automated control systems are interconnected by a LAN. The CP machines are connected to each other and to the regional CS of the Enhanced MSE system by a fiber-optic communication line (FOCL) with a bandwidth of 100 Mbps. The regional computer network, covering the brigade and battalion command posts, is built on the basis of NTDR radio stations and JNN communication terminals. In addition, NTDR radios provide redundant communication channels for the "team and above" control link.

Planning, configuration and reconfiguration of the network in the "brigade - battalion" link is carried out by the ISYSCON (V4) system software (integrated systems management software, version 4).

Serial production of the FBCB-2 automated control system has been established since 2002, while since October 2008, the implementation of the upgraded (based on the experience of the active stage (2003) of the operation in Iraq) version of the fifth generation software V1.5 has begun. The plans of the SV from 2008 provided for by the end of 2011 to adopt over 100 thousand of such systems.

Since 2003, in addition to the consistent deployment of FBCB-2 ACS terminals on vehicles and command posts, the troops began to receive portable ACS terminals for individual use for unit commanders and individual military personnel. The structure of such a terminal includes a PND positioning device - a microcomputer that meets the military standards of the MilStd series, which is equipped with a built-in NAVSTAR signal receiver.

Portable terminal ACS FBCB-2 for individual use

ACS FBCB-2 for sending and receiving information uses a variable format of text messages VMF (Variable Message Format) regardless of the identity of the recipient - the sender. The VMF format is currently approved as the main one for sending text messages in the ABCS ACS e-mail system.

An analysis of the ongoing modernization of the US military command and control system shows that this type of armed forces continues to be regarded as an important component in solving the tasks facing the armed forces related to deterring potential adversaries, ensuring the country's internal security, conducting large-scale military operations, as well as operations to stabilize the situation and post-conflict settlement.


A soldier of the US Army in the training courses for operators of the ACS FBCB-2

The reform of the ground forces is carried out within the framework of the concept of building the US Army "New Type Army". It is based on an extensive and carefully developed regulatory framework and an effective mechanism for implementing the requirements for the future combat capabilities of the armed forces, which are defined in unified operational-strategic concepts.

The ultimate goal of reforming the ground forces is their transformation by 2015-2025 into the army of the future, with an organizational and staffing structure of an expeditionary orientation, equipped with advanced weapons, communications, intelligence and control systems, and also capable of quickly deploying and effectively solving the entire range of tasks to ensure national interests United States in any region of the world.

As a result of the analysis of the views of the command of the US Army on the role and importance of creating a single information and communication space as the basis for the practical implementation of the concept of "network-centric" control of the formations of a new, modular structure of this type of aircraft, it should be noted that the leadership of the Army was tasked with carrying out a full-scale modernization of their network infrastructure , - starting with changes in the organizational structure of formations, units and subdivisions and ending with the organization of remote access to information resources of places of permanent deployment on the theater of operations (the concept of reach-back). The development of the network infrastructure takes place in close coordination between all types of aircraft within the framework of the program for building a global information and control network of the US Department of Defense, while each type develops its own global information network as a component of the GIMS.

The command of the US Army highly appreciates the results of using automated control and communication systems in conflicts of the late 20th - early 21st centuries and is interested in their further improvement through the creation of a unified infrastructure that can significantly improve the interaction of command and control bodies at all levels, improve the quality of decisions made by their commanders and bring them to subordinates, to ensure the achievement of overwhelming superiority over any opponent.

1 Situational Awareness is the principle of complex representation of heterogeneous information, linked both to space (that is, geographically reliable) and to time (represented in real time). Comprehensive data presentation makes it possible to qualitatively increase the degree of perception of geographic and tactical information by weapons system operators and command, to increase the speed of decision-making and their quality, while reducing the burden on a person.

2 . Naturally, not just tactical information is provided, but the most "fresh", fully connected in a single geographical, tactical and navigational context.

Foreign military review No. 2, 2012, pp. 43-50

There was the smallest combat unit "Patrol Link", it was allocated for guard duty, performing tasks of marching security and, in part, for reconnaissance. During the march of a military unit (cavalry regiment), for reconnaissance, inspection of the area, timely warning of the appearance of the enemy ahead in the direction of movement of the unit, sentinel link. When the unit is located on the terrain for recreation sentinel link also conducted inspection of the area and observation of the enemy. In the late 1930s, the term "Patrol Link" lost its meaning due to the emergence of a new term for these tasks.

Crushing tactical units

Counts [by whom?] that combat units smaller than a squad were introduced by the Chinese Communists during the 1927-1950 war. This tactic was borrowed from the Chinese by Evans Carlson (later General of the US Marine Corps). The tactic was tried during the Nicaraguan War [ ] and later adopted by the US Army.

In this case, the department consists of two or three links. Part of the soldiers (driver, gunner, sniper) are not included in any link. population link(3 - 4 people) is connected, in particular, with the fact that in link out of 2 people with the death of one fighter, the second remains alone. Also, when a fighter is wounded, it is easier to take him out of the battlefield together.

The division of the department into links allows the soldiers themselves to take the initiative [ ] on the battlefield, which increases the morale of the army and prevents trench warfare. [ ] This concept is especially useful in mercenary (non-draft) armies. [ ]

In the armed forces of the post-Soviet states, the division of the department into links officially absent due to the lowest number of branches of all the armies (8 - 9 people). [ ] However, the formation of machine gun and grenade launcher crews is often present by giving machine gunners and grenade launchers second numbers from among submachine gunners. In addition, the Combat Charter of the Russian Armed Forces in terms of combat by a motorized rifle squad provides for the division into two combat groups, maneuverable and fire, where the maneuver group, leading an active offensive and capturing enemy positions, consists of 2-3 shooters led by a senior shooter, and a fire group - from the squad leader, grenade launcher and machine gunner. In this case, the composition of combat groups can be arbitrary. This approach is somewhat similar to the practice of using links(fireteams) in the US Armed Forces in terms of mutual maneuver and fire cover links.

Compound link(Fireteam) in the US Armed Forces

see also

  • Link - a section of the notch line in the Moscow state.
  • A link is a designation of an instance in the system of command and control of troops, forces and rear.
  • The link is part of a floating bridge from a pontoon park.
  • Wing Commander (Squad Leader)

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Notes

Literature

  • Soviet military encyclopedia: [in 8 volumes] / chairman. Ch. ed. commissions A. A. Grechko [vol. eighteen], N. V. Ogarkov [vol. 2-7]. - M. : Military publishing house of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1976-1980.
  • The Great Soviet Encyclopedia (BSE), Third Edition, published by the Soviet Encyclopedia publishing house in 1969-1978 in 30 volumes;
  • st.st. 10-12.
  • Military Encyclopedic Dictionary (VES), M ., VI, 1984, 863 pages with illustrations (ill.), 30 sheets (ill.);
  • "Military Encyclopedic Dictionary" (VES), M ., VI, 2007;
  • Warhead // Naval Dictionary / Chernavin V.N. - M .: Military Publishing House, 1990. - S. 51. - 511 p. - ISBN 5-203-00174-X.
  • Military Encyclopedic Dictionary of Strategic Missile Forces / Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (Ministry of Defense of Russia) .; Chief editor: I. D. Sergeev, V. N. Yakovlev, N. E. Solovtsov. - Moscow: Great Russian Encyclopedia, 1999. - 632 p. - 8500 copies. - ISBN 5-85270-315-X.

Links

  • Article on airpages.ru

An excerpt characterizing the Link (tactical unit)

Having passed with hungry, barefoot soldiers, without a road, through the mountains, on a stormy night forty-five miles, having lost a third of the backward, Bagration went to Gollabrun on the Vienna Znaim road a few hours before the French approached Gollabrun from Vienna. Kutuzov had to go for another whole day with his carts in order to reach Znaim, and therefore, in order to save the army, Bagration, with four thousand hungry, exhausted soldiers, had to hold the entire enemy army that met him in Gollabrun for a day, which was obviously , impossible. But a strange fate made the impossible possible. The success of that deception, which without a fight gave the Vienna bridge into the hands of the French, prompted Murat to try to deceive Kutuzov in the same way. Murat, having met the weak detachment of Bagration on the Tsnaim road, thought that it was the whole army of Kutuzov. In order to undoubtedly crush this army, he waited for the troops that had lagged behind on the road from Vienna and for this purpose proposed a truce for three days, on the condition that both troops did not change their positions and did not move. Murat assured that peace negotiations were already underway and that therefore, avoiding the useless shedding of blood, he proposed a truce. The Austrian general Count Nostitz, who was standing at the outposts, believed the words of Murat's truce and retreated, opening Bagration's detachment. Another truce went to the Russian chain to announce the same news of peace negotiations and offer a truce to the Russian troops for three days. Bagration replied that he could not accept or not accept a truce, and with a report on the proposal made to him, he sent his adjutant to Kutuzov.
A truce for Kutuzov was the only way to gain time, to give Bagration's exhausted detachment a rest and to skip the wagon trains and loads (the movement of which was hidden from the French), although there was one extra transition to Znaim. The offer of an armistice provided the only and unexpected opportunity to save the army. Having received this news, Kutuzov immediately sent Adjutant General Wintsengerode, who was with him, to the enemy camp. Winzengerode had not only to accept the armistice, but also to offer terms of surrender, and meanwhile Kutuzov sent his adjutants back to hurry the movement of the carts of the entire army along the Kremsko-Znaim road as much as possible. The exhausted, hungry detachment of Bagration alone had to, covering this movement of carts and the entire army, remain motionless in front of the enemy eight times stronger.
Kutuzov's expectations came true both that the non-binding offer of surrender could give time for some of the transports to pass, and that Murat's mistake should have been discovered very soon. As soon as Bonaparte, who was in Schönbrunn, 25 versts from Gollabrun, received Murat's report and the draft of a truce and surrender, he saw the deceit and wrote the following letter to Murat:
Au Prince Murat. Schoenbrunn, 25 brumaire en 1805 a huit heures du matin.
"II m" est impossible de trouver des termes pour vous exprimer mon mecontentement. Vous ne commandez que mon avant garde et vous n "avez pas le droit de faire d" armistice sans mon ordre. Vous me faites perdre le fruit d "une campagne . Rompez l "armistice sur le champ et Mariechez a l" ennemi. Vous lui ferez declarer, que le general qui a signe cette capitulation, n "avait pas le droit de le faire, qu" il n "y a que l" Empereur de Russie qui ait ce droit.
“Toutes les fois cependant que l" Empereur de Russie ratifierait la dite convention, je la ratifierai; mais ce n "est qu" une ruse. Mariechez, detruisez l "armee russe ... vous etes en position de prendre son bagage et son artiller.
“L "aide de camp de l" Empereur de Russie est un ... Les officiers ne sont rien quand ils n "ont pas de pouvoirs: celui ci n" en avait point ... Les Autriciens se sont laisse jouer pour le passage du pont de Vienne , vous vous laissez jouer par un aide de camp de l "Empereur. Napoleon".
[Prince Murat. Schönbrunn, 25 Brumaire 1805 8 o'clock in the morning.
I cannot find words to express my displeasure to you. You command only my vanguard and have no right to make a truce without my order. You make me lose the fruits of an entire campaign. Break the truce immediately and go against the enemy. You will announce to him that the general who signed this surrender had no right to do so, and no one has, except for the Russian emperor.
However, if the Russian emperor agrees to the mentioned condition, I will also agree; but this is nothing but a trick. Go, destroy the Russian army... You can take its carts and its artillery.
The adjutant general of the Russian emperor is a deceiver ... Officers mean nothing when they do not have authority; he also does not have it ... The Austrians allowed themselves to be deceived when crossing the Vienna bridge, and you allow yourself to be deceived by the emperor's adjutants.
Napoleon.]
Adjutant Bonaparte galloped at full speed with this formidable letter to Murat. Bonaparte himself, not trusting his generals, with all the guards moved to the battlefield, fearing to miss the ready victim, and the 4,000th detachment of Bagration, cheerfully laying out fires, dried, heated, cooked porridge for the first time after three days, and none of the people of the detachment knew and did not think about what lay ahead of him.

At four o'clock in the evening, Prince Andrei, insisting on his request from Kutuzov, arrived in Grunt and appeared to Bagration.
Bonaparte's adjutant had not yet arrived at Murat's detachment, and the battle had not yet begun. The Bagration detachment knew nothing about the general course of affairs, they talked about peace, but did not believe in its possibility. They talked about the battle and also did not believe in the proximity of the battle. Bagration, knowing Bolkonsky as a beloved and trusted adjutant, received him with special superior distinction and indulgence, explained to him that there would probably be a battle today or tomorrow, and gave him complete freedom to be with him during the battle or in the rear guard to observe the order of retreat , "which was also very important."
“However, today, probably, there will be no business,” said Bagration, as if reassuring Prince Andrei.
“If this is one of the ordinary staff dandies sent to receive a cross, then he will receive an award in the rear guard, and if he wants to be with me, let him ... come in handy if he is a brave officer,” Bagration thought. Prince Andrei, without answering anything, asked the prince's permission to go around the position and find out the location of the troops so that, in case of instructions, he would know where to go. The duty officer of the detachment, a handsome man, smartly dressed and with a diamond ring on his index finger, speaking French badly but willingly, volunteered to see Prince Andrei off.
From all sides one could see wet officers with sad faces, as if looking for something, and soldiers dragging doors, benches and fences from the village.
“We can’t get rid of these people, prince,” said the staff officer, pointing to these people. - The commanders are disbanding. And here, - he pointed to the spread out tent of the shopper, - they will huddle and sit. This morning he kicked everyone out: look, it's full again. We must drive up, prince, to frighten them. One minute.
“Let’s go and I’ll take cheese and a roll from him,” said Prince Andrei, who had not yet had time to eat.
Why didn't you say, prince? I would offer my bread of salt.
They got off their horses and went under the marketer's tent. Several officers, with flushed and exhausted faces, were sitting at tables, drinking and eating.
“Well, what is it, gentlemen,” said the staff officer in a tone of reproach, like a man who has already repeated the same thing several times. “Because you can’t go away like that. The prince ordered that there be no one. Well, here you are, Mr. Staff Captain, ”he turned to a small, dirty, thin artillery officer, who, without boots (he gave them to the sutler to dry), in stockings, stood in front of the newcomers, smiling not quite naturally.
- Well, how are you, Captain Tushin, are you not ashamed? - continued the staff officer, - it seems to you, as an artilleryman, you need to show an example, and you are without boots. They will sound the alarm, and you will be very good without boots. (The staff officer smiled.) If you please, go to your places, gentlemen, everything, everything, ”he added bossily.
Prince Andrei smiled involuntarily, glancing at Captain Tushin's staff. Silently and smiling, Tushin, stepping from bare foot to foot, looked inquiringly with large, intelligent and kind eyes first at Prince Andrei, then at the officer's headquarters.
“The soldiers say: wiser more dexterously,” said Captain Tushin, smiling and shy, apparently wanting to go from his awkward position into a joking tone.
But he had not finished yet, when he felt that his joke was not accepted and did not come out. He was confused.
“Please leave,” said the staff officer, trying to keep his seriousness.
Prince Andrei glanced once more at the figure of the artilleryman. There was something special about her, not at all military, somewhat comical, but extremely attractive.
The staff officer and Prince Andrei mounted their horses and rode on.

MILITARY THOUGHT No. 1/2004, pp. 56-62

Tactical level control system: ways to improve

Colonel V.V. REVINSKY ,

candidate of military sciences

REVINSKY Valery Vasilyevich was born in 1962 in the village of Starye Budy, Brest region. He graduated from the Minsk Suvorov Military School (1979), the Ulyanovsk Guards Higher Tank Command School (1983), the Military Academy of the Armored Forces (1996) and the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff (2003). He served in command positions in various military districts. Since 1996 - in teaching and research work. In 2002, he was appointed to the position of head of the military-scientific committee of the Ground Forces.

MANAGE in the modern sense of the word means to ensure a consistent systematic approach to determining the goals, ways and tasks of the system functioning, allocating resources and comprehensively regulating the entire set of connections and relationships that arise in the process of solving the tasks set. The criterion for the effectiveness of management is the achievement in the shortest possible time of all the goals facing the system, with minimal expenditure of resources. Based on this approach, the analysis of the existing system of command and control of the tactical level of the Ground Forces makes it possible to single out some aspects that negatively affect the effectiveness of its functioning.

Firstly At present, the process of command and control of units and subunits in combat is based on a linear principle, the essence of which is that combined arms commanders, chiefs of military branches (special troops, services) control subordinates through their "trunks" of control. The collection of information for all types of troops at the levels of the corresponding hierarchies is carried out by combined arms commanders and their headquarters. However, they, in addition, are entrusted with the duty of agreeing on the priority of performing tasks after a decision is made, for example, in case of fire engagement of the enemy, maneuvering, taking measures to protect troops, comprehensive support, and others. As a result, the combined arms commander of a division (brigade) - regiment (battalion) link is forced to constantly maintain contact with 8-12 subscribers, which is more than 1.5 times higher than the permissible norm in accordance with the physiological capabilities of a person.

Secondly , the existing control system, unfortunately, does not allow a sufficient degree of prompt response to sudden changes in the situation. Meanwhile, modern combined-arms combat is difficult to predict and does not always develop according to the original plan of the commander. Therefore, it is very important, on the basis of the first and subsequent clashes with the enemy, to draw appropriate conclusions and make adjustments to the previously made decision, which is very problematic in modern conditions. For example, in a fire engagement system, one artillery or aviation subunit (unit) is not always capable of performing fire missions in the interests of several combined arms formations, which makes it difficult to maneuver with fire. The essence of the problem lies in the fact that, in accordance with the existing practice, to control artillery fire and aim aviation at the command and observation post (COP) of a motorized rifle (tank) battalion, the commander of the attached (supporting) artillery battalion and the air controller with their communications equipment should arrive. However, in the dynamics of the battle it is not always possible to ensure the timeliness of their arrival (movement) and quick "growing" into the current situation. This problem is especially true for second-echelon battalions, to which reinforcement (support) means are reassigned (assigned) immediately before being put into battle. As a result, as the experience of the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus showed, the units did not receive fire support due to the lack of air controllers and artillery spotters and suffered unjustified losses.

Thirdly , modern combined-arms combat is acquiring a new, increasingly complex character. This is no longer a battle of two or three branches of the armed forces on each side, but an armed clash of multi-branch and multifunctional combat systems. Moreover, the value of the destructive impact of one system on another is constantly growing. In this regard, of no small importance is the universality of knowledge of the combined arms commander, his ability to competently set tasks for units (subunits) of various types of troops and special forces with the help of specific commands and signals. However, experience shows that with an increase in the number of branches of service (special troops), types and types of combat equipment and weapons, the combined arms commander begins to fall further and further behind in knowledge of special issues. He is no longer always able to competently set the task of aviation to defeat (meaning - according to the canons of the aviation chief) or adjust artillery fire. In our opinion, this problem can hardly be solved by simply increasing the amount of specific knowledge and skills of a combined arms commander. To do this, you should look for another, more efficient way.

The presence of the above problems allows us to speak about the urgent need to optimize control processes in combined arms combat based on new achievements in control theory. From the theory of the system approach method, it is known that if the control system does not provide the required information processing parameters, then there is a need to create an intermediate stage that will process the incoming information flows and transfer them “upstairs” in an aggregated (processed, compressed) form.

"Riding" in the conditions under consideration is the combined arms commander. It is important for him how information will be aggregated, through what channels and in what ways his decision and commands (orders) will be transmitted to subordinates. Proceeding from this, it is possible, in our opinion, to solve the problem of optimizing management processes at the tactical level by switching from the linear to the linear-functional method of command and control of troops (Fig.). As a basis for determining the functions of combined arms combat, a triad known since ancient times is proposed: sword, shield, movement. In modern conditions, this fire, defense and maneuver . The blow as an integral part of the battle finds its expression in the combination of fire and maneuver. In addition, the concept of "strike" is more applicable at the operational, operational-strategic and strategic levels, since it is impossible to imagine a blow inflicted by a soldier, squad, platoon, and even regiment.

Important for the operation of the combat system is the maintenance and timely restoration of the combat capability of units and subunits, which primarily refers to functions of technical and logistic support . Therefore, it should be singled out separately. In addition, it is known from history that the entry into service of new means of armed struggle every time for a sufficiently long time makes it necessary to separate them into a separate component on a functional basis. Let's call her a function that monitors the combat use of weapons based on new physical principles.

In order to aggregate the information received by the specified functions, as well as for the qualified setting of tasks for the attached and supporting forces and means, after the decision is made by the combined arms commander, it is proposed to create special control bodies for the period of the battle from representatives of the corresponding branches of the armed forces, special troops and services (Table).

The question of principle is the level from which it is expedient to create these bodies. As for fire damage, in our opinion, this is the company, since tactical groups are already being created on the basis of this unit. Protection is a passive function. The first level for this function can be a regiment as a formation that includes air defense systems, units of engineering troops and NBC protection troops. The maneuver is used both in the interests of destruction and in the interests of defense, and thus characterizes the position of military formations in space for a certain time. Therefore, this function should be monitored by the headquarters, and at the company and platoon level - by the appropriate commander. Function of technical and logistic support affects the autonomy of the actions of the military formation. It is advisable to allocate it, starting with the battalion level, since this unit is capable of performing combat missions, acting independently for a certain time.

Generally the improved control system will have, in our opinion, a number of significant advantages. So, the combined arms commander is exempted from technical work on collecting information for the types of troops and special troops (except for combined arms), and the number of subscribers with whom he maintains contact in the division (brigade) - regiment (battalion) link is reduced from 8-12 to 4 -5, which is optimal. At the same time, the aggregation of all types of information is carried out according to the levels (hierarchies) of military structures, which makes it possible to plan a battle in parallel at all levels according to areas of responsibility.

Schematic diagram of the linear-functional method of command and control of troops at the tactical level

In addition, in relation to the system of fire damage, it becomes possible to more quickly refine plans for fire damage and redistribute weapons depending on changes in the situation in the dynamics of the battle, transfer applications for engagement (after the proposals are approved by the combined arms commander) from the lower authority to the higher one, bypassing the "barrel" of control combined-arms commander, as well as in a short time to concentrate on the most important areas the fire of the required number of weapons from different levels at the command of the center (team, group) of any hierarchy, which allows you to move from massing fire weapons to massing fire. At the same time, artillery commanders will return to firing positions, and the role of spotters will be performed by their representatives, allocated for the duration of the battle to the corresponding centers, groups and teams in all combined arms formations, regardless of which echelon they operate in. All this will make it possible to more fully take into account situations of uncertainty in combat, provide timely fire support for any formation, competently set tasks for engagement and adjust fire.

For the first time, the protection function has been singled out as an independent direction, which allows, firstly, to determine priorities in the priority defeat of enemy targets: preempted - it means defended, and secondly, to more clearly coordinate the efforts of military branches, special troops and services when carrying out measures to ensure survivability and maintaining the combat capability of units (subunits).

In the field of technical and logistic support, it becomes possible to aggregate information on the state of weapons and military equipment and the availability of all types of materiel not by type of troops, but by combat systems created for the duration of the battle, plan and carry out maintenance, repair and restoration of weapons and military equipment in the interests of the entire tactical group in in general, as well as switch to supplying them with packages of materiel formed on the basis of relevant applications.

The introduction of the proposed control system will require a revision of the staffing of military formations, as well as the creation of new special combat control vehicles. As for the staffing of command and control bodies of combined-arms formations, it will remain practically the same. It will only take a slight increase in the number of artillery spotters and air gunners (according to the number of supported combined arms formations). At the same time, they must engage in combat training in their units (subdivisions).

Special control machines for the operation of functional control units must be created anew at the rate of one machine for each center, group, team. Moreover, the very approach to their development will have to be changed, since they must combine the combat command and control systems of the armed forces (special troops) that have been created up to now on a departmental basis. The existing combat command and control vehicles of military structures can serve as the base for this, but with their equipment with appropriate means of communication, data transmission and jobs.

It is advisable to include control vehicles intended for the work of functional groups in the command posts of combined arms formations. Thanks to this, air controllers and other representatives of the armed forces and services (without their own command posts and means of communication) can be delivered to their destination much faster, using, for example, helicopters for these purposes, which will ultimately speed up the process of organizing a battle.

In conclusion, it must be emphasized that, in the opinion of domestic and foreign military experts, the achievement of success in a modern combined-arms operation (combat) will largely depend on superiority over the enemy in command and control. In this regard, the improvement of the tactical level command and control system based on the introduction of a linear-functional method of commanding troops in battle is, in our opinion, an urgent task of today.

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Topic No. 2 Organization of communications at the tactical level of command Lesson No. 7 Control of the communications system and platoon during preparation and during the battle

Training questions: 1. Liaison officers in SMEs (tb) and their responsibilities 2. Content of communications management

Literature: 1. Manual on communications of the Ground Forces (Communications in formations, units and subunits of the Ground Forces). - M.: Military Publishing House, 1985. 2. Fundamentals of organizing communications in the Ground Forces. Part III. - St. Petersburg. : VUS, 2003. 3. Fundamentals of the organization of communications in the Ground Forces. Part III. Schematic album. - St. Petersburg. : VUS, 2003

Training Question No. 1 Liaison Officers in SMEs (TB) and ADN and their Responsibilities

In accordance with the requirements of the charter of the internal service, the chief of staff is personally responsible for organizing command and control in the battalion. Art. 131. The chief of staff of the battalion in peacetime and wartime is responsible: ... for organizing and maintaining a stable and continuous management of the battalion units; Art. 135. The chief of staff of the battalion is obliged to: ... - organize communications in the battalion, check the condition and combat readiness of communications, develop covert control measures and monitor their implementation; ... (Chapter 2 of the UVS of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation)

The "Combat Charter for the preparation and conduct of combined arms combat" says: "Art. 41. The chief of staff of the battalion is the direct organizer of the work of the headquarters and is personally responsible ... for organizing and ensuring the continuous management of units; Art. 52. ... Responsibility for organizing communications, deploying a communications system and an automated command and control system for troops and their condition rests with the battalion chief of staff. The direct organizer of communications is the chief of communications - the commander of the communications platoon. »

The main document regulating the activities of all communications officials in the TKU is the MANUAL ON COMMUNICATIONS OF CONNECTIONS AND UNITS OF THE GROUND FORCES

Responsibilities of battalion communications officials: The Chief of Staff directs communications through the Chief of Communications. He is obliged: - to establish the general procedure for the use of means of communication and the mode of operation of communications according to the stages of hostilities; - determine the procedure for establishing and maintaining communication between subordinate, attached, supporting and interacting units (subdivisions); - set the task for the head of communications to organize and ensure communications; - approve the communication plan; - give orders on communications to subordinates; - organize control over the work and security of communications.

Responsibilities of battalion officials on communications: When assigning a task to the chief of communications, the chief of staff indicates: - building the combat (marching) order of the battalion; - tasks of the battalion and units, the order of interaction between them; - organization, placement, places and time of launcher deployment, order and directions of their movement; - with whom, by what time, by what means to establish contact and to which areas to pay special attention; - the procedure for using communication facilities and the mode of operation of communications according to the stages of hostilities; - the procedure for restoring communication in case of failure of the PU; - communication readiness time.

Responsibilities of battalion officials on communications: Art. 50 "Instructions ...": The head of communications is the direct head of all personnel of the communications units. In peacetime and wartime, he is responsible for the combat and mobilization readiness of subordinates, communications units, the timely organization of communications and the state of communications, and the stable functioning of the communications system.

Responsibilities of battalion officials on communications: The chief of communications is obliged to: constantly know the tactical and electronic situation and the communications situation, as well as the state of communications in subordinate units; make timely decisions on the organization and provision of communication; manage communications planning and communications system deployment; develop a communication order and set tasks for communication officials; participate in the development of a combat training plan, a battalion mobilization plan; ensure and control the timeliness of the passage of information in the communication system; provide for measures to ensure communication in the event of a failure of the battalion's launchers and the assumption of control by subordinate authorities; develop and implement measures for the security of classified communications and for the protection of the communications system from technical intelligence, the effects of electronic warfare and weapons of mass destruction;

Responsibilities of battalion officials on communications issues: The chief of communications is obliged to: organize control over compliance with the procedure for using communications equipment, automated control systems and the established operating modes of the RES; organize the reception and delivery of secret and postal items; to carry out planning and organization of technical support for communications and automated control systems in a timely manner; exercise control over the course of combat training of the communications platoon and ensure its constant high combat readiness; study and generalize the experience of organizing communications, combat training and bring it to the attention of subordinates; know the degree of training of personnel; know the losses of personnel and means of communication of units and take measures to replenish them; submit communication data in a combat report in a timely manner; keep a worksheet.

Responsibilities of battalion communications officials: The communications chief is also the head of the battalion's KNP communications center. The duties of the head of communications as the head of the service are defined in the Charter of the internal service of the RF Armed Forces. The head of the communication center is responsible for the constant readiness and stable operation of the node. He is obliged: - to know the combat situation and the state of communications in the battalion; - manage the deployment (folding) and movement of the communication center and ensure the timely establishment and maintenance of stable communications; - ensure the timely transmission (delivery) of combat documents, commands, combat control and warning signals passing through the communication center, and control their accounting; - exercise control over the technical condition and proper operation of communication facilities and timely maintenance;

Responsibilities of battalion officials on communications: Head of the communications center. . . is obliged to: - organize and ensure accurate duty and compliance with the requirements of the operational and technical service manuals at the node; - in case of violations of communication, immediately take measures to restore it; - ensure the uninterrupted operation of communications with the higher headquarters, know the location and procedure for moving its communication nodes (stations), detour directions for communication with them; - ensure the implementation of the established modes of operation of various means of communication, measures to protect communications from technical reconnaissance and electronic warfare of the enemy, the requirements for the security of communications and electromagnetic compatibility of all RES located on the KNP (KP); - organize engineering equipment, camouflage, protection against weapons of mass destruction, security and defense of the communications center.

Responsibilities of battalion officials on communications issues: The unit commander (department, head of the station, control room ...) is responsible for the combat and mobilization readiness of the unit entrusted to him, the timely and high-quality performance of the assigned tasks, combat training, the moral and psychological state and military discipline of the subordinate personal composition. He is obliged to: - know the data on the situation and the state of communications provided by the unit, as well as the state of his subordinates; - make decisions in a timely manner, manage the planning and combat use of the unit; organize interaction and maintain it with other communication units of the unit; - organize and control the operational and technical service on the communication lines deployed by the unit, the technical operation of communication equipment and automated control systems.

Responsibilities of the battalion's communications officers: The head of the communications direction is subordinate to the head of communications and is responsible for the timely establishment and provision of communications in the direction. He is obliged: - to know the location and direction of movement of the command posts of his headquarters and the unit (unit) with which communication is provided; - know the call signs of the communication centers of the command posts of their headquarters and units with which communication is provided, the signals for controlling the communication system and units, the procedure for maintaining communication with communication control points; - conduct reconnaissance of the direction of deployment (laying) of the communication line; - timely deploy and organize operational maintenance, security and defense of communication lines; - provide camouflage and protection of communication lines from fire, means of technical reconnaissance and electronic warfare of the enemy;

Duties of battalion officials on communications: The head of the communications direction ... is obliged to: - report to the chief of communications (communications officer) on the progress of the assigned task, on the readiness of communications and on the movements of control points of the unit (unit) with which he provides communications; - report to the commander of the unit with which he provides communication on his task, on the readiness of communication and constantly take care of timely receipt of data from him on the direction, procedure and timing of the movement of control points; - know the radiation, chemical and biological situation in the direction of laying a wire communication line and, if areas of contamination are found, report to the head of communications (communications officer) and look for ways to bypass; - keep an accounting card (working card), on which to apply the direction of laying a wire line, the location of communication nodes (stations), control posts, the calculation of forces and means of communication.

Responsibilities of battalion officials on communications: The head of the relay point (station) reports to the head of communications and is responsible for the smooth operation of the point (station) and ensuring relaying in the designated radio networks.

Management This is a conscious human impact on various objects and processes occurring in the surrounding world, which is carried out in order to give the processes a certain direction and obtain the desired results.

The control cycle is a complete set of periodically following each other components of the control process: - obtaining information by the control link, - processing information in order to develop a decision, - transferring data for implementation, - collecting information about the result of control.

General control scheme Program, indication Environment direct connection Control subject Control action Control object feedback Information about control result Control result

The control system must have high survivability, noise immunity. reliability and provide the possibility of both centralized and decentralized management of departments. Control facilities include communication facilities and an automated control system, technical means of covert command and control of troops, information processing and calculation, registration and reproduction. The communication system and the automated control system are the main means and the material and technical basis for the control of units (forces and means).

Communications management consists in the purposeful activity of the chief of communications, unit headquarters, unit commanders, other communications management bodies to create (develop) and comprehensively prepare the system, communications units of the unit in constant readiness to ensure the management of units, as well as to manage the system and communications units in fulfilling the set tasks. Communications management should ensure: - timely and covert deployment of a communications system and its build-up in the course of hostilities; - stability and continuity of the communication system; the implementation of flexible maneuver lines, channels and means of communication in accordance with the evolving situation; - timely passage of all types of information in command and control systems; - implementation of measures to protect the communication system from technical means of reconnaissance, destruction and electronic suppression of the enemy; - combat and mobilization readiness of communications units, effective use of their capabilities; - operational restoration of communications, as well as the combat capability of communications units; - fulfillment of communication security requirements.

Communication management includes: - continuous acquisition, collection, processing, study, analysis, evaluation and display of data on the situation and the state of communication; - making a decision on the organization of communication; - bringing tasks to subordinates; - communication planning for combat operations, other types of combat activities of the “unity (unit); - organization and maintenance of interaction; - organizing and carrying out activities for all types of ensuring the use of the system, parts and subdivisions of communications; - management of the preparation of subordinate communications control bodies, units and subdivisions of communications for use; - organization and implementation of control and assistance to subordinate units and communications units; - direct management of the actions of communication units and subunits in the performance of their assigned tasks; - maintaining the moral and psychological state of the units and subdivisions of communications; - organization and control of communication security and information protection; other activities.

Lieutenant Colonel S. Plavunov,
senior lieutenant S. Nosikov

Currently, the US Department of Defense is carrying out a full-scale modernization of command and control systems, which, along with changes in the organizational and staff structure of formations, units and subunits, provides for the organization of remote access to information resources of places of permanent deployment in theaters.

In this regard, significant efforts are being made to implement programs for introducing network information technologies into the practice of combat use of troops. The purpose of the ongoing technological and structural changes is to create formations of a new (modular) type, equipped with systems and means of information support of a modular design, which will not only optimize the structure of formations taking into account the performance of specific tasks, but also provide a significant increase in combat power and efficiency in the use of forces in conducting hostilities.

The range of areas of work in this area is quite wide, ranging from the individual training and equipment of military personnel capable of conducting combat operations in a single information space and ending with the creation of units formed according to a modular principle to solve the corresponding tasks. The implementation of these directions will make it possible to transform parts of the traditional structure into forces of a new type, which will guarantee superiority even over an enemy of equal technical equipment.

The steps being taken to fully modernize the entire information infrastructure and increase the role of information systems are in line with the Pentagon's overall focus on creating a global infrastructure that provides opportunities for sharing and exchanging information resources between all branches of the US Armed Forces within the framework of the concept of warfare in a single information space.

Such a promising information structure of the American armed forces was called the global information and control network (GPUS), the construction of which is considered by the command of the US Armed Forces as the basis for the transition to the network-centric principle of combat control, which provides reliable network support, a high degree of consistency and synchronization of actions dispersed in the theater of combat operations. and auxiliary formations of all types of the Armed Forces, but already on the basis of the joint use of information resources.

As part of the creation of the GIUS, the command of the country's armed forces pays special attention to the development of communication systems and automated control systems for tactical units conducting combat operations in direct contact with the enemy.

The communication systems of tactical subunits are subject to the following basic requirements: ensuring the continuity of combat control when they are on terrain with different terrain; reliability of communication with high mobility of subscribers; guaranteed protection of channels from unauthorized access and the impact of enemy electronic warfare, as well as the provision of a guaranteed quality of service to users.

A key place in solving problems in the tactical level is occupied by wireless access technologies to distributed information resources, since the advantages of using radio communications while working on a network are obvious: mobility, simplicity and speed of access to data, etc. Wireless personal, local and regional networks are already become reality; after the appearance of relevant standards, manufacturers began to create funds for commercial and military consumers.

The main means of communication for formations of the tactical level (battalion and below), of course, remain command communication network radio stations and tactical satellite communication terminals. Currently, the command of the US Army has begun to implement plans to create a new generation of communications, the purpose of which is to ensure the integration of the lower levels of command into the global information infrastructure being created.

The technical appearance of these means of communication will be determined by the implementation of programs for the creation of multiband multifunctional programmable radio stations. They will consist of unified modules, and their operating frequency range should be from the lower part of the KB- to the decimeter part of the VHF band.

The functionality and type of signal of such radio stations will be determined by the software. The radio hardware and software will be based on an open systems architecture that will make it possible to widely use commercial technologies and technical solutions, expand the production base, increase competition between suppliers and reduce the costs of acquiring, purchasing and operating radio communications.

Today it becomes especially obvious that reprogrammable radio stations will significantly affect the face of the world's telecommunications infrastructure. All components of these radios, from antennas, components, software to base stations, will be created on the basis of unique technologies.

However, of particular importance in combat conditions, characterized by an instant change in the situation and the dynamism of the situation, is the possibility of forming a radio network, all the administrative functions of which are performed by the nodes themselves without the participation of any elements of the network infrastructure or operator. Networks of this type are called mobile adaptive, which reflects their non-standard architecture, which differs from the classical scheme.

In general, a mobile adaptive network is understood as a dynamically changing network infrastructure formed by a set of mobile nodes, which has the following features:

The absence of external configuration mechanisms, that is, the network is self-configuring;

The network node performs the functions of both a router and an end device;

Relatively short lifetime of the network in the same state.

Deployment diagram of the unified tactical radio system

A mobile adaptive network has a number of advantages compared to networks with a fixed infrastructure - these are high survivability, topology flexibility and automatic adaptation to changes in the network configuration. The basis for the formation of such networks are radio stations created in the USA under the JTRS (Joint Tactical Radio System) program.

JTRS provides for the creation of a single family of unified multi-band, modular, programmable radio stations for all types of aircraft, the hardware and software of which will be based on the architecture of open systems.

The JTRS program, which has been running since 1997, was originally designed to replace 25-30 different types of military radios with one line of programmable devices that could operate in several frequency bands.

The basis of the program for creating a tactical system of programmable radio stations JTRS is the open architecture SCA (Software Communications Architecture), which defines the structure of applications and communication protocols. Compatibility of various radio stations is achieved by the fact that the software components of the communication protocols are easily transferred to any radio stations that support the SCA architecture.

The US military leadership believes that this system is optimal for achieving success in the functioning of digital network communications on the battlefield, and considers it as one of the components of the GPU S system. , processing, transmission of command and information materials of various formats at high speed and in close to real time, with a high degree of security of communication channels - such key tasks are assigned to the JTRS tactical radio communication system.

Currently, the creation of radio stations of the JTRS family involves work in several directions.

GMR Ground Mobile Radios(Ground Mobile Radio). The family of such radios is a four-channel, software-configurable digital communication system, developed primarily for use on ground military vehicles, such as the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, Ml Abrams MBT, armored vehicles of the MRAP family. Initially, the cost of the program was $370 million, but now it has already exceeded $1.4 billion.

HMS (Handheld, Manpack and Small Form Factor)- creation of portable wearable radio stations and stations for autonomous reconnaissance and remotely controlled vehicles.

JTRS GMR radio stations should form the backbone link of the land part of the GIUS system, providing through software-generated protocols the ability to connect with all other subscribers of the JTRS radio communication system, as well as with previous generation radio systems. The goal of the GMR program is to create a new broadband network communication protocol - Wideband Networking Waveform (WNW), which will allow packet transmission over the Internet protocol and provide wide network capabilities.

The GMR system of ground mobile radio stations should meet the needs of tactical level commanders in solving all key issues - orientation in the situation on the battlefield, flexibility in unit management, functioning in a multi-level communication security system, etc. At the same time, JTRS GMR, in terms of such characteristics as volumes and speed transmission of information, significantly superior to previous systems.

In order to transmit an equivalent amount of data for the same period of time, either seven EPLRS (Enhanced Position Location and Reporting System) devices or 125 single-channel radio stations SINCGARS (Single Channel Ground & Airborne Radio System), or just one channel via the WNW protocol on GMR radios.

In 2011, the US Department of Defense announced that it intended to cut its purchase of JTRS GMR radios from 86,956 to 11,030 units. With this move, it plans to save up to $15 billion.

JBC-P portable handheld radio
Radio stations of the unified tactical communications network GMR
Radio AN/PRC-154
An American soldier using the Rover-5 equipment receives video information from a reconnaissance UAV in real time

Radio stations for the Air Force, Navy and AMF fixed radio stations(Airborne, Maritime, Fixed Station). This direction involves the development of radio stations for the Navy, Air Force and army helicopters. In technical terms, JTRS AMF radio stations are four-eight-channel, duplex, programmable digital radio stations that will be installed on aviation, marine platforms and stationary objects of various classes and provide "seamless" high-performance communication using five original communication protocols - UHF SATCOM, MUOS, WNW, SRW and Link-16. These radio stations will provide the transmission of data, voice messages, as well as provide network capabilities for the interaction of various types of aircraft.

Special purpose radios(Special Radios) were created for the special operations forces (SOF). The development of this type of portable radio stations was under the control of the command of the US SO. They are intended primarily for the special forces of the Army, Marine Corps and Air Force, as well as for allied units during special operations by the forces of the NATO bloc.

At present, two portable programmable radio stations have been developed and are being produced, created within the framework of the program under consideration. These are AN/PRC-148 and -152, fully interoperable with other tactical radio systems and supporting SINCGARS and HaveQuick P communication protocols. The National Security Administration has issued a "JTRS approved" certification. Such radio stations are already being supplied to the troops, in particular, to the units of the American troops stationed in the United States and in Afghanistan.

network domain(Networking Enterprise Domain) - the direction associated with the development of communication protocols and network management software for all JTRS radios.

In particular, the AN / PRC-154 "Rifleman" radio station was created under the JTRS program. It works in data and voice mode. At the same time, the signal is checked for errors, corrected, the signal spectrum is expanded for high-quality data transmission, and the signal is further relayed over the communication channel. The JTRS HMS system uses the AN / PRC-154 radio station of various modifications: SFF-C (V) 1 (Small Form Factor C, Version 1); SFF-C; SFF-D.

These radios are single-channel, they use the Type 2 encryption standard. The SFF-J modification is a two-channel radio station that uses the Type 1 encryption standard. The SFF-J modification radio station will be compatible with the SINCGARS, SRW and Bowman transmission protocols.

Currently being developed communication system WIN-T - "Tactical information network for a combatant"(Warfighter Information Network-Tactical), which is a new US information system architecture. It is designed to provide a backbone communications network in the area of ​​responsibility of the US Army Corps up to the battalion (company) level.

The infrastructure of the WIN-T system will be able to transmit speech, digital data and video of all levels of secrecy, provide command and control of troops, and also provide communication to users on the move by placing all elements of the system on mobile platforms. It is planned to use the latest technologies of local networks and the use of JTRS multifunctional programmable radio stations, as well as existing broadband digital radio stations, as means of communication.

General Dynamics Satcom Technologies has entered into a contract with the US Department of Defense to supply additional satellite ground terminals for the implementation of the first stage of the WIN-T Increment 1 program. At this stage, data transmission is possible only when units are parked or at permanent locations .

Communication in motion will be implemented at the Increment 2 stage. In particular, it is planned to create a high-speed communication network for the US Armed Forces, which will provide communication between combatants and the GIUS.

The WIN-T Increment 2 program is also developing a mobile radio with an automatic self-recovery function, designed to provide stable communication on the move. The implementation of this project should be facilitated by the promising satellite communication system MUOS (Mobile User Objective System), the purpose of which is to provide guaranteed communication services to mobile subscribers on a global scale.

The WIN-T communication system allows communication between subscribers via radio channels, when any channel ceases to meet the requirements, the network automatically establishes communication with subscribers of the MUOS system, thereby ensuring its continuity.

It is noted that 164 million dollars were allocated for the initial tests under the second stage, which began at the end of 2011. It will take up to six months to give an assessment.

Currently, measures are being developed for the next stage of the creation of the WIN-T system - Increment 3, the implementation of which is scheduled for 2016. As a result, the system will be able to fully ensure reliable communication in motion by organizing communication channels with any aerospace platforms (UAVs, aircraft, spacecraft, etc.).

At the Increment 4 stage, secure satellite communications will be provided, as well as interfacing and integration of the entire system as a whole into the GNSS. The implementation of this stage is planned for the period after 2016.

For the safe exchange of video information at the tactical level, programs are being implemented to create autonomous 4G radio networks. Within the framework of these programs, possible ways of delivering video materials in streaming format to portable subscriber devices are considered. Several companies are developing such highly secure networks, namely Textron, Raytheon, L-3 Communications, and Siera Nevada Corp. In particular, L-Z Communications recently introduced a new remote-controlled transceiver that provides intelligence display and control of the Rover-6 series of weapons (ROVER - Remote Operations Video Enhanced Receiver). Initially, the equipment of the Rover-3 series was created, which provided the operator with the opportunity to receive video images of the observation area from optoelectronic reconnaissance equipment located on unmanned or manned aerial vehicles. This equipment operates in three frequency bands (Ki, C, L) and provides data reception at a rate of up to 11 Mbps.

Version "Rover-6", which is a transceiver, provides reception of high quality video images in real time. Such information is displayed on the screen of the terminal for displaying the situation in the form of video information or an electronic map of the area.

This equipment is part of the new generation tactical communication system Net-T (Network-Tactical). It uses 802.11 data transfer protocols, which work like cellular networks. The system uses tactical or medium-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles, and satellite communication terminals are used to organize communications on a global scale.

To provide the function of communication with the ground control station, the tactical UAV has an additional data link Mini CDL (Common Datalink). Thus, it works not only in the full-scale video transmission mode, but also has a telemetry information transmission channel. On the screen of the terminal, the operator can mark points of fire, and then transmit them with target designation data and video data to weapons that are equipped with the appropriate compatible equipment.

Thus, at present, in order to ensure the integration of the US Armed Forces into a single information space, the process of full-scale implementation of promising systems and means of communication based on new information technologies is underway. To increase the effectiveness of interaction between units in the tactical control link and organization of communication between units of various types of aircraft on a global scale, it is planned to use multi-band programmable radio stations of the JTRS family. Considerable attention is paid to this direction in the Pentagon, as a result of which the development of this program and the practical production of the corresponding equipment are an integral part of the general long-term plans for the development of the US Armed Forces as a whole.

Foreign military review No. 4, 2012, pp. 42-47