At the end of the 50s, when the program for the creation of domestic anti-submarine platters began, a decision was made to create highly automated and high-speed platters. Project 705 nuclear submarine (code "Lira", according to NATO classification "Alfa")- perhaps the most striking and controversial ship in the history of domestic submarine shipbuilding.

Simultaneously with the work on nuclear submarines of projects 627, 645 and 671, the Leningrad SKB-142 was actively searching for new, non-traditional technical solutions that could provide a qualitative breakthrough in the development of underwater shipbuilding. In 1959, one of the leading specialists of the SKB, A.B. Petrov - came up with a proposal to create a small-sized single-shaft complex - automated high-speed nuclear submarine with a reduced crew.

According to the plan, the new ship, a kind of "underwater fighter-interceptor", having an underwater speed exceeding 40 knots, was able to reach a given point in the ocean in an extremely short time to attack an underwater or surface enemy. With the timely detection of an enemy torpedo attack, the nuclear submarine had to move away from the torpedoes, having previously fired a salvo from its torpedo tubes.

The main characteristics of the submarine project 705 "Lira":
surface displacement - 2300 m 3
underwater displacement - 3180 m 3
length - 81.4 m
width - 10 m
draft - 7.6 m
total thermal power of nuclear reactor - 155 MW
surface speed 14 knots
submerged speed - 41 knots
working immersion depth - 320 m
maximum immersion depth - 400 m
autonomy - 50 days
crew - 32 people.
Torpedo armament:
- number and caliber of TA - 6 x533 mm,
- SAET-60 and SET-65 torpedoes; mines PMR-1 and PMR-2;
Radio-electronic weapons: BIUS "Akkord" (MVU-III), NK "Sozh", KSS "Lightning", GAK "Yenisei" (MGK-1001), RLC "Chibis", TK TV-1.

A small displacement, combined with a powerful power plant, should have provided a quick set of speed and high maneuverability. The nuclear submarine was supposed to move away from the berthing wall in a matter of minutes on its own, quickly turn around in the water area and leave the base to solve a combat mission, and after returning "home" - to moor independently.

After a very heated debate with the participation of representatives of industry and the Navy, as well as a number of significant changes to the project, the idea of ​​​​such a nuclear submarine was supported by the leadership of the Ministry of Shipbuilding and the military. In particular, the Minister of the shipbuilding industry B.E. Butoma and Commander-in-Chief of the Navy S.G. Gorshkov.

The technical proposal for the project was prepared at the beginning of 1960, and on June 23, 1960, a joint resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the design and construction of a submarine of project 705 was issued. if there are sufficient justifications, deviate from the norms and rules of military shipbuilding. This largely "untied the hands" of the creators of the new nuclear submarine, made it possible to embody the most daring technical solutions ahead of time in its design.

The work on project 705 was headed by chief designer M.G. Rusanov (in 1977 he was replaced by V.A. Romin). The overall management of the program was entrusted to Academician A.P. Alexandrova. The main observers from the Navy were V.V. Gordeev and K.I. Martynenko. The creation of the nuclear submarine of project 705 became, according to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU D.F. Ustinov, who oversaw the defense industry, "a national task." Powerful scientific forces, in particular, academicians V.A. Trapeznikova and A.G. Iosifyan.

Project 705 nuclear submarines (later 705K) were intended to destroy enemy submarines when they left their bases, at sea crossings, and also at positions where weapons were supposed to be used against coastal targets. They could also be involved in the fight against surface ships, as well as transports in all areas of the oceans, including the Arctic.

Submarine project 705 (705K) - double-hull, single-shaft. The case, made of titanium alloy (was developed by the Central Research Institute of Metallurgy and Welding under the guidance of Academician I.V. Gorynin, titanium alloys were also used for the manufacture of other structural elements and ship systems), along the entire length was a body of revolution. Fencing felling - "limousine" type. The titanium case reduced the magnetic field, but the acoustic field was still large, since the project was created in the early 60s.

Careful testing of the hydrodynamic contours of the boat's hull was carried out by scientists from the Moscow branch of TsAGI. Professor N.E. Zhukovsky under the direction of K.K. Fedyaevsky. A number of measures were taken to reduce the physical fields of the ship, as well as to increase its explosion resistance due to new design solutions and more efficient depreciation.

The strong hull was divided by transverse bulkheads into six watertight compartments. The 3rd compartment, where the main command post and utility rooms are located, was limited to spherical bulkheads designed for full outboard pressure.

The boat (for the first time in the world) was equipped with a pop-up wheelhouse (pop-up rescue chamber (SVK)) designed to save the entire crew at the same time when surfacing from depth up to the limit, with large values ​​of roll and trim. Nasal horizontal rudders were made retractable into the hull and placed below the landing line.

The main armament included six bow 533-mm TAs with a quick-loading system.

Nuclear submarine project "Lira" was supposed to have a displacement in the range of 1500–2000 tons and a speed of more than 40 knots, which required a fairly powerful power plant. As a variant of the power plant, a gas reactor was considered that ensures the operation of a gas turbine. As a result, we settled on a single-reactor power plant with a liquid metal coolant (LMC) and increased steam parameters. Compared to a nuclear power plant with a traditional water-cooled reactor, an installation with an LCM was more compact, which was important in this case. Calculations showed that the installation with LMC provided savings of 300 tons of displacement.

A proposal to create a single-reactor double-circuit steam-producing installation specifically for the Project 705 submarine, similar to the PPU of the Project 645 boat, was received in 1960 from the Gidropress Design Bureau. Soon a government decision was made to develop such an installation. Academician A.I. Leipunsky.

At the same time, two alternative types of nuclear power plant were designed: at the Gidropress Design Bureau under the leadership of the chief designer V.V. Stekolnikov created BM-40A (block, two-section, two steam lines, two circulation pumps), and in the Gorky OKBM under the leadership of I. I. Afrikantov - OK-550 (block, with branched communications of the primary circuit with three steam lines and three circulation pumps).

Single-shaft nuclear power plant OK-550 was made according to a single-reactor scheme with a liquid metal coolant (LMC) and mounted on a conventional beam-type foundation. The turbo gear unit is mounted on a foundation with a new shock absorption system, the most noisy equipment is installed on pneumatic shock absorbers. Steam turbine plant OK-7K - single-shaft, block design.

The boat was equipped with two auxiliary propulsion systems (2 x 100 kW), placed in hermetic gondolas in horizontal stabilizers and equipped with propellers with rotary blades.

There were two synchronous three-phase alternators (2 x 1500 kW, 400 V, 400 Hz). Each generator provides energy to all consumers of its board. An auxiliary diesel generator set (500 kW, 300 V) and an emergency battery of 112 cells were installed.

The new reactor made it possible to reduce the length of the boards, increase the speed, but turned out to be very capricious. The electric power system for the first time on a submarine was made at a high frequency current - 400 Hz.

During the design, the number of compartments of the pressure hull was increased from three to six, and the displacement increased by one and a half times. The size of the ship's crew changed. Initially, it was assumed that it would be 16 people, but later, according to the requirements of the Navy, the crew was brought up to 29 people (25 officers and four midshipmen). Then the crew was increased to 32 people. The reduction in the crew also led to more stringent requirements for equipment reliability. The task was to eliminate the need for its maintenance during the entire voyage.

Residential, medical and sanitary premises are located on the middle deck of the 3rd compartment, galley and provisional premises - on the lower deck of the same compartment. The wardroom allowed 12 crew members to eat at the same time.

For the project 705 "Lira" submarine, new combat and technical means were created based on the latest achievements of science and technology of the 60s, with significantly improved weight and size characteristics. In order to meet the terms of reference, it was necessary to reduce the crew of the nuclear submarine to a level approximately corresponding to the crew of strategic bombers of the 40-50s. As a result, a revolutionary for its time decision was made to create an integrated automated control system for nuclear submarines. In the Central Design Bureau at the plant. Kulakov (now - Central Research Institute "Granit"), a unique combat information and control system (CICS) "Akkord" was created for the ship, which made it possible to concentrate all control of the nuclear submarine at the central post.

The control of the submarine, its combat and technical means was carried out from the main command post. Integrated automation ensured the solution of the problems of using weapons, collecting and processing tactical information, combat maneuvering, reproducing the external situation, navigation, automatic and remote control of technical means and movement.

Maintenance of permanent watch at individual mechanisms and devices was not provided. By the readiness of No. 1 and No. 2, only a periodic bypass of unattended compartments was carried out by watchmen. The combat shift in a real situation is limited to eight crew members.

The REV included the automated SJSC "Ocean", the automated complex of autonomous navigation aids "Sozh", the automatic weapon control system "Sargan", the automatic radiation monitoring system "Alpha", the automated complex of radio communications Molniya, the TV-optical complex TV-1, The Bukhta radar, the Platan unified time system and the Ellipsoid intraship communications system.

The submarine "Lira" was equipped with a universal periscope "Signal". For programmatic, automatic and manual control of the movement and stabilization of the nuclear submarine on the course on the move, as well as on the depth of immersion (on the move and without the move), the Bauxite system served. Automatic trim on the move was carried out using the Tan system. Management and control over the operation of the power plant, as well as the electric power system and general ship systems and devices were provided by the Ritm system.

As standby engines, 100 kW electric motors were used, located in gondolas on aft horizontal stabilizers.

To reduce the size and weight of electrical equipment on ships pr. 705 and 705K, EPS of alternating current of increased frequency of 400 Hz, voltage of 380 V were used. On these boats, for the first time in domestic practice, pneumohydraulic torpedo tubes were used with a depth of fire from periscope to maximum. For the first time in world practice, the boat had a pop-up rescue cabin (chamber) that accommodated the entire crew.

The construction of an experimental submarine of project 705 (K-64) with a nuclear power plant OK-550, which was supposed to become a prototype of a large series of anti-submarine nuclear-powered ships, was started in the boathouse of the Leningrad Admiralty Association on June 2, 1968. On April 22, 1969, the ship was launched water. In the end, he arrived at the base in Zapadnaya Litsa and on December 31 entered service with the Northern Fleet, becoming part of the 1st flotilla of the 3rd submarine division.

However, the boat was plagued by failures. During the period of mooring trials, one of the autonomous loops of the primary circuit failed. During the initial period of operation, the second loop failed. Cracking of the welded titanium case was also revealed.

However, in 1972, course task No. 1 was handed over. In preparation for going to sea to work out course task No. 2, the process of solidification of the primary coolant began. All measures to prevent the accident were ineffective. Ultimately, the coolant completely froze, and the reactor was shut down.

August 19, 1974 K-64 was decommissioned. Earlier, in 1972, there was a decision to suspend further work on the laid down boats of the 705th project until the reasons for the failure of the first circuit of the reactor were clarified and eliminated.

The failure with the lead ship delayed the implementation of the program for a long time, but did not lead to its termination. In Severodvinsk, work began on the construction of a series of three improved submarines of project 705K (code "Lira") The last, fourth ship in the series, was dismantled on a slipway.

Submarines pr. beam type foundation). PPU BM-40A (150000 kW) - single-reactor type. A lead-bismuth eutectic alloy was used as the primary coolant.

The length of the pressure hull of Project 705K corresponded to the length of the pressure hull of the experimental submarine K-64, while on serial ships of Project 705 it was increased by two spacings in the area of ​​the reactor compartment. TZA and the most noisy mechanisms were placed on pneumatic shock absorbers.

The appearance of submarines pr.705 and 705K became a real sensation, since the combination of high speed comparable to the speed of anti-submarine weapons, great diving depth and high maneuverability forced our potential opponents to create a new generation of anti-submarine weapons, everything that existed seemed ineffective to the Americans.

Due to the peculiarities of its power plant, which did not require a special transition to increased power plant parameters with an increase in speed, as was the case on boats with pressurized water reactors, the submarine of the Lira project could develop full speed within a minute. High speed made it possible to quickly enter the "shadow" sector of any surface or submarine ship, even if the boat had previously been detected by the enemy's hydroacoustics.

The high speed and maneuverability characteristics of the Project 705 nuclear submarine made it possible to work out effective maneuvers for evading enemy torpedoes fired, followed by a counterattack. In particular, the submarine could circulate 180 ° at maximum speed and move in the opposite direction after 42 seconds. The contours of the hull of the boats ensured minimal reflection of hydro-acoustic signals, which made it difficult for the Alpha to be attacked by enemy ships using the GAS in active mode.

However, during the operation of the Project 705 boats, significant shortcomings appeared that prevented their effective use. In particular, serious difficulties arose with the provision of basing (due to the need to constantly maintain the primary circuit of the reactor in a hot state). Regular special operations were needed to prevent the oxidation of the coolant alloy, constant monitoring of its condition and periodic regeneration (removal of oxides).

Many operational issues turned out to be unsolvable. In particular, it was not possible to put into practice the idea of ​​creating two crews of nuclear submarines - "marine" and "coastal", ensuring the operation and maintenance of the nuclear submarine while it is at the base.

It is sad that all these shortcomings actually crossed out the true "Russian underwater miracle". After all, complex automation, by and large, has fully justified itself, and nuclear power plants with LMC have not yet said their last word.

As a result, the career of the Project 705 submarine, despite their unique merits, turned out to be relatively short. Its “decline” was also facilitated by the notorious perestroika, as a result of which the armed forces began to quickly lose funding.

The K-123 submarine went down in history as one of the longest overhauls in the history of the domestic submarine fleet, which lasted more than nine years - from June 1983 to August 1992. In July 1997, this ship was excluded from the fleet. The remaining submarines were expelled from the Navy much earlier - in 1990.

It should be especially noted that for 20 years of its operation on the ships of this project, not a single person was lost in the fight for damage.

In the process of working on the 705 project, it was planned to create three of its modifications. SSGN pr.705A, equipped with an anti-ship complex with an underwater launch "Amethyst", SSBN pr.687 (705B), equipped with missiles of the D-5 complex, PLAT pr.705D which would be a complete analogue of the submarine pr.705, but was equipped with a water-water reactor. But both of these boats remained in the sketches.

/Based on materials topwar.ru and armyman.info /

Project 705 Lira nuclear submarines are often called breakthrough and ahead of their time. An alternative point of view is given by Captain 1st Rank Sergei Topchiev, who served on one of these iconic ships. Reflecting on the need to build innovative projects for the Russian Navy, he compares the domestic and American shipbuilding programs and cites the technical characteristics of the Lir, because of which these submarines have gone down in history.

INSTEAD OF FOREWORD

Interestingly, in the description of military equipment of the Cold War period, there is always a comparison with similar systems of a potential enemy, usually the United States.

This is not in the materials about the 705th. As a rule, the authors describe the possibility of a submarine avoiding the American MK-48 torpedo due to the high maneuverability of the ship and its power plant. This beautiful legend was born because of the proximity of the speeds of the 705th and MK-48. In combat realities, this sweet maneuver is unlikely for one simple reason - the detection range of our nuclear submarines by the Americans was many times greater than our capabilities. Therefore, the American commander will not allow a duel situation, and using his advantage, he will take a position aft of the attacked nuclear submarine and fire a volley.

So why is there no comparison? For two reasons.

First, with what to compare? The cycle of design, construction and transfer to the fleet (as they said earlier: the transfer of submarines to the treasury) dragged on for twenty years. Unprecedented.

Therefore, if we compare at the time stage of the beginning of the design, then the object of comparison on the part of the United States will be the nuclear submarine of the small series Skate, Sargo, and possibly also the Triton.

If we turn to the stage of the transfer of boats of the 705th project to the fleet (the end of the 1970s), then the object of comparison is the Los Angeles-class nuclear submarine.

Let's assume the idea that, foreseeing the duration of construction, the designers included in the project the possibility of modernization in terms of weapons and, most importantly, in terms of secrecy and during construction - the implementation of these capabilities ...

It wasn't! There are no such precedents in the world shipbuilding practice.

Thus, based on the timing of the start of design (late 1950s and early 1960s), the Project 705 nuclear submarine should be attributed to the second generation of nuclear submarines of the USSR Navy and compared with the American Skipjack and Thresher.

It is difficult to get rid of the question: why did they build ships of this project for so long and persistently? Let's try to answer below.

Let's turn now to the second reason. If we exclude the method of comparison in time and analyze according to the main features of the project, then it turns out that there is nothing to compare with. There was not, is not and is unlikely to appear in the American fleet a series of nuclear submarines: with a liquid metal coolant, a small crew, integrated automation, a titanium hull, high-speed and high-frequency electrical equipment and uninhabited compartments, but with great speed and noise. The Americans are building boats for war, taking into account meaningful national and international experience, the American military-industrial complex does not dominate the Navy.

The lengthy construction of a project has many reasons. For understanding, it is advisable to compare the American and Soviet history of the construction of nuclear submarine fleets.

HOW THE US NUCLEAR SUBMARINE FLEET STARTED

The Nautilus was followed by the construction of a small series of nuclear submarines (the lead one was Skate). In parallel, there was a search for the type of power plant. For this, a SeaWolf was built with a nuclear power plant (NPP) on a liquid metal sodium coolant, the operating experience of which showed the preference for a water-to-water type. The SeaWolf installation was replaced and this issue was not returned to.

The experimental "Nautilus" was built double-hulled and with a stem, like its predecessors, the DPL. The experience gained in its operation, and, above all, the possibility of a long underwater run at high speeds, set the task of creating a new architecture for the hulls of future nuclear submarines. For this purpose, an experimental single-shaft diesel-electric submarine "Albacore" was built, the test results of which made it possible to form the basic principles for the construction of hulls for promising nuclear submarines. At the same time, having made sure of the reliability of the water-water type nuclear power plant, they abandoned two-reactor and two-shaft power plants.

The new hulls almost along the entire length had a single-hull design, which made it possible to reduce the noise of the flow around and the level of interference with the operation of their own hydroacoustic means (GAS).

At the same time, the buoyancy margin decreased to 14–18%. The hulls received a rubber anti-sonar coating (GWP) and a spindle shape with a length-to-diameter ratio of 8–10. The propeller was moved as far as possible from the hull, again to reduce noise. In everyday life, the building was called Albacore.

Later, and again to improve the working conditions of the GAS, the torpedo tubes were moved to the middle part of the hull, at an angle to the diametrical plane of the submarine. They didn’t chase speed, rightly believing that acoustic stealth and range were more important. Yes, and the resulting thirty knots is enough to solve most tactical problems. To complete the description of the case, an increase in the diameter of the propeller and a decrease in its speed should be added, again to reduce noise and reduce the cavitation zone.

The next, already full-fledged series of US multi-purpose nuclear submarines was built using Albacore technology. The lead ship was named Skipjack. It should be noted that during this period, our opponents were also looking for the type of main engine, for which they built the Tulibi nuclear submarine on full electric propulsion.

The next step in their shipbuilding program is simply elegant, and, again, epochal. Our opponents rammed a forty-nine-meter rocket section with sixteen vertical shafts into the Skipjack's hull, providing an underwater launch of ballistic missiles. By combining a submarine, a transport nuclear power plant and a ballistic missile with a nuclear charge, the United States received the third component of the nuclear triad, the most secretive and stable. Already in the fall of 1960, the new missile carrier, named "George Washington", began carrying out systematic combat service in the North Atlantic and the eastern Mediterranean, from where the Kremlin "got" its missiles. In the future, as new models of weapons and weapons appeared, without deviating from Albacore principles, our potential adversary built new series of nuclear submarines, while decommissioning those that had been decommissioned.

Another circumstance deserves attention, initiated again by Rickover, but already by the admiral. We are talking about differentiated payment for component equipment to supplier companies: the lower the noise level, the higher the cost.

And concluding a brief analysis of the American program, we note once again a fact that is important in our consideration: the initiator of the construction of the nuclear fleet was an ordinary officer of the US Navy, a low-ranking officer, a representative of the engineering, and not the command corps of officers of the US Navy.

Is it possible for us?

AND WE WILL GO OUR OWN WAY...

The weapon forms the tactics of its use, which was presented by the authors (among them was A. Sakharov) something like this. The boat approached the coast of the enemy and fired a monster torpedo, which was controlled by software, approached the coast (preferably to the port) and was blown up, creating a giant tsunami as the main damaging factor.

The design of nuclear submarines under the code "project 627" has begun.

The gradual involvement of the Navy led to an adjustment of the project: the monster apparatus was replaced with six conventional torpedoes placed in the bow. The letter "A" was added to the project code and it became 627A.

Unlike the Americans, albacores were not built, so it turned out as it happened. The fore end of the stemless type is almost Albakorovsky, and the stern end was completely copied from a twin-shaft diesel-electric submarine (project 651). The stern was crowned with two high-speed propellers of small diameter, located in close proximity to the hull. The boat was double-hulled along the entire length, the reserve of floating - more than thirty percent, which had a negative impact on the noise.

Having limited experience in operating a nuclear power plant (shore stand), following the principle "whatever happens," the installation was made two-shaft and two-reactor.

The series began to build immediately. Our first nuclear submarine "K-3" of project 627A launched in 1957, three years after the "Nautilus". Almost simultaneously, the construction of nuclear submarines of projects 658 and 675 began. The first was armed with three surface-launched ballistic missiles, the second with eight cruise missiles, and, again, with a surface launch. The surface launch determined the architecture of the hulls - both were stem-mounted. The stern did not differ from the 627A project, except that the project 675 propellers were in a protective shell to protect against ice.

In the late 1950s, the design of the second generation of nuclear submarines began. Three ships were designed. Project 667A missile nuclear submarine armed with sixteen submarine-launched ballistic missiles (APLRB), project 671 multi-purpose nuclear submarine and project 670 nuclear submarine armed with eight underwater-launched cruise missiles.

The second-generation nuclear submarines turned out to be very successful ships that bore the brunt of the confrontation in the Cold War. All three types were handed over to the fleet on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the Great October Revolution, i.e. autumn 1967. Despite the success of the projects, they all clearly lagged behind the US nuclear submarines in terms of stealth and range.

In parallel with the design of the second generation, the design of the 705th project began. It was initiated by a small group of young designers from the Malachite Design Bureau, recent graduates of the LCI. Everything, as in the case of the 627A project, began without the participation of the fleet.

Shipbuilders conceived a miracle weapon - a nuclear submarine with a small displacement (up to 1500 tons) with a speed of more than 40 knots, a small crew (no more than 15 people).

The main criteria for the effectiveness of the design were considered high speed and survivability, a large depth of immersion. The constructive provision of secrecy was given secondary importance. It was believed that this property provides the very fact of immersion.

Following the exit to the ocean, the confrontation between the nuclear submarines of the USSR and the USA began. The superiority of the opposite side became clear quickly. It was provided with less noise and the superiority of sonar weapons. As always, they started to catch up. They caught up, modernizing the second generation nuclear submarines. Given the superiority of the United States in mechanical engineering, they went their own way - by suppressing noise along the propagation paths, they did not disregard its source. In general, they ran after more than 25 years. They caught up by accepting third-generation nuclear submarines into the fleet, but most importantly, they changed their design thinking.

Let's return to the 705th project. Preliminary studies have shown the unreality of what was conceived in the estimated displacement.

The design balance took place with a displacement of about 3500 tons. At the same time, the hull should be titanium, the nuclear power plant should be with high specific energy characteristics, the electrical system should be high-frequency (it was believed that this would lead to a decrease in weight and size characteristics), and the crew should not exceed two dozen submariners.

The reduction of the crew required the development of automatic control of the submarine in general and its systems in particular, which led to the appearance of uninhabited compartments. Control over their condition (except for the central post) was given to automation and television. The military-industrial complex went so far that the designers were exempted from fulfilling a number of requirements of the TPPL in force at that time (requirements for the design of submarines). We started designing. At the same time, the military-industrial complex again took a bite of sweets - in fact, two similar projects 705 and 705K were designed. They differed in the type of nuclear power plant and the automatic control complex.

DIFFERENCE IN APPROACHES

About geopolitics, which explains that civilization develops in a dual unity. One part of the nations and the states formed by them are maritime, while others are continental. The first ones are more passionate, pragmatic. The social ethics of these countries is mobile, the main goal of society is enrichment. Continental countries are less dynamic, the development of society is ahead of the ethical norms of public life.

There is a constant struggle between the parties of dual unity, taking different forms.

Without a doubt, the leading maritime power is the United States, and Russia firmly occupies a place in the list of continental powers, despite its political structure. Maritime powers are constantly fighting for possession of the ocean as a transport artery and a source of resources, therefore they are carriers of maritime and naval experience, and the mentality of their citizens is maritime in nature. Sea nations are capable of quick reaction in cases fraught with the loss of oceanic dominance. This happened in the Battle of the Atlantic in 1939-1943. Germany started the war with 43 submarines, of which only a third were in a combat position at the same time. Forcing their construction and improving the tactics of use, the Germans reached the target by the end of 1942 - they sank monthly up to 600 thousand tons of merchant tonnage. The scale of success will be clear if we remember that at that time a ship with a displacement of 10 - 15 thousand tons was considered large. England, owning a powerful surface fleet based on a global basing system, could not cope with the German submarine fleet, acting alone without any support from other branches of the naval forces (surface ships and aircraft). Deprived of a systematic supply of raw materials, England was on the brink of disaster.

Saved the British two circumstances. First, the Germans started the war with a small submarine fleet. And the second is the US entry into the war (December 1941) with their powerful mobile economy.

If the Germans had started a war with a couple of hundred boats and captured Iceland (for their base), world history would have gone a different route (by the way, the Germans did not have naval aviation). But this could not happen, and only for one, but very good reason: German thinking, including military thinking, is strictly continental.

Germany built more than 1,100 submarines during the war, of which more than 700 died. Not a single branch (kind) of the country's armed forces suffered such losses (39 thousand dead out of 45 thousand active).

The anti-submarine defense of the Anglo-Saxons was built quickly, no expense or effort was spared. In the interests of anti-submarine defense, escort ships were built, including aircraft carriers, aircraft short-wave radars, new anti-submarine weapons and hydroacoustic stations were created. Anti-submarine aviation and its airfield network based on two continents of the theater developed intensively. For the first time, bottom acoustic systems began to be installed. They accelerated the construction of commercial tonnage. Improved anti-submarine defense tactics. Allied intelligence uncovered the communication system of the German submarine fleet.

Due to these efforts, German submarines in 1943 were squeezed out (but not destroyed) from the central Atlantic to the peripheral maritime theaters, including the northern one - the Soviet one. England resisted, and the Anglo-Saxons, a maritime nation, understood the power and capabilities of the submarine fleet, as well as the significance of submarine warfare.

And now (attention!) with the advent of nuclear submarines, anti-submarine defense is actually acquiring the status of US missile defense from the ocean direction. The current US ASW is a large system (in terms of cybernetics) spanning space, ocean, and land.

In the post-war period, its build-up was due to the space and bottom segments. Positional means of illuminating the underwater situation are located on the ocean floor, covering vast areas and, above all, the torrential zones. The system is crowned by several electronic information processing and control centers for anti-submarine defense forces. Moreover, there is an assumption about the active capabilities of these systems. For example, creating acoustic interference, acoustic curtains, activating minefields, etc. This is not fantasy, this is how a nation with a maritime mentality solves issues of ocean ownership and defense from the ocean direction.

WHICH FLEET CAN BE CONSIDERED OCEANIC?

It will probably not be a big mistake to consider three factors as the basis of American naval power:
- national maritime mentality multiplied by American pragmatism;
- the global world system of basing the forces of the fleet;
- air supremacy in the ocean zone due to ship-based and land-based aviation.

The other components of the fleet are also significant. For example, ship composition, force control systems, perfection of supply logistics, etc. But updating and improving over time, they rely on the three-factor field indicated above - the basis of the power of the US Navy.

These three factors are the American challenges that the Soviet Union had to answer by starting to build a Cold War fleet to counter the American one. And only by solving this problem, our fleet could become an ocean fleet.

Now a little about the first factor and its connection with the object of our study - the nuclear submarine of project 705.

In the first half of the 1980s, the author accidentally came across a report by Admiral Rickover on the required level of nuclear submarine automation. The essence of the report was the idea of ​​the harmfulness and inadmissibility of excessive enthusiasm for this process. The appearance of the report in itself illustrates the existence of a discussion in the US Navy on this topic.

The subsequent appearance of the Trident-class nuclear submarines with a crew of more than one and a half hundred souls is evidence of the acceptance of Rickover's views.

It was previously indicated that the result of deep automation of the 705th was the appearance of uninhabited compartments and the rejection of local control posts, a number of important systems and mechanisms. With the start of operation, the wildness of the decision became obvious, and above all to the crews of the submarine. They began to treat, for which three midshipmen were introduced into the crew - a shift watch, which they called wandering or mobile. The shift officer moved around the compartments, assessing their condition visually and organoleptically, that is, he did what before him - several generations of submariners, and what automation and television could not do. Automation is certainly needed, but only where it solves the problem faster than a person, with less resources and operations, and also does not create a zone of information uncertainty. The widespread introduction of self-propelled guns (automatic control systems) into the project, imposed on the fleet by the military-industrial complex, had many allies, even in the Naval Academy. In general, the visit to the 705th was very active. Each visitor (necessarily in a leadership position) offered something. The class fighters-political detachments were amazed at the absence of a political officer and promised to resolve the issue in Moscow (the staff of the political officer was absent in the crews of the boats due to the conditions of habitation).

Somehow, a professor of the department of automation of the academy arrived with a proposal to automate the ascent process. The assembled commanders of the ships explained to the professor that the ascent is an individual maneuver, and, with external similarity, no two are the same. He was offered to automate the search for a section of the network with reduced insulation. But the professor considered the problem insignificant. But this very isolation was the cause of the fires that claimed the lives of many submariners!

There are more examples of the absurdity of deep and indiscriminate automation. The design concept for the struggle for survivability is incomprehensible in the light of the same deep automation. We are interested in something else: the American maritime mentality did not allow such a roll in its submarine shipbuilding, as happened with us. By the way, on the deceased Komsomolets, the aft compartments in which the fire started were inspected by a moving watch, and the fire in the eighth compartment started in the absence of a watchman.

Analyzing the first factor, it is impossible not to touch upon the personnel policy of the opposing fleets. The personnel policy of our Navy is practically no different from the tsarist one, which took on an established form during the sail-steam clippers. The main categories of deck service both then, under the tsar, and in Soviet times were officers, enlisted sailors and midshipmen (non-commissioned officers, conductors). The officers were divided into two groups: command and engineering. The Soviet period added another group - political workers. The lowest caste was the engineering one, due to limited career opportunities (under the tsar, by origin). The inferiority of the engineering group was especially evident in the nuclear submarine fleet, where the engineer officers made up half of the officer corps. Quite typical was the situation when, after 7 - 8 years of service, an officer of the command profile reached the positions of senior assistant, or even commander, while his contemporary engineer remained at the primary level. This gave rise to a trend among the engineering staff to leave the deck service and settle on the shore. Among other things, the service of engineers on the submarine proceeded more difficult than the officers of the command profile.

The severity of the service of officers of various categories on board the nuclear submarine is well characterized by the choice of sailors entering naval schools from the fleet. The vast majority aspired to become political workers, someone chose a command profile. The author, who had the opportunity to observe this process for nineteen years, does not remember the case when submarine sailors entered the engineering schools of the Navy.

The obligatory (recruitment) nature of the service of the rank and file was in clear contradiction with the ever more complex ship technology. The situation was aggravated by the periodically shortened service life.

A significant role in the crews was played by extra-conscripts (midshipmen and foremen), who are carriers of the most valuable experience of the submarine - cut-off (from the word compartment). Having reached the retirement age by the age of 33-35 (two years), they left the submarine, taking away the most valuable experience.

There was no significant system of motivation combining moral and material incentives for members of the crews of the nuclear submarine.

The appearance of political departments in the formations somewhere in the mid-1970s only increased the stratification of the officer corps, closing one of the career loopholes for engineers - the transition to political work.

One of the consequences of the thoughtless work of the personnel bodies of the USSR Navy was the accident rate, which was inherited by the Russian Navy.

Analyzing the personnel policy of the fleet, it is impossible to get past the monoprofessionalism of command profile officers. Let's explain. Officers of the command profile do not rotate between the branches of the Navy forces, that is, the submariner has never served and will never serve on a surface ship and vice versa. This is an "achievement" of the Soviet personnel bodies - rotation was carried out in the tsarist fleet. It is difficult to assess the harm caused by such a policy.

By the way, in the US Navy, former pilots command aircraft carriers. In addition, caste artificially reduces the number of candidates for the position of ship commander - the central position of any fleet.

So by inertia rolled personnel work in the USSR Navy under the leadership of the commander-in-chief - the builder of the ocean fleet.

The new commander-in-chief, who had previously commanded the Northern Fleet, started a noisy company to increase the prestige of the seafarers, and then it turned out, as always ... certain conditions are met. I don't know if this situation has survived to the present day.

How this process is proceeding in the West can be illustrated by the example of British Admiral Woodward's service odyssey.

In the Navy - from the age of 13. The first officer position - on the basis of submarines. Then - junior navigator and watch officer of the cruiser in Indochina. Next - courses in logic, administration and business writing. At the end of the course - a miner on diesel-electric submarines in the Mediterranean Sea. After some time, he was appointed a student of courses for submarine commanders, after graduation he was appointed to the command post of a diesel-electric submarine of a new project under construction. Gains experience in working with industry and commissioning a new ship. Then - a year of study at the Academy in Greenwich, crowned with a diploma in the design of a nuclear submarine nuclear reactor. Then - the commander of the nuclear submarine. The next stage is the head of training courses for submarine commanders. Then he is transferred to the central office of the Navy, where he is engaged in planning the development of the Navy. From London he was transferred to Portsmouth as commander of the destroyer Sheffield, supervising its commissioning. Again service in the central office of the Navy. In 1981, he was appointed commander of the operational unit of surface ships (at the age of 49) and became an admiral. Under his command, England wins the Falklands War in 1982. This is how a maritime nation prepares cadres for war at sea.

The topic can be continued, but the conclusion is already obvious. The American maritime mentality is a safeguard against incompetent interference in the construction of the country's navy.

Russia needs a law (or several laws) excluding the creation of conditions for monopoly management of the construction of the Navy.

Now about the second component of American naval power - the US Navy's basing system, which includes several dozen naval bases and basing points. Moreover, being the leader of NATO, the United States potentially owns the system of air and sea basing of the countries of the vassal-members of the alliance.

The presence of a base in a theater of operations, if we switch to army terminology, means the preemptive creation of a fortified area. Long-term basing makes it possible to develop an area (a theater of operations or part of it), to equip it with various means, and to create the necessary reserves. That is, to do in peacetime what the enemy will be forced to do in the conduct of hostilities in the theater. An alternative to the ground-based system was (is) a floating rear. Historical experience shows his ability to fulfill his mission in peacetime. In wartime, it is destroyed by the enemy as a matter of priority.

If we carefully analyze the events of the Second World War in the Pacific Ocean, then all its main goals (ownership of sales and raw materials markets, as well as transport accessibility) resulted in a struggle for possession of the ocean-based system for basing forces and means of the Navy. Everything else - the battles of aircraft carrier strike groups, the actions of ships and submarines, landing operations - are just forms of this struggle.

Emphasizing the importance of the system, one cannot ignore the national experience. In 1904-1905, the Second Russian Pacific Squadron made an unprecedented transition from the Baltic to the Far East. At the same time, the floating rear solved the minimum problem (in the absence of enemy opposition) - the squadron reached Tsushima without losses, but at the same time lost (or did not acquire) combat readiness. The result is a national tragedy, the Tsushima rout.

Now subjunctive. Imagine that Russia would have bases somewhere in the southeastern part of the Asian continent (like England, France and Germany), allowing the squadron to restore combat readiness, replenish the ships of the first squadron that broke through from Port Arthur after the battle in the Yellow Sea. The threat factor emanating from the new squadron could incline Japan, exhausted by that time, to peace. This did not happen, but the experience remained - our national, Russian, maritime and bloody, which is used by the whole world ... Except us.

60 years after Tsushima, we again played the old harp - our "ocean fleet" (5th OPESK) was provided with a floating rear, the ships and ships of which followed to the provided squadron through three strait zones controlled by NATO member countries.

And in general, what opposed the Mediterranean OPESK?

The fleets of five NATO member states washed by the Mediterranean Sea, not counting the US Sixth Fleet, which includes two to three aircraft carrier strike groups. The theater is provided with national navigation systems and the most developed airfield network in the world.

What could our squadron do in the event of a full-scale war by non-nuclear means: inflict some damage on the enemy and replicate the Varyag - no more. Who would have allowed her to engage in anti-submarine activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially since in the 1970s and 1980s, the combat service areas of the American (British, French) nuclear submarines spread over the entire ocean due to an increase in the firing range of missile systems.

Did the commander-in-chief understand all the potential danger of the current situation? Judging by the further development of our oceanic presence, I understood, and confirmation of this was the appearance in the Navy of heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers of project 1143 and, finally, full-fledged aircraft carriers Riga, Brezhnev and Kuznetsov.

Why does the author constantly return to the figure of the commander-in-chief in the topic of project 705 boats? Gorshkov, as a commander-in-chief and an outstanding personality, quickly grew into a maritime mentality. Much faster than any figure in the power layer standing above him. Building the fleet, he overcame not only the inertia of land-based sectarianism, but also ideological dogmatism.

In the list of dogmas of that time: aircraft carriers are the tools of the aggressive military of the West; military bases in foreign territories - a legacy of colonialism, etc. The Commander-in-Chief of the sample of 1955 - 1962 and he is also the mid-1970s - as if different people. Probably, the "late" commander in chief would not have started building the nuclear submarine of the 705th project. For him, the time for surrogates had passed.

And, finally, about the third component of American naval power - aviation. Its shock potential manifested itself already in the First World War. Few people know that Russian hydro-air transports (prototypes of aircraft carriers) participated in the attacks on Turkish ports, adjusting the fire of naval artillery, and performed other tasks. The Second World War unambiguously approved aviation in the status of the main strike force of the fleet. Suffice it to recall the death of the Bismarck, Hood, Prince of Wales, the drama of Pearl Harbor, the air blockade of Sevastopol ... In the post-war period, the United States significantly expanded its combat capabilities. Naval aviation includes aircraft carrier, land and marine aviation. To understand the strike power of aircraft carrier strike groups, it is enough to imagine that the depth of defense of its core reaches 400-500 kilometers, and the area occupied by it with its declared dominance is equal to the area of ​​Bulgaria. The aircraft carrier carries aircraft and helicopters for various purposes - from fighters to AWACS. The air group is trained to destroy naval (submarine and NK) and ground targets, as well as to solve air defense and missile defense tasks. AUG forms the basis of strike formations implementing the "fleet against the coast" tactics at distances of several thousand kilometers. The importance of naval aviation in armed struggle is so obvious that the author considers further narration about it unnecessary.

WHEN INNOVATION IS HARMFUL

In the world design practice, there are at least two well-established patterns of international character:
- any new design is based on a prototype, that is, a pre-existing machine, structure or device;
- in the designed object, no more than 10-20% of subsystems are updated. This is done for safety and economic reasons.

The abundance of novelty delays the commissioning of the entire volume, leads to a significant loss of liquidity even at the construction stage. The second relates entirely to the nuclear submarine of project 705, which impresses with the number of innovative solutions in the design of the ship.

In addition, the organization of the crew service and the forms of maintenance were subjected to a sharp change. Innovations set new tasks for subcontractors, which numbered over several hundred. All this was the main reason for the long-term construction of the project.

In the course of the pilot project, we encountered the impossibility of implementing the Navy's requirements for unsinkability, which directly depends on the reserve of buoyancy. The Navy required to ensure surface unsinkability when one compartment and two adjacent tanks were flooded. With a small number of compartments (initially, a three-compartment submarine with the same number of main ballast tanks was considered) this is impossible. The way out was found in the six-compartment version with an increase in the number of tanks to 11. At the same time, the buoyancy reserve was retained by more than 30%.

Why is a large margin of buoyancy bad at all? The larger it is, the greater the amount of water between the hulls, figuratively speaking, "carries" the submarine in a submerged position, spending part of the engine power to move it. This circumstance is quite tolerable on diesel-electric submarines with their low underwater speeds. With an increase in the speed of the underwater course (with the advent of nuclear submarines), a large margin of buoyancy, structurally implemented through a double-hull design, leads to an increase in the noise of the hull flow around the hull with an oncoming flow of water, vibrational excitation of structural elements of the light hull, and, no less important, interferes with the operation of its own hydroacoustic systems .

In the United States, starting with the "Skipjack", they went for a single-hull version, not embarrassed by the loss of buoyancy margin up to 12 - 14%, that is, without having secured surface and underwater unsinkability.

Far from the originally conceived, but still relatively small displacement was achieved due to:
– replacement of hull steel with titanium alloy;
– NPP of high power density unit (149 MW) with liquid metal coolant;
– reducing the crew due to deep automation and centralization of control processes for nuclear power plants and submarines as a whole;
- transfer of electrical systems to an increased frequency (400 Hz);
- reducing the energy intensity of the backup source of electricity;
- simplification of the system of immersion - ascent;
– rejection of duplication of critical systems;
– lack of local control posts;
– combining the traditional separation of systems;
– transition to direct-flow shut-off valves instead of traditional ones.

According to this, far from a complete list of innovations, it is clear how deeply the designers and customers ignored the international design experience. The result is known: design began in 1958, and the Navy received its first boat in 1977 (K-123 705K). Total - 19 years! The appearance of K-64 (the lead project 705) in Zapadnaya Litsa in 1971 cannot be called a transfer to the fleet - the nuclear submarine was in disrepair.

Now more about innovations. The titanium alloy case posed some fairly difficult problems. Titanium is electrochemically passive, so any metal, black or non-ferrous, in sea water paired with it plays the role of a protector. The first titanium submarine (K-222 of project 661) quickly "ate" the steel floating pier due to electrochemical corrosion.

To get out of the situation, the pier was replaced, and ocean fenders and zinc protectors were installed between the boat and the pier.

For fifty days of military service in the North Atlantic (water temperature no more than 2 ° C), titanium managed to completely “eat up” the metal sheath of outboard cables, steel protectors. There was a leak in the steel barrel of the periscope. Titanium easily revealed a factory marriage. The complexity of titanium welding should also be noted - only in an inert gas environment, which, of course, complicated the repair work, including inside the pressure case.

Shipbuilding is an integrating industry. Often, with their requests, forcing estimators to master new technologies and materials. The titanium industry, which now supplies the aviation industry, including foreign ones, owes its birth to the submarine. Sitting in a Boeing or Airbus, remember that it relies on a chassis made of Russian titanium.

On the positive side, there is no rust.

Now about nuclear power plants with liquid metal coolant and steam generators with multiple forced circulation.

Both installations were distinguished by the increased complexity of thermal schemes and the composition of component parts. The usually declared advantage of such a technological solution is the ability to set up a quick output from the storage position. Somehow they are silent about how this “storage” looks like. In any position of the nuclear power plant - working or out of action - the alloy, the crystallization temperature of which is about one and a half hundred degrees, must be in a liquid state. In the working state, it is understandable, but in the withdrawn state, its temperature was maintained in one of three ways: due to the fission reaction, steam from the base, or due to the operation of an electric boiler with a capacity of several hundred kilowatts. They tried everything, but settled on the fission reaction, as the least dependent on coastal sources of steam and electricity. This meant the actual keeping of the watch in the base and the unproductive consumption of the resource of the installation itself.

The arrival of K-123 to the place of permanent deployment revealed the flagrant unpreparedness of the base. Of all the needs, it turned out to be the possibility of supplying electricity of the required frequency. The problem of steam supply from the base was solved on the move with the help of a concrete floating barracks with two boilers. The boilers themselves are a serious and potentially dangerous structure in the hands of amateurs.

The heat carrier of the alloy circuit turned out to be capricious. Reacting with hydrogen and oxygen, the alloy formed oxides, which changed the conditions for heat removal from the fuel rod, which led to the destruction of the core. The source of hydrogen and oxygen in the alloy circuit was the oxides of the structures and water of the secondary circuit, which enters there through leaks, since the pressure in the secondary circuit exceeds the pressure of the alloy.

In 1968, for this reason, a severe nuclear accident occurred on the K-27, the first Soviet nuclear submarine with a liquid metal coolant.

The nuclear submarine was put out of action, nine people died from radiation sickness. Surprisingly, after this accident, the nuclear submarines of the 705th project under construction at that time were not provided with devices for instrumental or laboratory control over the quality of the coolant.

The restoration of its quality was carried out only under basic conditions, the process itself was called high-temperature regeneration. The operation was carried out not even by industry, but by science in providing for the fleet. The process provided for the circulation of the alloy with the reactor inactive, so the steam was supplied from the "fifty kopeck" boilers (Project 50 watchdog), whose feedwater leaks were simply amazing.

The nuclear accident at the K-27, the appearance of the second generation of nuclear submarines in the fleet, and the difficulties in building the 705, which clearly emerged in the late 1960s, could serve as a basis for curtailing the project. Moreover, they had information about the refusal of the Americans from the SeaWolf. But the construction did not stop. Why? There was responsibility, but who needs it? The leadership of the fleet - obviously not, the generals from industry and science - even more so! The expenditure of funds and resources of various kinds is simply colossal, and the grandfathers from the party control commission were charged by Stalin. In order to prevent a scandal, they went the "natural" way: they shortened the series, completed the construction of the laid-down boats, and the boats seemed to naturally grow old and went to pieces. And the sheep are full, and the wolves are safe.

The turbine was no less of a hassle. The relatively short length of the main steam lines and the high temperature of the steam led to "breakdown" of the main valve gaskets (due to insufficiently thought out thermal expansion compensation). Replacing gaskets is a huge job of removing valves and related equipment.

The struggle to minimize displacement has led to the replacement of the usual turbine oil with aviation oil, which has an increased circulation rate. Aviation oil under anaerobic conditions proved to be toxic. The turbinists started having skin problems. Some big naval doctors came: they measured, discussed, were surprised, indignant and ordered that respirators should not be removed in the turbine compartment.

The absence of conscripts in the crews and a long stay away from active formations visibly changed the attitude in the officer environment, reducing the usual distances.

Initially, they planned a crew of about 14 - 15 divers. Life made adjustments, and the boats went to sea with a crew of 32 people. At the same time, the need for an increase existed, but could not be realized due to habitability conditions, because the possibilities of electrochemical regeneration of the air environment have been exhausted.

The crews of the project were distinguished by their originality, especially those that were formed first and were staffed by the best graduates. The service was conceived according to a velvet model: a town somewhere on the Karelian Isthmus, then a helicopter, an airplane, again a helicopter, finally - a board of a miracle ship, an exchange of signatures with a technical crew, two months of ownership of the ocean, and then everything in reverse order. They studied for a long time in various design bureaus and institutes, being in the status, if not astronauts, then somewhere close. Gradually life landed. Yesterday's fellow students at the school went up the career ladder, and the end of the construction of the boat was not seen. Career went out, children grew up. They were not allowed to change jobs. True, for the first crews, all officers raised their ranks one step higher. It calmed me down, but not much. It is not clear why, but officer positions were not called in accordance with the charter, but in a special way. The group leader was called an engineer. The division commander is also an engineer, but a senior one. Commanders of combat units - deputy commanders. Why this was done is not clear, except perhaps in the name of innovations as such.

Anyone, somehow connected with the submarine, is clear and obvious the importance of the mechanical engineer on duty. The organization of the service on the analyzed project did not provide for this figure - superfluous. Like, automation will replace everything. I wonder how the authors thought of the control of the submarine, for example, in the surface position, when the watch officer is on the bridge and is completely occupied with the surface situation?

Automation did not provide the tactics adopted and determined by the current management for damage control and, moreover, introduced information uncertainty into the assessment of the emergency. For example, in one of the uninhabited compartments, the starter coil will burn out (ordinary situation) with significant smoke without increasing the temperature in the compartment. How does the central post identify the very fact of a fire and the degree of danger of the situation? Either smoke will be detected on the ship's TV, or a mobile watch (initially not planned at all) at the entrance to the compartment will detect and report the fact of smoke. There will simply be no other information. The premises are uninhabited. The central post is obliged to start the fire extinguishing system, and then organize reconnaissance, surface, and provide ventilation to the atmosphere. This increases the likelihood of loss of secrecy, and in wartime - death. During combat action, according to the experience of the Great Patriotic War, water could enter, fires could start ... Only the energetic actions of the emergency party made it possible to quickly localize the situation and save the ship. A huge role in efficiency is played by the psychological factor, for which it is necessary to maintain communication between the emergency compartment and the central post. The absence of a permanent watch in the nuclear submarine compartment (at any level of automation) creates an information vacuum that does not allow promptly localizing an emergency and minimizing its consequences. The game of automated uninhabitability is one of the main reasons for the Komsomolets tragedy.

And the last thing about automating the process of fighting for damage. It cannot be automated. You have to go the other way. By creating effective tools to help personnel. The toolkit should be understood as diagnostic systems, computerization of calculations of the current state of stability, buoyancy, and much more.

Increasing the frequency of the current of the electrical system is one of the main differences of the analyzed project. Neither before nor after the world practice of shipbuilding does not know this. The innovators believed that by doing this they would reduce the weight and size characteristics of power electrical equipment, including by abandoning the mass of converters that feed the weapons and weapons systems.

The designers did not know about the basing, secrecy and reliability of the operation of the electrical complex or did not consider it a design object.

The boat used two types of drive motors - AChM and DFV series. The parametric range of the AFM series covered the power range from 15 kilowatts and above. The DFV series was used in the low power range. The AChM engines had water cooling of the stator zone, so that all the savings in weight and size were rather conditional, increasing due to pumps, fittings and heat exchangers of the cooling system. Drive motor speeds increased to 6000 rpm (synchronous). The increase in speeds has dramatically affected the reliability of bearing units (especially for drives with axial loads) due to the failure to take any constructive measures to improve their reliability.

There were no devices for diagnosing the condition of bearing assemblies. The node failed like an avalanche in an hour and a half: from the appearance of the first signs of abnormal operation accessible to diagnostics by personnel (moving watch) to its sintering (hardening). As a rule, it was not possible to use the puller without dismantling the engine, and more often, the associated equipment. Later, experience came, the replacement of bearings was simplified, but the problem remained until the decommissioning of the miracle ships. The mass of the reversible converter has increased significantly due to the multi-pole nature of the synchronous machine. Bearings haven't gotten rid of the ills of their predecessors.

The blower of the system of mechanical mixing of the electrolyte was new, which made it possible not to use medium pressure air and, therefore, not to create excessive pressure in the edema. It was very noisy, so it was rarely used. There were failures of the voltage correctors of autonomous turbogenerators associated with cracking of the epoxy casting mass. A complete surprise was the explosion of onboard power connectors from the shore due to internal short circuits. Attempts to avoid short circuits by separating phases by connectors led to heating of a durable case due to uncompensated high-frequency magnetization reversal.

Natural ventilation of the battery was not provided due to the presence of a downstream section of the exhaust pipeline. There was no low power DC fan, so an AC fan was used continuously. The VDC consisted of a static frequency converter (FC 400 V ~, 50 Hz) and two asynchronous propeller motors located in gondolas at the ends of the horizontal tail. Both HEDs (100 kW each) worked on two-bladed fixed-pitch propellers - "stop" and "move". The turn of the blades was carried out by ship hydraulics. HED had frequency control of speed. Under the HEM and the exhaust flow of the circulation lines, the boat developed a speed of up to five knots (with a flap on the exhaust, the jet could be directed perpendicular to the side, the "stop" position).

The inverter was a massive water-cooled installation, rather unreliable. The smooth adjustment of the speed of a rather low-power PEM was far-fetched, it could be completely replaced by a two-speed asynchronous motor.

The instrumental information of the electrical control panel was quite peculiar. A megohmmeter, for example, showed values ​​in the range from 0 to 200 kOhm, which did not allow identifying a trend in insulation changes and taking timely measures to improve it. An interesting solution was the remote control of the feeder machines of the main switchboard.

To power general-purpose household consumers (electric shavers, film installations, etc.), there was a low-power static converter.

It should be noted that an increase in the number of revolutions of autonomous turbogenerators and powerful drive motors made the vibroacoustic characteristics of the Project 705 submarine very individual and greatly simplified the identification of the enemy. Thus, the transition to an increased frequency turned out to be unjustified. Could the personnel have done something besides improving the acoustic culture that was actively introduced into the practice of subfloating in the 1970s and 1980s?

If we take into account that the military-industrial complex has achieved 300% of overhead costs in the production of many types of military equipment, then we can imagine how much the costs of implementing the high-frequency idea of ​​​​the project's power grid turned out to be.

Eh, where were the grandfathers-Stalinists from the Party Control Commission under the Central Committee of the Party?! And if they also understood the problems of the submarine, as in the cavalry ...

The itch of innovation did not bypass the valve designers. Instead of the usual and long-surviving stage of childhood illnesses, a new one appeared, the so-called direct-flow. Now the valve stem was not perpendicular to the flow of the working medium, but parallel. As a result, a rare valve ensured the tightness of the cut-off of the medium. To assess the magnitude of the consequences, imagine the procedure for any repair during a campaign. Well, for example, replacing the gasket on some steam pipeline. Tools, materials, personnel are being prepared. But the main thing is that all the repairs and the related shutdowns (switchings) do not lead to a loss of progress, disruption of the operation of weapons and weapons systems. And it happened, and often. Finally a solution has been found. In particularly difficult situations, a combat (training) alert is announced. The execution begins and then it turns out that due to the leakage of the valve (valve, clink), the working environment is not turned off ... Everything starts anew, often according to a potentially dangerous scenario.

The lowest level of reliability of the technical means of the Project 705 nuclear submarines, most of which did not pass life tests, doomed the small crew to endless repairs, making the service difficult, especially in the electromechanical warhead. No less burden fell on the technical crew. A little more about him.

The adoption of the aircraft maintenance model for Project 705 boats is another far-fetched innovation. It was thought that the technical crew was engaged in restoring the combat readiness of the ships during the entire inter-campaign period, and the crew of the boat (in naval jargon - swimmers) rested during this period, and then restored their skills in the training center. The idea did not come true for a number of reasons, so the 705th was transferred to the second crew, the carrier of linearity, which, together with the technical crew, implemented the measures of the inter-trip stage, ensuring the given combat readiness. The technical crew was a large separate military unit with its own number and seal. Formed long ago, and in the absence of ships, unoccupied by the main purpose, it turned into a source of manpower and an inexhaustible travel reserve for the authorities.

With the advent of the ships, the technical crew switched to performing the main functions, and then its structural inconsistency manifested itself - the lack of personal attachment to the ships, indirect responsibility, and much more, which is always the result of flaws at the design stage. In fact, the technical crew was manually controlled by the headquarters and the electromechanical service of the formation, leaving the issues of everyday life and socialist competition to its command. Understanding the need for its restructuring came quickly. It was planned to divide the technical crew according to the number of boats and deprive the status of a separate military unit. The first succeeded, the second did not take place due to the unwillingness of the personnel authorities. But that's another story.

AT SEVEN NUNS...

Then a gentle sunset began. In the early 1990s, all boats, with the exception of K-123 (which was under repair), were decommissioned. The operation of the 705th project by the fleet has developed a persistent allergy to nuclear power plants with a liquid-metal coolant. This is the main lesson of more than thirty years of epic. What the Americans have come to in a few years, we have been going for three decades. Now it is again proposed to use liquid metal as a coolant. The Danes, who carry this idea, assure about the solved problems. Well, for example, biological protection will also become a thermal accumulator, and therefore, they say, buyers (fleet) will not have problems with basic support, etc.

At the same time, the concept and implementation of such a complex engineering structure as the Project 705 nuclear submarine should be regarded as an undoubted achievement of the Soviet scientific and design schools, the high potential of the Soviet defense industry. It is not the fault of the engineers that their efforts were directed by officials away from common sense. The analyzed project should be considered encyclopedic if only because its operation by the fleet confirmed or refuted all sorts of design, organizational ideas that previously had only theoretical justification.

Another epic lesson: extraordinary weapons systems (such as the 705th nuclear submarine) must be designed in an integrated manner with elements of basic support. The latter should be built and mastered proactively.

For the crews, the development of the project was a real engineering school that taught many to solve complex non-standard engineering problems.

From the position of the present, the low status of the Navy as a state institution in the 1950s-1960s of the last century is obvious. The latter turned out to be unable to form and defend a holistic concept of the necessary boat, and in many respects went on about the various structures of the military-industrial complex, which proposed a miracle weapon. Or did someone need it?

I emphasize once again: the strength of the fleet is not in some kind of miracle weapon, but in the interconnected use of its branches of forces to achieve a realistically set goal.

It's impossible to answer. Its life cycle began and ended in the interwar period. At the same time, it is necessary to ask this question for one simple reason - so as not to repeat the epics of the 705th project. Without losing the semantic load, but moving away from the term surrogate (suddenly someone will be offended), the question can be put differently. But is the military equipment, the construction of which takes two decades, in conditions when the change of generations of IT occurs every three to five years, is a full-fledged military equipment? The answer is for the reader.

Today, the revival in matters of attitude to the fleet is obvious. A mass of different movements in support of the fleet has appeared, usually led by former political workers, the media is filled with reports of new naval weapons. What should the fleet be like?

The old conventional wisdom that outdated military theories are worse than outdated weapons now, at this crossroads, is again relevant. Will the lessons of building the ocean fleet of the USSR be taken into account, and, if so, which ones? Will they take into account the obvious tactics of the actions of NATO fleets against the "shore" that have become typical in recent decades?

A few words about the lessons of the Soviet Navy.

First of all, as already noted, it is necessary to adopt a legislative framework for the fleet that excludes incompetent decisions at the state level.

The personnel policy of the fleet needs to be reviewed and updated. It should be understood that in this direction there is a huge potential for the combat readiness of the fleet. Changing the personnel approach will require a change in naval education and the status of seafarers.

The high accident rate of the fleet in Soviet times was simply talked about. The fight against accidents was an imitation, and its forms sometimes took on an anecdotal character. For example, a line from the socialist duties of any sailor sounded like this: not to have accidents and breakdowns of the material part of the department through their own fault.

Accidents were never taken seriously. Back in the 1980s, the term "social" sounded dissident, but the roots of accidents are social and it doesn't matter at what level - design, command or operational - conditions will be created that will result in an accident or catastrophe.

The accident rate is a product of the activity (inactivity) of people. It is inherent not only in the fleet, but also in other high-tech industries - energy, aviation, etc. Accidents are international. Fighting it is one of the main areas of operation of engineering systems.

Thousands of scientists - candidates and doctors of sciences - worked in various research institutes, schools and instances of the fleet. If you try to find at least one dissertation on accidents, you will be disappointed - you will not find it. Why?

A serious analysis of the causes of accidents inevitably led to the defects of the system, that is, to the zone of ideological taboo. The lack of a scientific approach to studying the phenomenon of accidents led to the replication of emergency situations in the Soviet fleet.

It is impossible to ignore the behavioral motivation of the personnel of the submarines and the headquarters of the formations. Its essence is infinitely simple - to hide the fact of an accident (accident, breakdown), and if this is not possible, then in the report to reduce the negative consequences. This wave was followed by the General Staff of the Navy and optimistic reports of commanders of emergency submarines, clearly inconsistent with the current situation. Rare information on any accident corresponded to the real course of events. At best, it was a half-truth.

The ongoing recovery of state institutions, the emergence of financial resources for the country's defense institutions again raises the question: what should the fleet be like?

In fact, we are talking about a shipbuilding program. There have been several in our history. Particularly memorable post-Tsushima and Soviet.

Any shipbuilding program is always very costly and long-term. It should take into account geopolitical forecasts, the current state of the fleet, the level and forecasts of the development of science and the economy, and a host of other factors. In the current situation, under these other factors, we, first of all, must understand the fact that our fleet has not taken part in hostilities for a long time, or rather 70 years. In this lies the danger of influencing the formation of the program of the Soviet admiral corps, brought up in peacetime on the idea of ​​an "ocean" fleet of the USSR. The situation, in our opinion, is aggravated by an inadequate understanding of the nature of the fleet as one of the national defense institutions at many levels of government. The combination of these factors, multiplied by the appetites of the military-industrial complex, will give such a synergistic effect that we will lose both the fleet and the treasury. The call has already sounded: after France's refusal to hand over the Mistral, the media are filled with reports about the design of a nuclear aircraft carrier for the Navy. The military-industrial complex launched a marketing attack. The authors of the idea are far from understanding what must be done in order for an aircraft carrier strike group based on this aircraft carrier to be ready to solve any military tasks. Significant investments will be required in the space, aviation and ground segments to ensure its activities. The ship composition of the defense zones of an aircraft carrier must be equipped with nuclear power, in order to have a single tactical property, otherwise high-speed tankers must be introduced into the group. Ensuring air defense and missile defense will require the creation of deck-based AWACS systems and so on ...

The question arises, do we need aircraft carriers? Are we going to take back Alaska? Defend colonial territories? Have you resolved a set of issues of guaranteed security of the patrol areas of nuclear submarines armed with ballistic missiles? Have you built positional systems in the torrential zones of our inland seas that exclude the actions of a potential enemy there? Do we want to disrupt enemy shipping in the Atlantic?

Do we have the potential of the USSR economy and bring the number of aircraft carrier strike groups up to American figures?

The author does not know how the shipbuilding program of the renaissance of the Russian fleet is formed, but he understands well that in the absence of a maritime mentality at the top of government, the low authority of the Navy command, the extremely high activity and adventurism of the military-industrial complex, the shipbuilding program, to put it mildly, may turn out to be not the same as which the country needs.

It is desirable that the developers of the program take into account several circumstances:

1. It is necessary to develop and establish, in accordance with the established procedure, a set of legislative measures to protect the Navy from incompetent decisions of any level;

2. The oceanic zone has been inhabited by a potential enemy for a long time and very soundly. To try to compete with him is to engage in another imitation;

3. The need for a constant build-up of the naval strategic nuclear forces of the Navy. Ensuring the complete inaccessibility of patrol areas by the enemy;

4. The fleet is not only the composition of the ship, aviation, BRAV and MP. These are also positional bottom systems of an active-passive type;

5. Establishment of the defense zone of the state territory in the sea (ocean) and its continuous increase as the stages of the program are implemented;

6. Organization of a ship-based missile defense (air defense) system in missile-hazardous directions. Its integration into the missile defense (air defense) system of the Ministry of Defense;

7. Restructuring of the personnel policy of the Navy.

Retired Captain 1st Rank
S.V. Topchiev
Sevastopol

The idea of ​​​​building a submarine - an interceptor for aircraft carrier strike formations was expressed in the late fifties. The proposed boat - a destroyer of aircraft carriers and submarine missile carriers, was supposed to have unique maneuverability and underwater speed, capable of appearing in specified areas before operational data on the location of the enemy became obsolete.

According to the plan, the submarine, having an underwater speed exceeding 40 knots, with the timely detection of an enemy torpedo attack, had to move away from the torpedoes, having previously fired a salvo from its torpedo tubes.

The small displacement of the boat, combined with a powerful power plant, should have provided a quick set of speed and high maneuverability. The nuclear submarine was supposed to move away from the berthing wall in a matter of minutes on its own, quickly turn around in the water area and leave the base to solve a combat mission, and after returning “home”, moor independently.

The development of the project, which received the code 705 (according to NATO classification - "Alfa"), was started by a group in SKB-193 (later called "Malachite") under the leadership of chief designer A.B. Petrov. The overall management of the program was entrusted to Academician A.P. Alexandrova.

The creation of the nuclear submarine of project 705 became, according to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU D.F. Ustinov, who oversaw the defense industry, "a national task." Powerful scientific forces, in particular, academicians V.A. Trapeznikova and A.G. Iosifyan.

To provide the given tactical data, the submarine must have a displacement of about 1500 tons, and a powerful and maneuverable power plant.

These conflicting requirements were met by a nuclear power plant based on epithermal neutrons with a liquid metal coolant. An experimental nuclear submarine of project 645 K-27 was built to test a nuclear power plant with an LMT, which went into operation on April 1, 1962.

In autonomous navigation from April 21 to June 12, 1964 in the waters of the Central Atlantic, she broke records for the range of an autonomous trip, the duration of scuba diving. True, later, after the start of construction of a series of submarines of the 705 project, an accident occurred on the K-27 with a power plant with exposure to the entire crew and the death of 8 people. There was hope, using the experience gained, to finalize the design.

The second innovation, designed to provide the specified tactical properties of the submarine 705 of the project, was the use of titanium alloys in the design of a durable and lightweight boat hull. . Due to its much greater strength, titanium made it possible to reduce the thickness of the hull sheets and, accordingly, the mass of the nuclear submarine.

To work out this innovation, an experimental nuclear submarine of project 661 K-162 was built. The creation of submarines from titanium is a complex technical task. Titanium is a capricious material and at high temperatures, absorbing hydrogen from the air, it becomes brittle. Welding of structures is carried out in an argon environment with tungsten electrodes doped with rare earth elements.

These technical difficulties caused a significant delay in the implementation of the project. By 1963 it became clear that the design was underdeveloped, which caused a change in the chief designer. M.G. Rusanov became the new chief designer.

He redesigned the boat, the displacement of which increased to 2300 tons, the number of compartments was increased from the original three to six.
The creation of strong and lightweight titanium hulls made it possible to reduce the mass of the structure, and, consequently, the size of the wetted surface, on which the speed of the submarine depends.

The same goal, to reduce the mass of the submarine, served another innovation, the use of 400 Hz AC in the main power network.

Thanks to all these innovations, it was possible to create a high-speed nuclear submarine with a surface displacement of 2300 tons, a length of 81.4 meters, a width of 9.5 meters, and a draft of 7.6 meters.

Boats 705 of the project were equipped with a nuclear plant of the OKA-550 (or BM-40A) type with one reactor with a liquid-metal coolant, with a thermal power of 155 MW, which ensured, even with a displacement increased to 2300 tons, a speed of more than 40 knots.

An integral part of the nuclear plant was the OK-7 steam turbine plant, in which the specific indicators of domestic PTUs were improved by 2-3 times. According to comparable characteristics, OK-7 surpassed all foreign counterparts.

The source of thermal energy was a nuclear reactor, with a coolant in the primary circuit - a eutectic alloy of lead and bismuth. The main advantages of the boat reactor are:

High maneuverability, significantly exceeding the indicated indicators for pressurized water reactors;

The low pressure of the working medium in the primary circuit and the heat-technical properties of the coolant increase the thermodynamic reliability of the reactor plant and make it impossible for the "thermal" explosion of the reactor in emergency situations;

Greater environmental safety in case of an accident, due to the natural freezing of the coolant.

Since it was impossible to accommodate a large crew in the limited volume of the submarine, another innovation was applied - the integrated automation of all technical means serviced by a crew of 20 people. 19 officers and one midshipman.

As an example of the staffing table, I cite the composition, dear to me, of the second crew of the nuclear submarine K-64, with a warm feeling, remembering my colleagues.

1. Commander, Captain 2nd Rank Valery Viktorovich Starkov. Regular category captain 1st rank. He graduated from the service as a senior researcher at the Research Institute, candidate of technical sciences, captain 1st rank

2. Senior assistant, captain 2nd rank Bokov Nikolai Grigorievich. Regular category captain 1st rank. He graduated from military service as a senior researcher at the Research Institute, captain of the 1st rank.

3. Assistant in arms, captain-lieutenant Shcherbakov Vyacheslav Nikolaevich. Regular category captain 3rd rank. He graduated from military service as the head of the department of the Naval Academy, doctor of naval sciences, professor, rear admiral.

4. Assistant for navigational weapons, captain-lieutenant Tyugin Felix Alexandrovich. Regular category captain 3rd rank. He graduated from military service as the commander of the 595th technical crew of the 705th project.

5. Assistant for electronic weapons, captain-lieutenant Pashuk Nikolai Grigorievich. Regular category captain 3rd rank. He graduated from military service as chief of staff of the 10th missile site, captain of the 1st rank.

6. Senior engineer for radio electronics, captain-lieutenant Korovkin German Sergeevich. Regular category captain 3rd rank. He graduated from military service as a senior lecturer at the Navy training center, captain of the 2nd rank.

7. Senior Radio Communications Engineer Lieutenant Laptev Vadim Fedorovich. Regular category captain 3rd rank. He graduated from military service as a deputy head of a department of a scientific research institute, a candidate of technical sciences, an associate professor, a captain of the 1st rank.

8. Hydroacoustics engineer, Lieutenant Sazhnev Nikolai Grigorievich. Staff category lieutenant commander. He finished military service as a technical crew commander, captain of the 2nd rank.

9. Computer engineer, Lieutenant Dobrovolsky Valery Alekseevich. Staff category lieutenant commander. He graduated from military service as an assistant to the flagship specialist of the flotilla, captain of the 2nd rank.

10. Commander BCH-5 Captain 3rd rank Ovchinnikov Vsevolod Leonidovich. Regular category captain 2nd rank. He graduated from military service as the head of the department, doctor of technical sciences, professor, captain of the 1st rank.

11. Senior engineer of the power plant, captain-lieutenant Zaitsev Pavel Nikitovich. Regular category captain 3rd rank. He graduated from military service as a senior lecturer at the Higher School of Education, captain of the 1st rank, associate professor.

12. Senior Engineer of the EES, Captain-Lieutenant Andrey Prokofievich Vizhunov. Regular category captain 3rd rank. He graduated from military service as a senior researcher at the Research Institute, captain of the 2nd rank.

13. Senior engineer OKS, lieutenant commander Sidorenkov Gennady Ivanovich. Regular category captain 3rd rank. He graduated from military service as a senior lecturer at the Navy training center, captain of the 2nd rank.

14. Engineer for automation of the power plant, lieutenant Lobanov Alexander Ivanovich. Staff category lieutenant commander. He graduated from military service as the head of the department of the Higher Medical School, candidate of technical sciences, associate professor, captain of the 1st rank.

15. Engineer for automation of electrical equipment, lieutenant Bakharev Yuri Ivanovich. Staff category lieutenant commander. He graduated from military service as the head of the department of the Higher Medical School, candidate of technical sciences, associate professor, captain of the 1st rank.

16. Electrical engineer, lieutenant Kirichenko Vladimir Pavlovich. Staff category lieutenant commander. He graduated from military service as a senior researcher at the Research Institute, captain of the 2nd rank.

17. Engineer for traffic control automation, lieutenant Komarov Vladimir Ivanovich. Staff category lieutenant commander. In this rank, he was commissioned due to illness.

18. OKS automation engineer, Lieutenant Khoptenko Viktor Fedorovich. Staff category lieutenant commander. He graduated from military service as a senior officer of the GUK, senior researcher, captain of the 1st rank.

19. Head of the medical service, captain of the medical service Vasilenko Vyacheslav Feodosevich. He graduated from military service as a senior researcher at the Military Medical Academy, lieutenant colonel of the medical service.

20. Kok, midshipman Popivnenko Vasily Andreevich. Established category senior midshipman. In this rank, he was transferred to the reserve.

All combat posts - control panels for various systems, are designed in the central post, in the third habitable compartment, which is a refuge compartment, the spherical bulkheads of which were calculated for the maximum submarine immersion depth, 400 meters.

Monitoring the state of uninhabited compartments was supposed to be done with the help of television cameras. For the purpose of saving all personnel, in the event of a submarine sinking at a depth of less than 400 meters, a pop-up cabin was intended.

For the first time on the nuclear submarine of the 705 project, pneumohydraulic torpedo tubes with deep firing, and an automatic quick-loading system were used.

In addition to the two floating crews provided for on all Project 705 submarines, one technical crew was created to service and maintain a group of submarines while they are at their home base.

It was proposed that in the base the boat be under the responsibility and constant supervision of the maintenance teams of the technical crew. One floating crew would be nearby in constant readiness to go to sea, and the second floating crew would undergo inter-trip training at a training center or be on vacation.

After going on combat duty, and returning from the campaign of the first crew, the boat would again pass under the supervision of the technical crew. Now, the second crew would be in constant readiness to enter the sea, and the first would go for inter-campaign training and vacation. There should have been two such cycles per year.

On June 2, 1968, the K-64 nuclear submarine was laid down on the slipway of the Novo-Admiralteysky Shipbuilding Plant. By this time, both floating crews of K-64 had arrived in Leningrad in the 39th brigade of newly built ships, who had completed the training course, in order to further study the technology and participate in the maintenance of the submarine under construction

On April 22, 1969, the birthday of V.I. Lenin, the first submarine 705 of the K-64 project was launched from the slipway of the Novo-Admiralteysky plant. From the very one from which the cruiser Aurora was launched in May 1900.

Despite the secrecy and the cordon of the Neva bank from the side of the Mining Institute, the descent of the submarine was met by a crowd of onlookers, and "enemy voices" informed the world about the descent of a fundamentally new nuclear submarine, christening it the "Blue Whale".

In 1970, a physical launch of a nuclear reactor took place at the K-64 nuclear submarine. And in October of the same year, the experimental K-64 was transferred to the dock along the White Sea-Baltic Canal to Severodvinsk to complete the tests. Both crews of the K-64 nuclear submarine left for Severodvinsk and became part of the 339th brigade of the submarines under construction.

On November 13, 1970, the nuclear submarine K-64, under the command of the commander of the first crew, Captain 1st Rank Alexander Sergeevich Pushkin, went to sea for the first time under its own power to demagnetize and measure the total magnetic field of the boat.

On July 4, 1971, during testing, due to the failure of an abnormal plug on the superheated steam pipeline, high-pressure steam entered the reactor compartment. The accident was successfully eliminated without damage to the crew and builders of the nuclear submarine.

In November 1971, during the mooring trials, a serious accident occurred, one of the three loops of the primary circuit failed.
It was decided to continue the test on the two remaining loops.

On November 23, 1971, the K-64 nuclear submarine entered factory sea trials. During sea trials, the submarine, within 29 days of navigation, covered 3481 miles (1513 - submerged), made 21 dives.

On December 5, 1971, state trials began on the ship.
On December 24, 1971, after the next exit to the sea, the K-64 nuclear submarine, without returning to Severodvinsk, moved to its permanent base in Zapadnaya Litsa.

December 31, 1971 the boat entered service, and was enlisted in the Third Division of the First KSF Flotilla, based in Zapadnaya Litsa, for the purpose of trial operation.

January 23, 1972 1 crew passed the first course task.
However, in February 1972, during the initial period of trial operation, the second loop of the primary circuit failed. Due to the failure of two NR heat exchange loops, in February 1972, the K-64 nuclear submarine was put into reserve, and the construction of serial Project 705 submarines was suspended until the causes of the accident were clarified.

Attempts to eliminate the aria and restore the ship's combat capability continued. All this time, the reactor was operating at a minimum controlled power to prevent freezing of the alloy. With the implementation of heat transfer through the remaining loop.

In April 1972, while preparing to go to sea for the delivery of task No. 2, an accident occurred in the power plant - the coolant alloy froze in the primary circuit. The reactor was shut down.

June 3, 1972 went under diesel for docking at SRZ-10 in Polyarny.
After docking, K-64 was towed from Polyarny to Severodvinsk.
There, at the Zvyozdochka shipyard, the nuclear submarine stood for more than a year, waiting for a decision on its fate.

Finally, on August 19, 1973, the emergency boat was withdrawn from the Navy. After separation at the Zvezdochka shipyard, the bow, sent by the dock to Leningrad, and turned into a simulator there, the aft compartments were laid up in Severodvinsk. And the sailors joked bitterly: "The K-64 nuclear submarine is the longest boat in the world, the bow is in Leningrad, and the stern is in Severodvinsk."

So, without fanfare, the fate of the K-64 nuclear submarine, the first boat of the 705 project, ended.
But the experience of building and short-term operation of the K-64 helped to bring the subsequent boats of this project to the required standards.

In addition to the K-64, six more nuclear submarines were built, which, despite their novelty and unusualness, proved to be combat-ready ships, quite reliable in operation.

During the entire period of operation, the ships were in service in constant readiness for combat use, participating in almost all exercises and maneuvers of the Navy, in the Atlantic and under the ice of the Arctic Ocean, while demonstrating their high efficiency. Thanks to this, in 1983, the Project 705 nuclear submarine connection became the best connection in the Navy.

The formation's submarines demonstrated a high readiness to go to sea, due to the ability to introduce a power plant in one hour, which made it possible to carry out a quick dispersal and ensure the successful withdrawal of the ship from under attack in the base.

High underwater speed, (Project 705 nuclear submarine was listed in the Guinness Book of Records as the fastest submarine in the world)
made it possible to quickly arrive in areas of combat mission.

High maneuverability, and the ability to gain maximum speed in one minute, made it possible to get away from anti-submarine torpedoes, and facilitated long-term tracking of foreign submarines. This was also facilitated by the small reflective surface of the ship, providing a significant reduction in the reflected hydroacoustic signal, as well as a non-magnetic hull.

Submarines of the division repeatedly established long-term covert contacts with nuclear submarines of a potential enemy.
In the process of tracking, the ideal contours of the hull and the design of the rudders provided the submarine 705 of the project with the ability to turn around at high speed and with a minimum radius. In a duel situation, this did not give the enemy the opportunity to enter from the stern and attack from the shadow zone.

The division's submarines practiced effective maneuvers to evade fired enemy torpedoes followed by a counterattack. At the same time, at the maximum speed, the boat circulated 180 ° and after 42 seconds moved in the opposite direction.

The combat information and control system "Akkord" showed itself well in operation, dramatically increasing the speed of solving combat missions. For the first time, she processed information from the navigation complex and periscopes, from the hydroacoustic complex and radar stations.

The Akkord CICS, which preceded the creation of integrated combat control systems for a submarine, determined the elements of the movement of three targets and the bearing for additional targets with an indication on the commander's console, developed recommendations for the use of weapons, and automatically entered data into torpedoes and missiles.

She also solved navigation problems, developed recommendations for combat maneuvering of a single submarine and for managing a group of submarines, and ensured the implementation of combat training at sea and in the base.

The appearance of the Project 705 boats became a real sensation, as the combination of high speed comparable to the speed of anti-submarine torpedoes, deep diving and high maneuverability forced our potential adversaries to create a new generation of anti-submarine weapons.

American authors Norman Polmer and K. Gee Moore in the book "The Cold War of Submarines" (Bhazzey8 Jnc Washhington D/C, 2004) testify:
"Project Alfa is the most outstanding submarine of the 20th century. The appearance of Project Alfa caused a shock in the naval circles of the West. We have upgraded our Mk48 torpedoes in order to increase the speed and depth of immersion to values ​​exceeding those achieved on these exceptional submarines"
It should also be noted that the integrated automation of ship, weapon and power plant control processes adopted in the project was efficient and reliable. The actual service life of the OKS and GEM automation on all ships was exceeded by more than 2 times.
It is very important that during all the years of operation of the Project 705 nuclear submarine not a single person was lost.
At the same time, due to the poor readiness of the coastal support infrastructure, the mechanisms of the main power plant and general ship systems were forced to work 24 hours a day both at sea and at the base. This led to their rapid wear and the need for the constant presence of the crew on board the boat.
These factors, aggravated by the complexity of repairs in a collapsing economy, and, most importantly, the political decisions of "perestroika" led to the fact that, in the 1990s, these unique ships were decommissioned, although they could still serve for the good of the Motherland.
It is sincerely unfortunate that all these factors actually killed the true "Russian underwater miracle". After all, complex automation and other innovations of the project, by and large, have fully justified themselves, and nuclear power plants with LMC have confirmed their performance, having accumulated about 70 reactor-years during the entire operation of the 705 project.

To date, lead-bismuth technology at the industrial level has been mastered only in our country. In recent years, new Russian developments based on an alloy of bismuth and lead have been used as promising coolants for a fast neutron reactor. In particular, in SVBR-100 - a power reactor with an electric power of 100 MW

The military leadership of Russia will consider the possibility of building nuclear-powered robotic submarines with a sharply reduced crew size by automating ship systems. This was reported on February 24 by Lenta.ru, citing a source in the defense industry.

He recalled that such submarines - nuclear torpedo submarines of project 705 (later 705K) "Lira" - had previously been built in the USSR, and new technologies would make it possible to create their more reliable counterparts. According to the specialist, the Soviet submarines of this project were not very successful precisely because of the difficult maintenance, which led to long breaks between campaigns.

According to the media interlocutor, it seems more rational to create a robotic submarine of the usual displacement for this class based on proven technical solutions with increasing automation.

- The crew of such a submarine can be reduced to 50-55, and later to 30-40 people.

Many experts in the field of the Navy believe that the nuclear submarines of Project 705 were far ahead of their time, therefore they were difficult to operate. As a result, in the 1990s, the boats were withdrawn from the fleet, and in the second half of the 2000s they were disposed of. The project submarine was conceived as an "underwater fighter-interceptor". With an underwater speed exceeding 40 knots, she was able to reach a given point in an extremely short time to attack an enemy underwater or surface object. With the timely detection of an attack, the submarine could get away from the torpedoes, having previously fired a volley from its torpedo tubes.

As historians, called “Alphas” in the West, note, these submarines could hang on the tail of NATO submarines for hours, not allowing them to break away or counterattack, due to their advantage in maneuverability and speed. The unique characteristics of the 705 nuclear submarine of the project were noted in the Guinness Book of Records: high speed and maneuverability allowed her to make a 180-degree turn at full speed, which took only 42 seconds.

Model of the submarine project 705 "Lira" (Photo: Dmitry Kopylov / TASS)

The boat had only one habitable compartment, and right above it - for the first time in the world - an emergency pop-up camera, which ensured the salvation of the entire crew from depth up to the limit, even with a significant roll. The introduction of Project 705 (705K) boats into the fleet was an unpleasant surprise for the United States. Here is how the American magazine Defense Electronics wrote in 1984:

- The appearance of the Soviet Alfa-class submarine in the late 70s caught the US Navy by surprise. The new anti-submarine submarine created a difficult position for the American strategic forces - missile boats. The Alpha was also deep enough and fast enough to avoid American torpedoes. Even the detection of a new boat seems difficult, since its hull is made of titanium, which, due to its non-magnetic nature, is invulnerable to magnetometric detection tools. In addition, it is protected by about a six-inch coating that absorbs sounds, making the submarine less detectable by acoustic means. Its ability to dive deeper than other boats also allows it to take advantage of temperature and other ocean variations to maintain stealth, which reduces the effectiveness of many U.S. sonar systems. "Alpha" is a truly secretive boat.

But is it possible today to create a submarine similar to the Soviet Lirams? And does the modern Navy need it?

Former Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Chief of the Main Staff of the Navy in 1998-2005, Admiral Viktor Kravchenko, says that today there are no technical obstacles to the creation of submarines with a small crew, especially since there is experience in operating seven small high-speed anti-submarine PLAT projects 705 and 705K (four plus three).

- Another thing is that an enemy object pursued by such a submarine will counteract, as a result of which its automated devices can be disabled ...

In general, if we recall the history of the 705 project, at first, due to integrated automation, it was planned to radically reduce the PLAT crew to 16 people, but at the request of the Navy leadership, the composition was increased to 29 officers and midshipmen (later - up to 31 people, of which the cook's assistant was the only sailor - "SP"). Of course, it is fashionable to make robots now, one way or another, this direction is the future, however, in such a technically complex object as a submarine, a person will be indispensable for a long time to come.

Head of the Defense Expert Council of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, captain 1st rank of the reserve Boris Usvyatsov notes: on the Lira boats, a truly revolutionary integrated automated control system, the Akkord CICS, was introduced for that time.

- It made it possible to concentrate control of the entire boat at the central post, provided control, collection, processing and integration of information from submarine systems (sonar system, torpedo tubes, navigation equipment), as well as the use of weapons.

It is clear that the development of automation systems did not stand still, and in the 21st century there are already completely new requirements for the “stuffing”. For example, Yasen-class multi-purpose cruise-missile nuclear submarines (SSGNs), which are causing concern in the West, are highly automated ships. Their CIUS "Okrug" carries out real-time control of all combat systems, information about the state of the ship and from surveillance equipment, and target designation. But the operation of the most complex automated systems dictates its own requirements for the crew: in theory, the teams of such SSGNs can consist of 64 people, but in practice they reach 93 people - officers and midshipmen. The more complex the equipment, the more qualitative approach should be to its operation.

Thus, equipping submarines with automated systems leads to an increase in the number of crew. And this is despite the fact that automated complexes to the maximum exclude the notorious "human factor" - no one is safe from diseases in the "autonomy", especially in scuba diving conditions.

“Automation of naval equipment in the direction of reducing the number of crews has long been a trend for the leading fleets in the world,” notes independent expert in the field of Naval Forces Prokhor Tebin. - First of all, this is due to the fact that despite the multibillion-dollar cost of the submarine, a significant part of the costs is associated with the crew. On the other hand, the small size of the team is reflected in the struggle for the survivability of the submarine - in the event of a collision or any accident. That is, if, for example, 10 people are eliminated, a large crew can eliminate a hole or fire and operate the ship at the same time.

For example, the automation factor was one of the Americans' arguments in favor of reducing the number of surface ships under construction in the coastal zone (Littoral Combat Ship) - from 52 to 40. They were built with a large share of automation, but during their operation it turned out that the existing crew is simply not in forces to cope with all duties, and it is impossible to increase its number, since there is not enough space on the ships.

Is there money?

Finally, there are other issues related to robotic submarines. Firstly, do the production capacities of the Russian Federation allow us to take on a series of such ships? After all, now we have only one Sevmash in Severodvinsk, which builds both multipurpose and strategic submarines. Naturally, its possibilities are limited. And the fleet needs to solve problems at sea, maintain a certain number of submarines on combat duty.

Secondly, does the Ministry of Defense, and indeed the country, have funds for this kind of submarines? Recall that in the winter of 2014-15 in Severodvinsk at the Zvyozdochka plant, the modernization of two titanium nuclear submarines of Project 945 Barracuda, the B-239 Karp and B-276 Kostroma, was stopped. The reason was the reduction of budget expenditures in connection with the financial crisis and the excessively high, according to the military, the cost of the project. Also at the end of January 2016, it became known that the fleet command decided to complete the construction of two boats of the 677 Lada project and stop the series at this point, directing funding to the new Kalina project, which will develop only after 2020.

Help "SP"

The length of the project 705 (705K) boat is 81.4 m.

The greatest width is 10 m.

Full displacement 3100 tons.

The maximum diving depth is 400 m.

Autonomy - 50 days.

Submerged speed - about 40 knots (at least 1 boat developed 42 knots during trials), surface speed - 14 knots.

The main armament of submarines of projects 705 and 705K is six bow 533-mm torpedo tubes with a quick-loading system.

Ammunition: 18 torpedoes or 36 mines, as well as anti-ship missiles "Vyuga" fired through the TA.

Nuclear submarine Project 705 "Lira" (Photo: mil.ru)

The military leadership of Russia will consider the possibility of building nuclear-powered robotic submarines with a sharply reduced crew size by automating ship systems. This was reported on February 24 by Lenta.ru, citing a source in the defense industry.

He recalled that such submarines - nuclear torpedo submarines of project 705 (later 705K) "Lira" - had previously been built in the USSR, and new technologies would make it possible to create their more reliable counterparts. According to the specialist, the Soviet submarines of this project were not very successful precisely because of the difficult maintenance, which led to long breaks between campaigns.

According to the media interlocutor, it seems more rational to create a robotic submarine of the usual displacement for this class based on proven technical solutions with increasing automation.

- The crew of such a submarine can be reduced to 50-55, and later to 30-40 people.

Many experts in the field of the Navy believe that the nuclear submarines of Project 705 were far ahead of their time, therefore they were difficult to operate. As a result, in the 1990s, the boats were withdrawn from the fleet, and in the second half of the 2000s they were disposed of. The project submarine was conceived as an "underwater fighter-interceptor". With an underwater speed exceeding 40 knots, she was able to reach a given point in an extremely short time to attack an enemy underwater or surface object. With the timely detection of an attack, the submarine could get away from the torpedoes, having previously fired a volley from its torpedo tubes.

As historians, called “Alphas” in the West, note, these submarines could hang on the tail of NATO submarines for hours, not allowing them to break away or counterattack, due to their advantage in maneuverability and speed. The unique characteristics of the 705 nuclear submarine of the project were noted in the Guinness Book of Records: high speed and maneuverability allowed her to make a 180-degree turn at full speed, which took only 42 seconds.

Model of the submarine project 705 "Lira" (Photo: Dmitry Kopylov / TASS)

The boat had only one habitable compartment, and right above it - for the first time in the world - an emergency pop-up camera, which ensured the salvation of the entire crew from depth up to the limit, even with a significant roll. The introduction of Project 705 (705K) boats into the fleet was an unpleasant surprise for the United States. Here is how the American magazine Defense Electronics wrote in 1984:

- The appearance of the Soviet Alfa-class submarine in the late 70s caught the US Navy by surprise. The new anti-submarine submarine created a difficult position for the American strategic forces - missile boats. The Alpha was also deep enough and fast enough to avoid American torpedoes. Even the detection of a new boat seems difficult, since its hull is made of titanium, which, due to its non-magnetic nature, is invulnerable to magnetometric detection tools. In addition, it is protected by about a six-inch coating that absorbs sounds, making the submarine less detectable by acoustic means. Its ability to dive deeper than other boats also allows it to take advantage of temperature and other ocean variations to maintain stealth, which reduces the effectiveness of many U.S. sonar systems. "Alpha" is a truly secretive boat.

But is it possible today to create a submarine similar to the Soviet Lirams? And does the modern Navy need it?

Former Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Chief of the Main Staff of the Navy in 1998-2005, Admiral Viktor Kravchenko, says that today there are no technical obstacles to the creation of submarines with a small crew, especially since there is experience in operating seven small high-speed anti-submarine PLAT projects 705 and 705K (four plus three).

- Another thing is that an enemy object pursued by such a submarine will counteract, as a result of which its automated devices can be disabled ...

In general, if we recall the history of the 705 project, at first, due to integrated automation, it was planned to radically reduce the PLAT crew to 16 people, but at the request of the Navy leadership, the composition was increased to 29 officers and midshipmen (later - up to 31 people, of which the cook's assistant was the only sailor - "SP"). Of course, it is fashionable to make robots now, one way or another, this direction is the future, however, in such a technically complex object as a submarine, a person will be indispensable for a long time to come.

Head of the Defense Expert Council of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, captain 1st rank of the reserve Boris Usvyatsov notes: on the Lira boats, a truly revolutionary integrated automated control system, the Akkord CICS, was introduced for that time.

- It made it possible to concentrate control of the entire boat at the central post, provided control, collection, processing and integration of information from submarine systems (sonar system, torpedo tubes, navigation equipment), as well as the use of weapons.

It is clear that the development of automation systems did not stand still, and in the 21st century there are already completely new requirements for the “stuffing”. For example, Yasen-class multi-purpose cruise-missile nuclear submarines (SSGNs), which are causing concern in the West, are highly automated ships. Their CIUS "Okrug" carries out real-time control of all combat systems, information about the state of the ship and from surveillance equipment, and target designation. But the operation of the most complex automated systems dictates its own requirements for the crew: in theory, the teams of such SSGNs can consist of 64 people, but in practice they reach 93 people - officers and midshipmen. The more complex the equipment, the more qualitative approach should be to its operation.

Thus, equipping submarines with automated systems leads to an increase in the number of crew. And this is despite the fact that automated complexes to the maximum exclude the notorious "human factor" - no one is safe from diseases in the "autonomy", especially in scuba diving conditions.

“Automation of naval equipment in the direction of reducing the number of crews has long been a trend for the leading fleets in the world,” notes independent expert in the field of Naval Forces Prokhor Tebin. - First of all, this is due to the fact that despite the multibillion-dollar cost of the submarine, a significant part of the costs is associated with the crew. On the other hand, the small size of the team is reflected in the struggle for the survivability of the submarine - in the event of a collision or any accident. That is, if, for example, 10 people are eliminated, a large crew can eliminate a hole or fire and operate the ship at the same time.

For example, the automation factor was one of the Americans' arguments in favor of reducing the number of surface ships under construction in the coastal zone (Littoral Combat Ship) - from 52 to 40. They were built with a large share of automation, but during their operation it turned out that the existing crew is simply not in forces to cope with all duties, and it is impossible to increase its number, since there is not enough space on the ships.

Is there money?

Finally, there are other issues related to robotic submarines. Firstly, do the production capacities of the Russian Federation allow us to take on a series of such ships? After all, now we have only one Sevmash in Severodvinsk, which builds both multipurpose and strategic submarines. Naturally, its possibilities are limited. And the fleet needs to solve problems at sea, maintain a certain number of submarines on combat duty.

Secondly, does the Ministry of Defense, and indeed the country, have funds for this kind of submarines? Recall that in the winter of 2014-15 in Severodvinsk at the Zvyozdochka plant, the modernization of two titanium nuclear submarines of Project 945 Barracuda, the B-239 Karp and B-276 Kostroma, was stopped. The reason was the reduction of budget expenditures in connection with the financial crisis and the excessively high, according to the military, the cost of the project. Also at the end of January 2016, it became known that the fleet command decided to complete the construction of two boats of the 677 Lada project and stop the series at this point, directing funding to the new Kalina project, which will develop only after 2020.

Help "SP"

The length of the project 705 (705K) boat is 81.4 m.

The greatest width is 10 m.

Full displacement 3100 tons.

The maximum diving depth is 400 m.

Autonomy - 50 days.

Submerged speed - about 40 knots (at least 1 boat developed 42 knots during trials), surface speed - 14 knots.

The main armament of submarines of projects 705 and 705K is six bow 533-mm torpedo tubes with a quick-loading system.

Ammunition: 18 torpedoes or 36 mines, as well as anti-ship missiles "Vyuga" fired through the TA.